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Powers for Dispositionalism: A Metaphysical Ground for New Actualism 
Abstract 
In this dissertation, I develop a metaphysics of  powers to ground Dispositionalism, the 
theory of  the source of  modality according to which all alethic modal truths are grounded 
in dispositional properties instantiated in the actual world. I consider a number of  key 
theses that powers metaphysics display, and investigate which can be incorporated in the 
metaphysical base of  Dispositionalism, and how.  
 In the first part I examine the interaction of  two core principles of  powers 
ontologies: Directedness, the thesis that powers ‘point at’ their manifestations, and 
Independence, the thesis that powers can fail to manifest. These two principles are in 
tension: there is an argument, known as Too Much Possibility, to the effect that they are 
inconsistent.  I examine various strategies to resist the argument. These involve Physical 
Intentionality, numerical identity between power and manifestation, process ontologies, and 
platonic universals. I conclude that they are all unsatisfactory.  
 In the second part, I develop a ‘minimal metaphysics of  powers’ that is immune 
from the threat of  Too Much Possibility.  This involves considering unmanifested 
manifestations to be akin to (a suitably re-vamped version of) Mere Logical Existents. I 
argue that the best way to avoid the tension at the heart of  powers ontologies is to conceive 
of  unmanifested manifestations as non-essentially non-spatiotemporally located entities. I 
then consider some consequences of  minimal metaphysics: I examine which ontological 
category the manifestations of  power can belong to, and what are the prospects of  
grounding metaphysical, as opposed to natural, modality.  
 Finally, in the third part, I investigate whether further key theses of  powers 
ontologies can be incorporated into the minimal metaphysics. This leads to discuss the 
relationship of  the minimal metaphysics with grounding and dependency relations, the 
metaphysics of  time, the truthmaking principle, and tendential theories of  powers.  
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0. Introduction   
The world could have been different than it is: Napoleon could have won at Waterloo, 
Flaubert could have never written the Sentimental Education, and I could have picked 
different examples of  modal sentences. Some other things, on the other hand, must be the 
way they are: two plus two necessarily equals four, and everything must be identical to itself  
and nothing else. Some cases are less clear cut: it is unclear whether massive objects must be 
attracted to each other by gravitational force or they could have been repelling each other, 
or whether Socrates might have failed to have Phaenarete and Sophroniscus as parents. 
These are not specially selected facts. Modality is pervasive.  All truths (and falsities) have a 1
determinate modal force: they are all either possible, impossible, necessary, or contingent.  2
 This raises two closely related questions. The first is to ask, for any particular fact, 
whether it is possible or not, necessary or not, and how do we know this is the case. This is a 
formidable challenge. But there is also a more general question, which is possibly even 
harder to answer to: in virtue of  what something is possible as opposed to impossible, or 
necessary rather than contingent? Following Dummett (1959), we can re-state this question 
as follows: ‘What is the source of  modality?’.  
0.1 Powers and modality   
 In this thesis, I take a closer look to an apparently very intuitive answer to this latter 
question: that modal truths have their source in certain special properties present in the 
actual world: tendencies, capacities, potentialities, abilities, dispositions, and so on. Since for 
my purposes we need not worry about the fine-grained distinctions between these, I will use 
the umbrella-term ‘powers’ for them, and refer to the theory of  modality that individuates 
the source of  modality in actual powers as ‘Modal Dispositionalism’ (from now on, just 
‘Dispositionalism’). The core idea of  Dispositionalism, in its simplest terms, is that some 
 John Divers (1999) aptly refers to this as the principle of  Modal Ubiquity. 1
 Of  course, not all these are mutually exclusive: something can be both necessary and possible, for 2
example.  
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irreducible properties concern and ground what individuals bearing them can do: the way 
something is tells us something about the ways that thing could be and what it can do. That is 
to say, powers are connected to their manifestations by a necessary connection of  some 
kind; if  powers and their manifestations can be said to be wholly distinct entities, then the 
view qualifies as anti-Humean, insofar as it contravenes the principle that ‘there is no object, 
which implies the existence of  any other if  we consider these objects in themselves’ (T 2.3. 
§IV).  According to the view, the potentialities of  actual objects fix the modal facts and 3
determine the topology and extension of  modal space. 
 We can sketch Dispositionalism in its simplest form as the conjunction of  the 
following two theses:  
DPoss: ‘possibly p’ is true iff  and because  there is some power whose manifestation, if  4
manifested, would make ‘p’ true.  5
DNec: ‘necessarily p’ is true iff  and because there is no power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘not-p’ true. 
It is important to note that Dispositionalism does not aim to give us a reductive account of  
modality: we are not grounding modal truths in non-modal facts: powers are modal properties, 
and thus the view is in a sense a form of  modal primitivism. How does this help answering 
 This is commonly referred as ‘Hume's Dictum’. However it is not obvious that powers metaphysics are 3
anti-Humean because they violate the dictum, mostly because giving a precise characterisation of  it is 
surprisingly tricky—see (Wilson 2010) for some elucidations. Depending on the chosen reading of  
Hume’s Dictum, a view according to which powers are all connected to one another by relations of  
metaphysical dependence might not count as ‘wholly separate’ entities. 
 The clause ‘because’, although often omitted, is fundamental, for it distinguishes theories of  X from 4
mere theories about X (Wasserman 2016). Dispositionalism aims to be a theory of  modality—that is, it 
aims to explain and ground global modal truths such as ‘possibly, p’ by appealing to powers, and not just 
to note that they line up nicely, extensionally: ‘iff ’ is symmetric, and carries no explanatory value. The 
principle ‘“possibly p” is true iff  there is some power whose manifestation, if  manifested, would make 
“p” true’ is available also to somebody who does not buy into Dispositionalism as a theory of  modality, 
but simply recognises its extensional adequacy. 
 Although I have formulated Dispositionalism in terms of  sentences (and throughout the thesis will use 5
sentences as truth-bearers), nothing hangs on this: everything I say in what follows would stand if  we 
preferred the more common position and adopted propositions as truth-bearers. 
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the question about the source of  modality, then? To see where the explanatory value of  the 
theory lies, we have to first appreciate the great variety of  modal truths that we normally 
deal with: general statements of  possibility or necessity of  the form ‘possibly, p’ or 
‘necessarily, p’, counterfactual conditionals such as ‘were it the case that p, then it would be 
the case that q’, modal auxiliaries such as ‘she might φ’, and so on. Since the revival of  
interest in modality in analytic circles and the development of  modal logic, and in particular 
‘the discovery that the semantics of  “possibly” and “necessarily” can be treated as a special 
case of  the logic of  the existential and universal quantifier, as long as we allow the 
quantifiers to range over an infinity of  “possible worlds”’ (Vetter 2015: 1), philosophers 
have been taking the ‘global’ sentential operators ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’ as the 
fundamental and paradigmatic expressions of  modality, and tried to reduce the other 
expressions to these.  
 Dispositionalism, on the other hand, holds that we should take localised modality as 
the bedrock, the ultimate source of  all expressions of  modality. Let’s try to unpack this 
statement. I understand the expression ‘x is the ultimate source of  y’ as involving some 
minimal explanatory constraints:   6
Why: An explanation is an answer to a ‘why question’. In our case, ‘Why are some 
propositions necessary rather than contingent, and some possible rather than impossible?’  
Acyclicity: That x is explainable by y requires that y need not be in turn explained by x.  
 Vetter (2015: 10) says that ‘metaphysical modality is… to be accounted for in terms of  disposi6 -
tional properties’. Given the fact that she includes grounding in her background assumptions (Vetter 
2015: 26-8), we can safely understand her as maintaining that modal facts are grounded upon facts 
about dispositional properties. Given the controversies about every aspect of  grounding, and in par-
ticular about the existence of  a ‘big-G grounding’ (Wilson 2014;  Berker 2018), I prefer to elucidate 
the notion of  ‘ultimate source’ invoking more neutrally only the notion of  explanation. Given that 
grounding, however understood, is commonly thought (but see Maurin 2019) to be closely connec-
ted to explanations, in that either it is itself  an explanatory relation (Fine 2012, Dasgupta 2017), or 
metaphysical explanations track it (Audi 2012), I take my elucidation to be perfectly consistent with 
the spirit of  Dispositionalism. 
 13
Objective: An explanation of  this kind does not constitutively depend on our epistemic 
powers: it might be that x is explainable by y even if  no one knows about that.   7
Ultimate: If  x is a K, there is nothing that is not a K which explains y.  
Although these minimal constraints are probably not enough to offer a full-blown 
elucidation of  ‘ultimate source’, hopefully they are enough for our purposes.  
 It is also not easy to offer a precise and satisfactory criterion for what counts as 
being localised. For the purposes of  this Introduction, we can be satisfied by Vetter’s 
characterisation of  the notion:  
A potentiality is localised in the sense that that it is a property of  a particular object... possibility, on 
the contrary, is not localised this way. Its being possible that such-and-such is not primarily a fact 
about any one particular object; it is a fact about how things in general might have turned out to be 
(Vetter 2015: 2). 
This approach to the source of  modality mirrors a recent and influential development with 
respect to another Aristotelian notion, that of  essence. In a series of  seminal papers in the 
‘90s, Kit Fine has argued that we cannot reduce or ground the essence of  particular objects 
to mere (global) necessities; rather, it is localised essence  that is prior to necessity and grounds 8
it. Indeed, Dispositionalism and Essentialism are very similar theories about the source of  
modality: they both assert the priority of  localised modalities over their global counterparts, 
 Why, Aciclicity, and Objective are a subset of  the constraints on explanation offered by Romero 7
(2019). 
 Fine tries to capture locality in a more precise manner than than the loose way I have adopted 8
above, imposing an objectual constraint to the closure conditions which appeals to the notion of  
objectual content of  propositions. See Fine (1994; 1995) for the details. It is far from clear that anything 
like a precisification of  locality in terms of  objectual content is available to powers ontologies. Al-
though it would be very interesting to try to develop a suitably rigorous notion of  locality for 
powers, for the purposes of  this thesis the mere intuitive, rough characterisation will be sufficient. 
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and both strive to be ‘Hardcore Actualist’ (Contessa 2008) theories of  modality; that is, they 
reject the idea that possible worlds (however conceived) should play a role in making modal 
statements true. In short, they both reject the idea that the Leibnizian biconditionals  are 9
metaphysically informative, as it were. The main difference between Dispositionalism and 
Essentialism is that the former is a ‘possibility-first’ and the latter a ‘necessity first’ theory 
of  localised modality.  In this thesis I will not explicitly thematise the relationship between 10
these two theories, but their uneasy co-existence will emerge time and time again 
throughout.  
 It is important to bear in mind that philosophers have typically distinguished among 
various kinds of  modality: natural (or nomological), logical, metaphysical, and so on, and 
debated which one is to be considered the most fundamental. What sort of  modality is 
Dispositionalism aiming to ground? We can distinguish two brands of  the project here, one 
ambitious and one more modest. The latter is characterised by the aim of  grounding only 
natural or nomological modality, while the former aims at grounding metaphysical modality 
(understood as being the widest kind of  modality: adopting the terminology of  Hale (2013), 
the one involved in talk of  absolute  possibility and necessity). Ordinarily, the difference 11
between the two kinds of  modality is thought to be this: natural necessity does not entail 
 By Leibnizian biconditionals I mean the following: ‘possibly p’ is true iff  ‘p’ is true at some pos9 -
sible world, and ‘necessarily, p’ is true iff  ‘p’ is true at all possible worlds.
 The terms ‘possibility-first’ and ‘necessity-first’ are usually used to refer to different approaches to 10
the epistemology of  modality. Here I employ them in a metaphysical sense: for the potentiality theo-
rist, the fundamental phenomenon makes possibility statements true, and necessity is to be obtained 
from there indirectly. It is tempting, but not necessary, to think that the epistemology would be iso-
morphic. Note that when I talk about ‘Essentialism’ here I have in mind essentialist theories of  modality 
of  the kind proposed by Lowe (2016), Hale (2013), Fine (1994; 1995; 1995b; 2015, Oderberg 2007, 
and Shalkowski 2008, that is, theories that have the explicit goal of  locating the source of  metaphys-
ical modality in actual essences. I do not mean to include ‘Dispositional Essentialist’ theories of  
properties, such as Ellis’ (2000; 2001). Dispositional Essentialism is an interesting case when consid-
ered as a theory of  modality (which is not!), because it seems to introduce both a primitive essence 
and a primitive potentiality operator that both have modal consequences, and are not reducible to 
one another: Saying that the essences of  F is to have the power to φ, seems to entail □◇φ, where 
box and diamond are generated by different, irreducible elements in the theory. Wildman (forth-
coming) uses this as a counterexample against reductive essence-first accounts of  modality. 
 Although it is common to equate the notion of  metaphysical modality with that of  absolute or widest 11
or most inclusive modality (inter alios Kripke 1980, Lewis 1986, Sider 2011, Hale 2013, Williamson 2016), 
it is not obvious that such equation is unproblematic: see Clarke-Doane (forthcoming) for a critique.
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metaphysical necessity, whereas metaphysical necessity entails natural necessity: natural 
necessity is a sort of  contingent necessity, as it were. Conversely, metaphysical possibility 
does not entail natural possibility, whereas natural possibility entails metaphysical possibility. 
That is to say: natural modality is strictly weaker than metaphysical modality. This is fairly 
easy to model in possible-world theoretic terms: natural modality concerns a subset of  all 
the possible worlds, and natural necessity is to be understood in terms of  a restricted 
universal quantifier. This familiar characterisation does not fit powers metaphysics and 
Dispositionalism, however, as both theories entail that laws of  nature are metaphysically 
necessary (Bird 2007): in possible worlds talk, natural necessities would hold across all 
possible worlds. Nevertheless, I think that the distinction between the two kinds of  
modality should be retained.   
 In a one-world theory, such as Dispositionalism, the difference is not to be cashed 
out in terms of  whether one modality holds only for a subset of  possible worlds of  the 
domain of  the other, but rather in terms of  what kind of  entities in each world the 
modality is about: I take metaphysical or absolute modality to be about any entity 
whatsoever within each world, while natural necessity only holds for a subset of  entities in 
each world (minimally, those located in spacetime). This preserves the idea that natural 
modality is weaker and more restricted than metaphysical or absolute modality: instead of  
restricting the domain of  possible worlds upon which the quantifiers (equivalent to the 
modal operators) range, we restrict the domain of  entities within a single world upon which 
the quantifiers (not equated with the modal operators) range. So, the difference between 
ambitious and modest Dispositionalism will revolve around whether powers can be 
truthmakers for sentences about non-natural entities: presumably, these might include sets, 
numbers, and other abstracta, together perhaps with logical operators (as in Hale 2013), if  
there really are any such things. We can spell out the two positions as follows:  
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Ambitious Dispositonalism: All modal truths concerning everything whatsoever are fixed 
by actual powers.  
Modest Dispositonalism: A subset of  all modal truths, those concerning natural entities, 
are fixed by actual powers.  
The main goal of  the dissertation is not to establish which version of  Dispositionalism is 
preferable. However, the views developed in what follows will bear on the question, so the 
point will be addressed indirectly: I will suggest that Modest Dispositionalism is to be 
preferred.  
0.2 The Big Picture  
I am interested in examining a theory of  the source of  modality according to which modal 
truths are grounded in some special kind of  properties: powers. This leaves us with two 
different, but closely related, lines of  investigation: we have to spell out how, exactly, powers 
can ground all modal talk. That is to say, we have to provide a credible logic and semantics 
of  powers-talk and show how we can reduce all global modal truths to the localised ones, as 
well as accounting for problematic cases. Call this the ‘semantic task’ for Dispositionalism. 
On the other hand, we have to make sure that we know what we are talking about when we 
talk about powers: what are, exactly, these properties that are supposed to do all the heavy-
lifting in a dispositional theory of  modality? Call this the ‘metaphysical task’.  
 This latter point is surprisingly obscure, despite (or perhaps because of) the recent 
explosion of  interest in powers ontologies. Taking a closer look at the literature on powers, 
it turns out that many powers theorists have very different notions of  what powers are 
supposed to be and how they should be characterised (Bird 2016, Groff  ms.). What is 
worse, often they do not realise that this is the case, and end up talking past each other. So, 
we need to establish what powers are, if  we are to ground modality on them. This task is 
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particularly urgent because it is not obvious that every account of  powers is equally well-
suited for the Dispositionalist project, be that modest or ambitious: not all conceptions of  
powers do an equally good job at grounding modal talk. Therefore, the confusion 
concerning the proper understanding of  powers ontology threatens to undermine the 
Dispositionalist project as a whole, or at least to introduce very dangerous ambiguities at its 
foundations.  
 The main aim of  this thesis is to remedy this confusion and formulate the best 
metaphysics of  powers for Dispositionalism: that is, to take up the metaphysical task. By 
this I mean that I intend to provide an independently plausible and attractive theory of  
what powers are which can give Dispositionalism (either modest or ambitious) its best shot 
at being a satisfactory account of  the source of  modality.  In order to do so, we need to 
meet two key desiderata. The first one is, naturally, that the metaphysics must not pose 
insurmountable difficulties for the semantic task—-again, it must give Dispositionalism a 
good shot at being a satisfactory theory of  (at least natural) modality. Call this the ‘modality 
desideratum’.  
 The second desideratum is that the metaphysics must still be recognisable as a 
metaphysics of  powers, and be independently appealing for those friends of  powers who are 
not primarily interested in the foundation of  modality: it must share the core principles and 
elements of  powers ontologies, so that dispositionalists can meaningfully interact with other 
powers theorists. That is to say, the differences with other metaphysics of  powers must not 
be so great as to make them radically different, and thus avoid the risk of  being accused of  
having changed the topic of  conversation. The properties used by the dispositionalist must 
still be recognisable as powers. We must formulate a unitary framework, so that it makes 
sense to think that the same power ontology—and not simply a family of  radically different 
but homonymous ones—can be put to use in the various projects that friends of  powers 
are interested in, such as the foundations of  modality, laws of  nature, causation, theory of  
action, free will, etc. Call this the ‘integration desideratum’.  
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 The goal of  this dissertation is to strike the right balance between these two 
desiderata: I want to ground Dispositionalism in a metaphysics of  powers that shares the 
core principles of, and thus can meaningfully interact with, other theories of  powers which 
were developed with goals in mind other than grounding modality, and, at the same time, 
make sure that it gives Dispositionalism a chance.  
 Let’s start by considering some theses that are ordinarily adopted by various powers 
theorists, to get a preliminary sense of  the state of  the playing field. Keep in mind that not 
all power theorists accept all of  the following, and not all of  them are equally promising for 
Dispositionalism. My goal will be to develop a minimal metaphysics of  powers for 
Dispositonalism: to see which of  the following theses the dispositionalist must accept, 
which ones she may, but need not, accept, and which ones she must reject, and show how 
the resulting blend is the best theory of  powers simpliciter. The relevant theses are the 
following: 
Modal. Powers are modal properties. The fact that powers are directed to their manifestations 
tells us what something could be or do. 
Irreducibility. Powers are modal properties. Genuine dispositional predicates refer to ontic 
properties—entities in one’s domain.  They cannot be reduced to simple conditionals or 12
counterfactuals that hold in virtue of  something that is not, itself, a power.  13
Directedness. Powers are directed properties: their identity is determined  by what they are 14
for. Powers have their modal profile essentially. 
 Bird (2016; 2018) equates being an ‘ontic property’ with being a fundamental or perfectly natural 12
property. But characterising them as ‘ontic properties’ is perfectly orthogonal to questions concern-
ing their degree of  naturalness, basicness, of  fundamentality—It is a further metaontological as-
sumption that only fundamental or natural properties are really there (Fine 2001, Cameron 2010b) 
and thus are the only properly ontic properties. 
 There is a long literature of  attempts to such reduction or analysis, and an equally long literature 13
of  arguments for their failures. Since the topic has been so thoroughly discussed, I will not add to 
the pile. For some relatively recent discussion, see Choi (2009), Wasserman & Manley (2011), Vetter 
(2015). 
 In what follows, I freely use ‘determine’ and ‘fix’ interchangeably: if  x determines that Fy, then x 14
fixes the F of  y. 
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Independence. At least some powers, despite being instantiated, fail to bring about their 
manifestation.  15
Causality. Powers are closely related to causality. This comes is at least two varieties: weak and 
strong. Weak: if  there is causation, then powers are being exercised. Strong: If  powers are 
being exercised, then there is causation—that is to say, all powers are causal powers (Shoemaker 
1980, Bird 2007, Mumford & Anjum 2011).  
Productivity. Powers are productive: they bring about their manifestation by producing it 
(Mumford & Anjum 2011, Groff  2013).  16
Dynamism. Powers are dynamic and active.  A world of  powers is not a passive mechanism 17
that receives its activity from an external source, but is itself  the source of  change 
(Mumford & Anjum 2011; 2018, Groff  2013).  
Tendency. Powers confer a tendential, sui generis kind of  modality, stronger than mere 
metaphysical or natural possibility but always short of  natural and metaphysical necessity 
(Mumford & Anjum 2011; 2018). 
What are the ingredients for the minimal metaphysics of  powers? In what follows, I will 
take Modal and Irreducibility as given: I will take it for granted both that powers are 
irreducible to global modalities such as counterfactuals, and that they are genuine 
properties. I will also assume that powers can be truthmakers for at least some modal claim: 
 ‘Power is one thing; its exertion is another thing. It is true, there can be no exertion without 15
power; but there may be power that is not exerted’. (Reid 1983: 302). 
 This thesis can be seen a particular variation of  Strong Causality: causation is productive, and 16
since all powers are causal powers, powers are productive, too; at least, this is how I take Mumford 
& Anjum (2011) to understand it. However, I think that the two theses can be separated, and that 
Productivity only aims to capture the idea that manifestations are borne out of  powers, in some 
sense—whether causally or not might not be as vital. 
 It is not easy to offer a precise specification of  the distinct meaning that these two terms have 17
within the picture offered by radical powers theorists: they are usually used together and belong to 
the same family (Groff  2013: 215). I take it that ‘active’ concerns the location of  the causal oomph, 
as it were (within the entities in the world, rather than in the laws) and ‘dynamical’ is more con-
cerned with the peculiar way in which powers are exercised. I will focus especially on this feature, 
when discussing Dynamism. 
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the challenge will be whether we can get every modal truth out of  them. The conjunction of  
Modal and Irreducibility is the core idea of  Hardcore Actualism: that modality is not to 
be ‘outsourced’ (Vetter 2011:743) to possible worlds. Possible worlds (however conceived) 
should not play a role in making modal statements true, and Leibnizian biconditionals are 
not metaphysically informative. In particular it is very important to stress that I will take as 
a starting point the version of  Modal proposed by Barbara Vetter in her book Potentiality 
(2015), namely that powers are first and foremost truthmakers for simple ‘can-sentences’ 
such as ‘Finola can escape from Blenheim Park’ and ‘Ana can sing Heart of  Glass’, in turn 
directly connected with ‘global’ sentences of  possibility such as ‘it is possible to escape from 
Blenheim Park’, as opposed to the (perhaps more common) idea that powers and 
dispositions are most closely associated with counterfactual conditionals (Bird 2007, Jacobs 
2010, McKitrick 2018). Vetter has a number of  interesting and, to my view, convincing 
arguments for this,  which I will not rehearse here. This is due to the fact that this 18
dissertation has a somewhat modest scope, insofar as it is primarily concerned with the 
metaphysical task, and not the semantic task. I believe that most of  what I say in this 
dissertation would be, with relatively small adjustments, compatible with the idea that 
powers are primarily truthmakers for counterfactual conditionals, but I will not attempt to 
show how this can be done in what follows. I will adopt Vetter’s brand of  Dispositionalism 
as far as the semantic task is involved unless explicitly stating otherwise throughout the 
thesis: it is by far and large the best and most fleshed-out version of  the theory on the 
market.   
 On the other hand, I will discuss at length Directedness and Independence. I 
take both to be at the core of  the minimal powers metaphysics. However, they are 
surprisingly difficult to square with each other: there is, prima facie, a strong tension between 
them (to the point that we can formulate an argument, known as ‘Too Much Possibility’, to 
the effect that the two theses are inconsistent) which we will have to dispel. Disarming Too 
 Aimar (2019) has an interesting argument to the effect that dispositions ascriptions are semantic18 -
ally equivalent to possibility claims, supporting Vetter’s theory. See also Kratzer (2012). 
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Much Possibility will involve exploring and mapping an intricate web of  relations that 
obtains between powers and their manifestations. I will pay special attention to the 
interaction of  two relations of  dependence: on the one hand, I will defend the idea that 
powers depend for their identities upon their manifestations (call this ‘metaphysical 
dependence’ of  powers upon their manifestations): a power has the identity that it has in 
virtue of  the fact that it is a power for something.  
 On the other hand, powers are responsible for bringing their manifestations about
—so, in another sense, it is the manifestations (and their occurrence) that depend upon 
powers (call this ‘productive dependence’  of  manifestations upon powers). This results in a 
picture where powers and their manifestations are linked by complex, criss-crossing 
dependence relations. The picture has some surprising consequences: first of  all, if  we 
think that dependence tracks relative fundamentality, it entails a form of  anti-
foundationalism: in a powers ontology there cannot be a collection of  absolutely 
fundamental, ungrounded entities. Secondly, it pushes the ontology of  powers towards 
Necessitism, the view that necessarily, everything exists necessarily. Exploring and 
accounting for the interaction of  Independence and Directedness, mapping the 
consequences of  their relations, and finding the best way to resist Too Much Possibility will 
keep us busy for a considerable portion of  this thesis, and will be the springboard for the 
central element of  the theory of  powers I develop.  
 The picture I will present, painted in very broad strokes, is this. Powers are genuine, 
ontic properties directed to their manifestations; manifestations fix the identities of  the 
powers. When powers are exercised successfully, they bring about their manifestations. 
Saying that powers are directed to their manifestation means that there is a relation, call it 
‘Directedness’, obtaining between powers and what they are for. Powers depend for their 
identity upon the identity of  their manifestation, in virtue of  the fact that they are related to 
it by Directedness. Such a relation commits us to the existence of  both relata: both powers 
and their manifestations exist, or are something, simpliciter. Powers are directed toward their 
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manifestations even if  they might not bring those manifestations about. I will argue that we 
have to take this at face value and accept the existence of  unmanifested manifestations (that 
is, manifestations that have not been, and never will be, brought about). What is the 
ontological status of  unmanifested manifestations? I will argue that the best way to 
characterise them is somewhat akin to Williamson’s (1998; 2002; 2013) mere logical 
existents. However, we have to modify Williamson’s characterisation of  them if  we accept 
Dispositionalism: instead of  being treated as contingently non-located entities, they should be 
thought of  as non-essentially non-located entities.  
 This will allow us to spell out what it means for a manifestation to become 
manifested: it means for it to acquire a spatio-temporal location. This view leaves us 
considerable freedom when it comes to the ontological category of  manifestations of  
powers: powers can be directed towards tropes or states of  affairs—I will argue that these 
are better candidates than universals as manifestations—and even towards particulars. This 
flexibility, I believe, represents a considerable advantage for the semantic task of  
Dispositionalism, because it will allow to give an account about de re sentences about merely 
possible individuals, as well as (suitably re-interpreted) claims about contingent existence, 
which may otherwise be hard to accommodate (Leech 2017; Kimpton-Nye 2018; 
forthcoming). Thus, the picture of  the world that will emerge is going to be one network of  
particular entities (be they tropes or states of  affairs), some of  which are concrete and 
spatiotemporally located, and some of  which are mere logical existents, all interconnected 
by criss-crossing dependence relations that fix the identities of  the nodes—in a sense, the 
picture is akin to one of  Leibnizian monads, insofar as each node of  the network is a 
particular that is not reduced to the totality of  relations, and yet is essentially related and 
contains all information about all  other particulars.  19
 This is a minimal metaphysics of  powers: it only encompasses the core and necessary 
elements that any theory who wants to qualify as a powers ontology must have. However, it 
 Assuming that there are no ghost-system of  powers, that do not interact with one another (Willi19 -
ams 2010; 2019). 
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can be enriched by adding some of  the other theses mentioned above, such as (weak or 
strong) Causality, Productivity, and Dynamicity. Call ‘radical powers metaphysics’ any 
theory that accepts one or more of  the other theses, alongside the minimal metaphysics. 
The possibility of  radicalising the minimal ontology of  Dispositionalism allows 
dispositionalists to share their ontology with other power theorists involved in other 
debates, thus ensuring that there could be meaningful communication between them, and 
they could form a common anti-Humean front, as it were.  
 In very broad strokes, here are a couple of  examples to show that the minimal 
framework can be radicalised. Although I will largely ignore the relation between powers 
and causation, I suggest that the minimal metaphysics offers in principle no obstacle to the 
adoption of  Causality. This is because it is a consequence of  the minimal theory that 
powers can only have as manifestations entities that can exist in spacetime (and, indeed, for 
a manifestation to be manifested just is to acquire a spatiotemporal location). This means 
that the minimal framework excludes that powers could be directed towards those entities 
that cannot enter causal relations, namely abstracta. This does not, by itself, suffice to establish 
that all powers are causal powers (Strong Causality) or not even that powers are involved 
in every causal process (Weak Causality)—it leaves open the possibility that certain powers 
bring about their manifestations non-causally. More work needs to be done to exclude such 
possibility. However, the minimal metaphysics limits the domain of  manifestations of  
powers to the right extent. This fits rather uneasily with Ambitious Dispositionalism: 
metaphysical modality, we have said, concerns every entity whatsoever, including abstracta. 
However, it is compatible with Modest Dispositionalism. Causality is not going to be 
central in what follows, and its acceptance is not necessary for the purposes of  the project 
of  grounding natural modality; however, it is a positive consequence that a suitable 
ontology could be available to the philosopher who is interested in accounting for both 
causation and natural modality.  
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 Productivity and Dynamism are more interesting for the dispositionalist project, 
and will be discussed in more detail. As far as the former is concerned, in presenting the 
minimal metaphysics I will highlight that manifestations (and, in particular, the obtaining of  
the manifestation) depends upon the power that brings it about: minimally, this means that 
manifestations depend for their spatio-temporal location upon the fact that their powers are 
themselves located. I will call this notion of  ontological dependence ‘productive 
dependence’. While I think that this notion is enough to capture the intuition that powers 
are responsible for the obtaining of  their manifestations, it is probably too weak and 
lightweight to capture what certain proponents of  Productivity, such as Mumford and 
Anjum, have in mind. However, just like the case of  Causality, there are in principle no 
obstacles in adding the extra elements needed to implement a more heavy-weight version of  
Productivity, if  one so wishes. I will suggest that a suitably stronger version of  
Productivity can be obtained by adding irreducible processes to the mix, which is a 
perfectly consistent development to the minimal theory. The presence of  irreducible 
processes is also the core of  Dynamism. The fact that the introduction of  irreducible 
processes is consistent with the minimal metaphysics does more than just showing that 
dispositionalists can be in the same conversation as radical powers theorists and do not risk 
to past talk each other, however: I will argue that accepting Dynamism allows us to to 
acquire a much firmer grip on the debate over the temporal direction of  powers, re-framing 
it in terms of  a debate over the direction of  time’s arrow. This, in turn, could contribute 
significantly to the semantic task of  Dispositionalism, because it allows us to offer a 
semantics of  dated possibility claims (such as ‘It is possible for Sarah to eat raclette Monday 
at 7’) without having to introduce a multitude of  merely possible dated states of  affairs, 
such as [Sarah eats raclette Monday at 7], [Sarah eats raclette Tuesday at 8], etc. Thus, I will 
argue that even if  she does not need to, the dispositionalist should welcome a radicalisation 
of  the minimal metaphysics, as to include at least a light-weight version of  Productivity 
and Dynamism: the best metaphysics for Dispositionalism shares more elements with 
radical powers ontologies that one might first think.  
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 Some of  the theses above presented are obviously incompatible with a powers 
ontology that aims to ground Dispositionalism: in particular, Tendency cannot, evidently, 
be squared with the project of  grounding necessities upon powers; therefore, it cannot be 
part and parcel of  the minimal metaphysics of  powers for Dispositionalism. However, it is 
not enough to rule out the thesis on the ground that it would represent an insurmountable 
hurdle for the project I am interested in: in order to fully meet the second desideratum, we 
also need to show that Tendency is not a legitimate extension of  the minimal metaphysics. 
Otherwise, we would introduce the possibility of  an unbridgeable gap in the middle of  
powers ontologies. It will turn out that this is not as easy as one might think: I will suggest 
that we should exclude Tendency from the metaphysics of  powers on the basis of  
considerations from theoretical virtues only. 
 The two desiderata (modality and integration) sometimes pull us in different 
directions, but are both equally important. Metaphysics is a systematic and holistic discipline
—reality is a unitary and interconnected system. Even when we zoom in on a particular 
problem, we must offer a solution that could be employed elsewhere. If  powers 
metaphysics and in general Anti-Humeans are to become a serious competing research 
tradition and hope to replace the dominant, Neo-Humean paradigm, they must show that 
they can do a better job in grounding modality without hampering one’s ability to deal with 
other problems in metaphysics, as well as other fields of  philosophy. If  powers metaphysics 
turned out to offer a better theory of  modality but prevented us to deal with  problems 20
about persistence, mereology, objective chance, emergence, time, free will and so on, its 
chances to replace Humeanism would look rather grim, since that framework has proved to 
be immensely fruitful and influential in all those fields. The minimal theory that I develop in 
what follows aims to take a step in this direction, and offer a common metaphysical ground 
for a number of  philosophical projects involving powers.  
 By this I mean either offer a novel and more convincing account of  these phenomena, or 20
more modestly just adopt the existing theories. 
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0.3 Structure of  the Dissertations and Chapter Outline  
The thesis is structured as follows. I start by setting out the a problem at the heart of  
powers metaphysics in chapter 1 — the tension between Directedness and Independence, 
and the argument which can be derived from this tension, called Too Much Possibility. Too 
Much Possibility targets the ontological status of  the manifestations of  those powers that 
are not exercised: these manifestations seem to both exist (because powers point at them) 
and not exist (because they are not manifested). Much of  the thesis will revolve around the 
solution of  this problem. In the chapters 2 and 3, I consider two attempts to dissolve Too 
Much Possibility by showing that it is a pseudo-problem, based on a misunderstanding of  
powers metaphysics.  
 In chapter 2, I examine the first such attempt, proposed by Anna Marmodoro. It 
involves adopting the view according to which powers are numerically identical to their 
manifestations, and hence the non-existence of  unmanifested manifestations is not an issue.  
 The second attempt, examined in chapter 3, involves adopting a process ontology, 
claiming that Independence is ambiguous, and therefore that it should be substituted with a 
clearer principle, Interrupt, according to which every process can be interrupted before 
reaching its natural endpoint, but maintains its identity even if  interrupted — thus avoiding 
the tension between Directedness and Independence by simply abandoning Independence. 
I argue that both attempts at dissolving Too Much Possibility fail, and that the solution to 
the problem will have to involve abandoning one of  the intuitively compelling background 
premisses to the argument.  
 In chapter 4, I first consider whether we can solve Too Much Possibility by denying 
that Directedness is a genuine relation which ontologically commits powers theories to the 
existence of  (unmanifested) manifestations — a strategy that I call the ‘Physical 
Intentionality Route’. I argue that this strategy is doomed to fail, because powers 
metaphysics finds itself  committed to manifestations even if  Directedness is not a relation. 
I conclude the chapter by recognising that the only viable way to avoid the contradiction 
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threatened by Too Much Possibility is to recognise that unmanifested manifestations do 
exist, but have a peculiar ontological status — a strategy that I call the Actualisation Route. 
The question that comes to the fore, then, becomes what is this peculiar ontological status: 
what is the difference between manifested and unmanifested manifestations.  
 In chapter 5, I examine the existing views that follow the Actualisation Route: 
taking unmanifested manifestations to be existing but non-actual entities, and taking them 
to be uninstantiated universals, either Platonic or Aristotelian. I argue that neither of  these 
options is fully satisfactory. In particular, I argue that adopting universals as manifestations 
of  universals make it hard to see how Dispositionalism could account for de re truths about 
merely possible individuals, and that they make it hard to account for Independence while 
preserving the link between a universal and its instances.  
 Chapter 6 is the heart of  the thesis. Here I offer my solution to Too Much 
Possibility — a solution that requires us to rethink some key aspects of  the metaphysics of  
powers. I argue that the key factors that shape the ontology of  powers and carve it at its 
joints are a primitive essence operator and the property of  being spatiotemporally located: 
unmanifested manifestations, in particular, are to be understood as those entities that are 
not essentially not located in spacetime. With these resources, I present my theory, which I 
call the ‘minimal metaphysics’ of  powers. Most of  the rest of  the dissertation is dedicated 
to exploring the consequences of  the adoption of  this theory and its categorical structure.  
 In chapter 7 I return briefly to what ontological categories are compatible with a 
powers ontology, and I conclude that either states or affairs, tropes, or particulars are well-
suited to be the manifestations of  powers.  
 In chapter 8, I turn to the question of  whether the minimal metaphysics that I have 
presented in chapter 6 can (and should) be “radicalised”, by adding to it some further, more 
controversial theses that are defended by some powers theorists, such as Productivity or 
Dynamism. I argue that both theories can be easily added to the minimal theory, and indeed 
they are a natural and welcome fit. This discussion leads to exploring the relation between 
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my framework for powers and questions about fundamentality and the metaphysics of  time. 
I argue that powers sit rather uncomfortably with foundationalism about fundamentality, 
and that the theory I develop is most naturally associated with Eternalism.  
 In chapter 9, I turn to some problems that confront the minimal metaphysics with 
regard to truthmaking. Admitting mere logical existents in my ontology, I risk to have to 
admit that some contradictions are made true, and that everything that is possible is also 
true, in virtue of  the fact that it has a truthmaker. To solve these problems, I adopt  a form 
of  truthmaking pluralism, to the effect that there are different kinds of  truthmaking 
relations — and I distinguish between sentences about concreta, which are made true by 
spatiotemporally located entities, and sentences about abstracta, which are more naturally 
understood as being made true by the essences of  abstract entities instead.  
 In the last chapter, I return to Independence, and examine its scope, its relation with 
tendential modality, and whether it presents problems for a dispositionalist foundation of  
necessity. I contrast two views concerning the source of  Independence: one which 
maintains that Independence is constitutive of  what it is to be a power, and therefore holds 
unrestrictedly, and another which maintains that Independence is grounded on more basic 
facts about powers, and which offers the possibility of  restricting its scope. Investigating 
the source of  Independence offers some important insights in the form that 
Dispositionalism will take, especially where the grounding of  necessities is concerned. I 
present a model according to which Independence is grounded upon the degrees of  
powers, and show how this view fits with the grounding of  necessities. I conclude that the 
account is preferable to the constitutive view of  Independence on grounds of  theoretical 
virtues.    
 I conclude the thesis highlighting the interplay between powers and essences that 
the minimal metaphysics has brought to centre-stage, and suggest that this is the critical 
point that new actualist theories of  modality need to investigate.   
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Chapter 1. The problem of  Unmanifested Manifestations  
The overall aim of  this dissertation is to work out the details of  a metaphysics of  powers 
that is well-suited to act as foundation for Dispositionalism. In order to do so, we must 
make sure that a minimal version of  powers metaphysics is in good order, or 
Dispositionalism will never even get off  the ground. By this I mean that, regardless of  its 
success in acting as the right basis for the semantic task of  Dispositionalism, the minimal 
metaphysics of  powers must be consistent and independently attractive as a theory of  
reality. It will turn out that this is far from easy or obvious: there is a deep-rooted tension at 
the core of  any theory of  powers that we will have to dispel before we can proceed. In this 
chapter, I will start by introducing and clarifying two core principles that characterise every 
metaphysics of  powers (§1.1) and spell out the tension that arises between them. This 
tension is rather serious: an argument can be formulated to the effect that the two theses 
are inconsistent. Following Armstrong (1997) and Bird (2006; 2007), call such argument 
‘Too Much Possibility’ (§1.2). In §1.3, I consider two ways to understand Too Much 
Possibility.   
1.1 Two Principles of  Power Ontologies    
The first part of  this thesis will be devoted to examining the interaction of  two key 
principles of  powers ontologies. Call these Directedness and Independence. These can 
be summed up as follows:  
Directedness: Powers are directed towards their manifestation;  
Independence: There are powers which exist without their manifestations ever being 
manifested.   21
 I adopt this reading of  the principle for the sake of  ease of  exposition. The principle is often 21
presented in modal term, along the lines of  ‘(some) powers can fail to bring about their manifesta-
tions’. I will return to the difference in formulations in §10. 
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Let me say something more about each of  these before moving forward.  
Directedness is the guiding principle of  any powers ontology: ‘Powers, or dispositions, are 
properties for some behaviour, usually of  their bearers. These properties have an object 
towards which they are oriented or directed’ (Molnar 2003: 60). This is the usually taken to 
be what constitutes the anti-Humeanism of  powers metaphysics: distinct entities (powers 
and their manifestations, be them other properties, events, facts, or what have you) are 
nevertheless essentially linked: a vase’s fragility is essentially connected to something else 
that is beyond itself, as it were: its breaking. What it is to be fragile is to be directed to 
breaking. In other words, ‘Having a direction to a particular manifestation is constitutive of  
the power property’ (Molnar 2003: 60). I will refer to this link between distinct  existents as 22
the directedness relation.   23
 The directedness relation is constitutive of  powers because it contributes, although 
indirectly, to the identity of  the power. In particular, it is in virtue of  the fact that a power is 
connected by directedness to its manifestations that the manifestations fix the identity of  
the power—a power P has the identity that it has because it is a power for a certain 
manifestation; and it is linked to that manifestation because it is directed towards it. It is 
important to note that there might be more to the identity of  a power than its 
manifestations. In particular, I think that the degree of  a power plays a key role and is 
constitutive of  the identity of  token-powers just as much as their directedness is.  By 24
‘degree of  power’ I mean what captures the intensity of  a certain power: a ‘strong’ power to 
 It is controversial that directedness links numerically distinct entities: for instance, Marmodoro 22
(2017) denies it. I will discuss her position in chapter 2. 
 Note that it is controversial that directedness is to be understood as a relation. For instance, Willi23 -
ams (2019), Contessa (forthcoming), Marmodoro (2017), Ingthorsson (2013), Martin (2008), Heil 
(2003), and Molnar (2003) all reject the idea. I will discuss this point with due detail in chapter 4. 
 Those who think that powers are most closely connected to counterfactuals or manifestation 24
ascriptions, instead of  simple ‘can’ sentences (paradigmatically, Bird 2007), will also stress the fact 
that the stimuli conditions (or mutual manifestation partners, or ‘constellations’ (Williams 2019)) 
play a role in fixing the identity of  the power. Similarly, those tho think that token powers are modes 
(Molnar 2003) will maintain that the token-identity of  the power is partially determined by its bearer 
(Socrates’ mortality differs from Plato’s mortality).
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break is a different property than a ‘weak’ power to break. However, the role of  the degrees 
of  powers will largely be irrelevant until chapter 10. Therefore, in what follows I will ignore 
the degree of  powers, and freely speak only of  manifestations determining the identity of  a 
power: bear in mind that this is just for readability reasons, and I always implicitly mean that 
a manifestation partially fixes the identity of  a power, and that there might be additional 
factors at play.  
 For the time being, I will focus on the fact that ‘a power’s type-identity is given by 
its definitive manifestation’ (Molnar 2003: 60). Note that I am here talking about  
individuation in the metaphysical sense, rather than the cognitive sense. Cognitive individuation is a 
mind-dependent act that involves singling out an entity in thought. Although it is true that we 
cognitively individuate dispositions by thinking about the manifestations that they are dispositions 
for, this is not the kind of  individuation that is at issue above. Even if  minded creatures were not to 
exist, it would still be the case that the nature of  a disposition is determined by the type of  
manifestation that it is a disposition for. Thus, in speaking of  the individuation of  dispositions, we 
are speaking of  a mind-independent metaphysical determination relation that distinguishes a given 
dispositional property from all other possible dispositional properties (Giannini & Tugby 2020).  
I will say more on this sense of  metaphysical determination in this chapter 4, as well as in 
chapter 8. The other key principle for the minimal powers ontology is this:  
  
Independence There are powers which exist without their manifestations ever being 
manifested. That is to say, some powers can either exist without ever being exercised, or fail 
to bring about their manifestations even if  they are exercised.   
The principle is best expressed by Molnar:  
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The occurrence of  the manifestation of  a power depends on the existence of  the power, but not 
vice versa. Powers can exist in the absence or in the presence of  their manifestations and so are 
ontologically independent of  the occurrence of  the manifestations. (Molnar 2003: 82) 
We can distinguish various readings of  this principle, of  increasing strength:  
• Time-Independence: An individual power (token) might exist unmanifested for some 
time, but it has to manifest at some other (later?) time. 
• Token-Independence: A token power P of  kind O might exist and be forever 
unmanifested, but some other power of  kind O has to be manifested at some time. 
• Type-Independence: There could be a kind of  powers that never manifest. ‘There is 
type-independence iff  a disposition trope of  kind O can exist without a manifestation of  
any trope of  kind P existing’. (Molnar 2003: 82)  
Most power theorists, I take it, favour Token-Independence: Time-Independence is way 
too weak; on the other hand Type-Independence seems to be too strong and bears 
unwelcome consequences.  However, I will argue that Token-Independence is untenable, 25
and collapses into Type-Independence, and so we should adopt the strongest version of  
the principle.   
 Token-Independence is an exception-making thesis: it states that powers of  a 
certain type generally manifest—meaning that at least some of  them must do so, but some 
specific individual might be an exception and remain unmanifested. As any exception-
making theory, it needs to justify i) why there could be exceptions and ii) why couldn’t the 
exception be the norm, that is, how it can exclude that Type-Independence is the case. It 
is this latter task that Token-Independence struggles to meet. Assume, for the time being, 
 For instance, they would be epistemically untraceable. If  one is attracted to the Eleatic Principle 25
for epistemic reasons (see Colyvan 1998 for discussion), then type-independent powers pass the test 
but betray its spirit.  
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that Independence is an intrinsic feature of  powers qua powers.  Now consider the 26
following dilemma for Token-Independence: either A) there is something special about 
the unmanifesting tokens, or B) there is not. If  B) there is not, then we have to admit that 
any power token could fail to bring about its manifestation: there is no principled reason to 
say that P could fail to bring about M and P* could not fail to bring about M* if  there is 
nothing special distinguishing the two. This means that we could pick an arbitrary power-
token and say that it could fail to bring about its token manifestation. But, given that the 
token-independent power was arbitrarily picked, if  we are operating in a non-free logic that 
accepts universal generalisation (A→∀xA) we have to conclude that every token power is 
token-independent. If  F is true of  an arbitrary x of  the domain, then ∀xFx. In slogan 
terms: if  it holds for any whatsoever, then it holds for everything whatsoever. If  this is the 
case, then we have to conclude that every token power is token-independent, and so it is 
possible that each token power fails to bring about its manifestation. But this possibility just 
is an instance of  Type-Independence: a type is not manifested unless it has any token that 
is.  That is to say: a generalised Token-Independence just is Type-Independence.   27
 What if  we choose the other horn of  the dilemma, A) that there is something 
special about the token-independent powers? Call this distinguishing feature K, and 
maintain that only a subset of  the power tokens of  a certain type happen to have it.  The 
subset can easily be construed as requiring to be a power and having K. But then it would 
seem that Token-Independence is not a feature of  powers per se, but rather of  Ks: K is the 
difference-maker and hence the truthmaker of  Independence. But our initial assumption 
was that Independence was a principle of  powers qua powers. Of  course, that assumption 
 This is not a hefty and not uncontroversial assumption. I will return to this point, and discuss it in 26
detail, in chapter 10. 
 If  we have Aristotelian sympathies when it comes to the type/token distinction, we might per27 -
haps even be tempted to maintain that a type does not exist unless at least a token is manifested. As 
it will become clear in what follows, I do not share such sympathies; furthermore, considerations 
such as these are irrelevant for establishing whether Independence should be read in its Type or 
Token version. 
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might be rejected.  But, as long as the assumption is granted, we have to accept the 28
stronger reading with unrestricted scope: every power-token, and every kind of  powers, can 
fail to manifest. This will have consequences when we examine whether Aristotelian 
Universals could be the manifestations of  powers (§5.2).  
1.2. The Problem  
From Independence and Directedness we can derive a contradiction. The argument, also 
known as Too Much Possibility, was first offered by David Armstrong:   
Consider, then, the critical case where the disposition is not manifested. The object still has within itself, 
essentially, a reference to the manifestation that did not occur. It points to a thing that does not exist... how 
can a state of  affairs of  a particular’s having a property enfold within itself  a relation (of  any sort) 
to a further first-order state of  affairs, the manifestation, which very often does not exist? We have 
here a Meinongian metaphysics, in which actual things are in some way related to non-existent 
things (Armstrong 1997:79).  
There are two ways to unpack the argument. The first is by considering powers metaphysics 
in a broadly Quinean metaontology, according to which we are ontologically committed 
only to the entities that are bound by the existential quantifiers of  the formalisations in 
classical logic  of  our best overall scientific-cum-metaphysical (see Sider 2011 for the 29
addition of  the metaphysical part) theory. Adopting a powers metaphysics involves, 
 For instance, one might think that K is the degree of  a power (Vetter 2015). Note that even if  we 28
accept that Independence is not a feature of  powers qua powers but rather of  some K, this alone 
would not be enough to prove that Token-Independence does not collapse into Type Independ-
ence: we would need also to show that, for every type of  powers T, some but not all token Ts are K
—for instance, that for every type of  powers, some have maximal degree and some do not. This 
would be a very substantial thesis to prove, even if  we admit that certain powers have maximal degrees and 
some do not, to the point that one might think that the burden of  the proof  lies in the camp of  those 
who deny the collapse. I will discuss the assumption that Independence is a feature of  powers qua 
powers in much more detail in chapter 10. 
 I use ‘formalisation in classical logic’ over ‘first order logic’ because what is at stake here is the 29
existence of  certain properties, and offering a nominalistic translation of  the claim would be exceedingly 
laborious. I take it that the amended Quinean theory captures reasonably well Armstrong’s own metaonto-
logy, given that he was a staunch realist about universals. 
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minimally, a commitment to the idea that our best overall theory includes sentences 
referring to powers or quantifying over powers: if  one adopts a powers metaphysics, then 
she will maintain that powers are at least sometimes involved in our best overall theory of  
the world.  Now, if  Directedness holds of  powers, and this is taken to mean that, 30
constitutively, powers are related to their manifestation (where the manifestation of  a power 
is a certain entity, and not just some sentence made true by the power), it will follow from 
classical logic that also the manifestations of  powers are part and parcel of  our best overall 
theory: we are ontologically committed to them, too, by virtue of  the fact that we are 
committed to the existence of  powers and the relation that links powers and manifestations 
— and we are free to apply Existential Generalisation on the second relatum. Here is where 
the tension with Independence emerges. Independence states that certain powers can fail 
to bring about their manifestations. If  we take this to mean that, when a power fails to 
bring about its manifestations, these simply do not exist, we get into serious trouble. Our 
best theory of  the world makes reference, via Directedness, to manifestations, and so by 
Quine’s lights we are ontologically committed to them. But, by Independence, we are also 
committed to the idea that sometimes they do not exist, since certain times powers can fail 
to be successfully exercised. But this leads to serious problems: we are both ontologically 
committed to unmanifested manifestations and we are not ontologically committed to 
them.    
 Armstrong’s argument, as presented in the quotation above, is slightly different: he 
skips the contradiction in our ontological commitment, and focuses on a different bad 
result. This is because, I think, he directly considers an answer to the original problem, (and 
he takes it to be the only answers), which he thinks, at the end of  the day, to be equally 
unsatisfying.  
 A most natural solution to the tension between Directedness and Independence is 
to introduce two kinds of  existential quantifiers: one “inner, serious”, for which Existential 
 Often powers theorists will be more ambitious: they will maintain that powers appear at the fun30 -
damental level (Mumford 2006, Bird 2007). 
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Generalisation does not hold, and one “outer, lightweight” for which the rule does hold. In 
this way, we can modify the Quinean criterion for ontological commitment and say that 
only the variables bound by the inner existential quantifier are part of  our ontology. If  we 
adopt a powers metaphysics, we will admit that certain powers are quantified over by such 
inner, serious existential quantifier, but that the theory in itself  does not quantify in a similar 
manner over manifestations (or, at least, not over unmanifested manifestation). Then, we 
admit that, given Directedness and the relation between powers and manifestations, by 
existential generalisation we can also quantify over manifestations. But, as we know, 
Existential Generalisation holds only of  the “outer, lightweight” quantifier. Thus, we need 
not derive any ontological commitment about manifestations. If  we interpret 
Independence to be formulated in the inner quantifier, we can avoid the contradiction: 
powers exist “seriously”, but manifestations only exists in a “lightweight” sense, and 
ontological commitment is only determined by the serious quantifier. If  we read the serious 
quantifier as ‘exist’ and the lightweight one as ‘there are some’, we escape the contradiction 
by saying that ‘there are things that do not exist’. This is a paradigmatic statement of  
Meinongianism. Thus, Armstrong concludes, powers ontologies are committed to a kind of  
Meinongian ontology — which he takes to be a unacceptable result.  
 The first argument (the one concluding to the fact that powers theorists are both 
committed to the existence and non-existence of  powers) relies on the following five 
background assumptions:  
I. Directedness is a relation. 
II. Existential Generalisation is admitted. 
III. Being manifested = coming into existence/becoming something.  
IV. Existence is captured by unrestricted existential quantified translations of  our best 
theories. 
V. The formalisation of  some of  our best theories involves quantification over powers. 
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The second argument (the one concluding to the fact that powers theorists are offering a 
Meinongian ontology), on the other hand, relies only on the following background 
assumptions: 
A. Directedness is a relation  
B. There are two existential quantifiers (an inner and and outer), and only for the latter 
does Existential Generalisation holds  
C. Being manifested = coming into existence  
D. Existence is captured by the inner existential quantified translations of  our best theories  
E. The formalisation of  some of  our best theories involves inner quantification over 
powers  
Both arguments, if  sound, would be bad for any kind of  powers metaphysics— many 
friends of  powers, being hardcore actualists, would not appreciate belonging to the same 
disreputable club that admits Meinongians. It would seem, therefore, that friends of  powers 
need to reject (or suitably modify) one among Independence, Directedness, or the 
relevant background assumptions to avoid both versions of  the arguent. This sets the initial 
agenda of  the dissertation: I will examine various strategies that can be adopted to resist 
Armstrong’s problem. Since I take it that both Independence and Directedness are non-
negotiable linchpins for any theory of  powers, avoiding the contradiction will typically rely 
on the rejection of  one of  the background premisses. 
1.3 Which Formulation?  
Before moving on to consider the various strategies available to resist Too Much Possibility, 
we should ask ourselves: which version of  the argument should we focus on? The 
background assumptions I will be interested in are I. and III. (A and C) which are at the 
centre stage in either formulation, so it does not seem that much hangs on the choice of  
how Armstrong’s argument is cashed out. Indeed, I want to stress that both formulations 
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can manage to bring into focus the contrast between Directedness and Independence 
which represents the core worry of  the first part of  this dissertation, and so they would 
both serve their purpose. This being said, it is more convenient if  we settled on one 
formulation — if  anything, for reasons of  clarity.  
 I am inclined to adopt the first formulation. There are two main reasons for this 
choice, and they are somewhat symmetrical. Both are purely dialectical, and so carry only 
relative weight, but I think we should take them into account nonetheless. The first is that 
some philosophers who subscribe to the Quinean orthodoxy will find the introduction of  
an outer quantifier outright unacceptable. Although, in the end, I will maintain that the 
culprit of  all the troubles connected with Too Much Possibility is assumption III/C, and my 
solution will not require the adoption of  free logic, many philosophers sympathetic to 
Armstrong’s position (and to hardcore actualism) will find even the momentary assumption 
of  B. to be unacceptable. The second worry is specular: those philosophers who, on the 
other hand, are happy to allow for an outer quantifier and the adoption of  free logic, will 
not see anything wrong in the conclusion that Too Much Possibility arrives at. So, they will 
not see the urgency of  solving the problem — the argument does not conclude to an 
inconstistent position. Note here that Armstrong equates the adoption of  free logic with 
Meinongianism, but that is perhaps a bit too strong: the adoption of  free logic is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for most Meinongian ontologies, and is typically 
associated with possibilism or contingentism (Williamson 2013), which is a weaker position than 
full blown Meinongianism.  31
 Some additional theses that are needed to go from possibilism or contingentism to full blown 31
Meinongianism might be the following: The Characterisation Principle: for each collection of  prop-
erties, there is an object that instantiates them. ‘If  A(x) is any property, or conjunction of  properties, 
we can characterise an object cA and be guaranteed that A(cA)’ (Priest 2005: 83). The thesis accord-
ing to which ‘some proper names refer to things which do not exist, and can be used to state truths 
about such things’ (Sainsbury 2010: 45).’
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 With this I do not intend to endorse a Meinongian ontology.  My point is just that 32
Too Much Possibility will not move those who do: they will just happily bite the bullet — 
and on the other hand, those who are opposed to a Meinongian ontology, will protest that 
the second formulation involves a background assumption that they cannot endorse, even 
if  in the end it will be rejected.  
 So, I suggest that it would be preferable, if  possible, to focus on the first 
reconstruction, which has a clearly unacceptable conclusion. Again: I do consider the 
conclusion to possibilism and free logic to be a bad result, and so I am persuaded of  the 
urgency of  disarming the second version of  the argument, too. If  it turns out that the first 
formulation is inadequate, I am happy to adopt the second, Meinongian formulation: the 
main arguments presented in this thesis, including my preferred solution to the problem, are 
untouched.     
 Adopting the first formulation is not without its issues. Robin Hendry suggested 
that there is a good reason to abandon the first formulation, because assumptions II and III 
seem enough to generate a contradiction, without any need for the other background 
assumptions, nor Directedness — thus threatening to take the tension between 
Directedness and Independence out of  the spotlight. If, indeed, Directedness was not 
necessary to generate the bad result, this would clearly run counter the spirit of  the 
 On the contrary, throughout the thesis I would like to assume a fairly orthodox metaontology, 32
what can be captured by the following theses: 
One Existence: Existence is univocal—to exist is not said in many ways.  
One Quantifier: Existence is captured by the unrestricted existential quantifier (of  our most natural 
language) 
One Commitment: We are ontologically committed to the entities bound by the existential 
quantifier appearing in our best overall theory 
Note that this last thesis is consistent with adopting a layered, hierarchical conception of  reality—an 
‘Aristotelian’ ontology, to adopt Schaffer's (2009) terminology. I am perfectly happy to concede that 
there might be more or less fundamental, or more or less natural, entities. And this is also consistent 
with thinking that ontologists and metaphysicians ought to be mainly interested in the fundamental 
level—what really exists, to adopt Fine's (2001) expression, and everything that is not fundamental is 
a sort of  ‘free lunch’ supervening or grounded in the fundamental. What this is not consistent with 
is the idea that everything that is not fundamental does not exist simpliciter and that only what really 
exists, exists simpliciter, alongside the lines of  Cameron (2010b) and van Soldkoff  (2019). I am 
hesitant to include Fine (2001) among these—his position seems to me to be closer to Schaffer 
(2009), but I admit that he could be interpreted as to be in the eliminativist camp.
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argument and miss the intended target that I aim to investigate, namely the relation between 
Directedness and Independence, and so it would be a good reason to prefer the 
Meinongian version of  Armstrong’s argument. Hendry’s argument runs as follows:  
It is a tautology that for every x, x=x. We can substitute x for every constant and obtain another 
tautology. In particular, we can substitute for M, where ‘M’ is the name of  a particular manifestation 
of  any given power under consideration, thus obtaining the tautology M=M. From this, applying 
Existential Generalisation, we obtain that ∃x (x=M), which is enough to generate a contradiction 
with Independence, if  III is adopted and thus Independence is understood as the conjunction of  
∃x (x=P) & ¬∃(x=M). So, Directedness does not play any role in generating the contradiction. 
This misses the point of  Too Much Possibility: the argument was supposed to bring out a tension 
between Directedness and Independence.  
The argument is elegant and touches upon a genuine worry. However, I think that it can be 
resisted— we can show, I think, that Directedness plays a key role even in Hendry’s 
argument and, therefore, also in the first version of  Too Much Possibility: it is not just 
Independence plus classical logic that does all the heavy lifting. 
  The crucial move to focus on in order to resist the argument is the substitution of  
M, in order to obtain M=M from x=x. This substitution, I think, is warranted only if  ‘M’ 
does refer. Assuming a Millian/Kripkean theory of  the meaning of  proper names,  33
according to which the meaning of  a proper name just is its referent, and a compositional 
semantics for sentences, if  ‘M’ fails to refer — if  it is an empty name — then the sentence 
‘M=M’ is simply meaningless, and as such cannot be true. Reference is a precondition for 
truth of  sentences involving proper names; ‘Iuhfoyu2gf  is red’ is not truth-apt, because it 
does not express any proposition, because ‘Iuhfoyu2gf ’ fails to refer. Indeed, the minimal 
 If  names were definite descriptions in disguise, it would be even less problematic, I think. ‘M=M’ 33
would amount to p = p, where p is a sentence of  the form ‘there exists some x such that…’ — but 
from there we cannot generate anything that gives a contradiction with the second conjunct of  In-
dependence: ‘the actual king of  France = the actual king of  France’ does not yield a contradiction 
with ‘there is no actual king of  France’ if  ‘the actual king of  France’ just means ‘there is some x, 
such that x is the actual king of  France’ and the sentence can be false. 
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characterisation of  Meinongianism offered by Sainsbury (2010: 45) included the thesis that 
‘some proper names refer to things which do not exist’. 
 Alternatively, we can concede that M=M is true, but deny that from it we can infer 
that there is an M, if  ‘M’ fails to refer. The idea would be that, since ‘M’ does not refer to 
anything in particular, it is just a notational variation of  ∀ x=x: it does not convey anything 
different than the schema expressed with variables. M=M just is a formulations of  the 
schema of  self-identity. But from the schema of  self-identity we cannot infer that 
something is M.  
 The possibility of  reference failure, and the consequent failure of  meaningfulness 
of  the name and truth-aptness of  the sentence they are embedded in, is the reason why we 
cannot create entities out of  thin air, by uttering self-identities involving arbitrary names, 
after all— and that we cannot so easily attribute necessary existence to everything.     34
 Even easy ontologists who want to allow for relatively unproblematic creation of  
fictional entities usually associate the proper name of  the fictional character to some 
application conditions (Thomasson 2007; 2015), which demand that something else exists 
in the world (e.g. that some authors have performed some special speech acts or are in some 
mental state at some time):  the application conditions will then ‘associate’ ‘Sherlock 35
Holmes’ with a particular existent entity (e.g. a description produced within an act of  story-
telling) — and that is what ‘Sherlock Holmes’ will refer to, at least initially.     
 Assuming that powers theorists, when engaged in ontology, are not involved in the 
kind of  speech act productive of  fictional characters and do not plan to offer application 
conditions for ‘manifestation of  M’ that involve the semi-reference used to create fictional 
characters, this leaves open the possibility that ‘M’ fails to refer, unless one assumes 
Directedness. That is, I think that a power theorist could resist Hendry’s argument by 
 From the fact that necessarily, everything is self-identical we cannot infer that everything exists 34
necessarily. And yet, surely it is true at every possible world that GG=GG. See Fine (2005b) and 
Williamson (2002). 
 This leaves it open which speech act is involved. Schnieder and von Solodkoff  (2009) and Molt35 -
mann (2015) use the term ‘semi-reference’ in these contexts. 
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saying that she is not committed to the fact that ‘M’ refers, and so substituting it to ∀x x=x 
either does not yield a meaningful sentence, or just yields a notational variation of  it, from 
which it is not legitimate to infer M’s existence, since ∀x x=x could also be vacuously true.  
 If  this is the case, then it would be perfectly acceptable to maintain that the 
manifestation of  powers (note: here I am using the term as a generic description, not as a 
proper name of  the entity the power is for) does not exist — and thus that Independence 
(interpreted along the lines of  III.) is not inconsistent with classical logic on its own. 
 However, once we bring Directedness to the fore, and with it assumption I., the 
above strategy to resist Hendry’s argument is no longer available: if  it is constitutive of  the 
identity of  a power that it is related to some entity it is directed towards, then we can 
introduce the name ‘M’ as that which refers to whatever P is related to — thus ensuring that 
‘M’ refers. At this point, Hendry’s argument does go through — but so does the original 
argument, which applied Existential Generalisation on the directedness relation, without 
taking the detour of  M’s self-identity.  
 My point is that powers theorists, without Directedness, are only committed to the 
idea that some powers exist (and thus, that some names for powers refer) — nothing suggests 
that powers theorists are committed to manifestations (and, a fortiori, to the idea that names 
for individual manifestations do refer).  However, once we bring in Directedness, 36
understood as a relation (in virtue of  adopting I.), this neutrality must be lost — and from 
here, we generate the conflict at the heart of  Too Much Possibility.   
 It can be replied that here it is Directedness that is doing the work, and not 
assumption I. — why then are we adding it to the background assumptions? Wouldn’t 
Directedness alone do? We do not need anything quite as strong and assumption I. to 
grant that ‘M’ refers, after all: so, a number of  weaker formulations of  Directedness will 
 Indeed, this seems the position of  some primitivists about powers, such as Ingthorsson (2012; 36
2015) and Azzano (2019): they only think that powers are truthmakers for modal sentences, and 
there is no need of  talking about powers being directed at anything. 
 44
yield the problem, and this alone is a good reason to adopt the Meinongian version of  the 
argument.     37
 I have two observations to offer in response of  this point. The first one is that, as a 
matter of  fact, assumption I. establishes what it means for Directedness to hold. So, as 
long as I. is assumed, to say that Directedness holds just is to say that there is a relation 
between a power and its manifestation. Assumption I. helps fixing, in a more precise way, 
what it is for powers to be directed — just as much as assumption III contributes to fixing 
what it is for a power to fail to bring about its manifestation. As long as I. and III. are 
assumed, they just are Directedness and Independence. Thus, as long as Directedness 
plays a role in the argument above, so does assumption I.   
 The second observation is that, only because Armstrong’s (and Hendy’s) argument 
can get off  the ground with a weaker understanding of  Directedness (e.g. one that 
establishes that every power refer to its manifestation,  and not that it is related to it) this 38
does not mean that the argument is in any way deficient. At best, it can be protested that 
assuming that Directedness is a relation is an overkill. But that will be a problem which 
becomes relevant only for those who aim to solve the problem by rejecting assumption I., 
and who will face the task of  finding a characterisation of  Directedness which is suitably 
weak and does not allow Hendry’s argument to get off  the ground. Indeed, in chapter 4 I 
will argue that such characterisation is nowhere to be found, and will suggest that it is 
assumption III. that we need to get rid of. But this alone does not tell against the first 
formulation of  Too Much Possibility.  
 In light of  these considerations, I think it is fair to conclude that the first 
formulation of  Too Much Possibility is build around (and captures) the tension between 
Directedness and Independence. On the basis of  the dialectical considerations above, I 
think that this version of  Too Much Possibility is preferable, as its urgency and weight will 
 A second objection might be this: why assume that ‘M’ is a proper name? Can’t it be a predicate? 37
This idea is quite similar to the proposal of  solving Too Much Possibility by invoking universals, I 
think. I address that point in chapter 5.
 Note that this reflects the original formulation by Armstrong: ‘The object still has within itself, essen38 -
tially, a reference to the manifestation that did not occur.’ (Armstrong 1997: 79). 
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be more likely to be felt by a wider number of  metaphysicians. I think this is enough to 
suggest that we adopt it, when discussing Too Much Possibility.  
 However, it is important to reiterate that my main worry in what follows is the same 
that the Meinongian version targets — namely, that there is a problem in thinking that 
Independence understood as possibility of  non-existence (assumption III/C) can be 
paired with Directedness understood as a relation between powers and manifestations 
(assumption I/A). So, even if  the reader is not convinced by the defence of  the first 
formulation, insofar as they agree that a Meinongian metaphysics is not a welcome result, 
they can share my preoccupation with solving Too Much Possibility by rejecting one 
background assumption.  
 Before considering which among the background assumptions we should reject, 
however, we need to consider the possibility that the whole of  Armstrong’s argument rests 
on a conceptual confusion and is nothing but a pseudo-problem which, in a somewhat 
Wittgensteinian spirit, should be dissolved rather than solved. This will be the focus of  the 
next two chapters.  
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Chapter 2. Dissolving the Problem: Identity  
In this and the next chapter I examine two attempts at dissolving Too Much Possibility 
without rejecting any of  the background premisses. The first is based on the idea, defended 
by Anna Marmodoro (2016), that powers and their manifestations are numerically identical. 
If  that were the case, then it would trivially follow that the ontological status of  
manifestations is no more mysterious than that of  powers, and that it cannot be the case 
that a power being unexercised entails that its manifestation does not exist, since powers 
and manifestations are one and the same.  
 The second strategy I consider relies on identifying the manifestation of  powers 
with processes, and maintains that Too Much Possibility is based on an ambiguity of  
Independence, which can be understood as concerning either the process itself  that powers 
give rise to, or their endpoint. In a certain sense, this latter strategy involves abandoning 
Independence, at least as formulated in the reconstruction of  Armstrong’s argument 
above, and replacing it with a weaker principle, that I will call Interrupt. However, the 
strategy aims at accounting for the same intuition from which Independence stems, and 
exploits the unique resources available to process ontologies to maintain that no central 
tenet of  powers metaphysics has been violated.  
 Ultimately, I will argue that Too Much Possibility is a genuine problem whose 
solution requires abandoning substantive metaphysical background assumptions, and both 
attempts to dissolve it are ultimately unsatisfactory. 
2.1 Marmodoro’s Aristotelian Identity Theory 
The idea of  powers as directed properties is rooted in Aristotelian philosophy and in 
particular in his notions of  dunamis (often translated as ‘potentiality’) and energeia/entelecheia 
(often translated as ‘actuality’ or ‘actualisation’). If  we take a closer look at Aristotle’s texts, 
however, it becomes quickly apparent that his usage of  both dunamis and energeia/entelecheia 
do not map on the contemporary use of  powers and manifestations. Dunamis and energeia 
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are both predicated of  the instantiated property—of  the actual power (in our sense of  
‘actual’), not of  the manifestation.  This becomes even more clear when we attend more 39
closely to the meaning of  the two terms that he uses to describe ‘being in act’: energeia and 
entelecheia. ‘Energeia’ is best translated not as ‘actuality’, but as ‘activity’ (Kosman 2013). 
Something in act, for Aristotle, is something that is doing its job, something that is actively 
exercising its ability to fulfil its (proper) function:  
Aristotle asserts that energeia means activity, because it is connected with action and motion – the 
word ‘ergon’ indicating ‘work’ or ‘job’ but essentially ‘active functioning’ (whether the function is in 
fact a product of  action, like shoes, or the action itself, like shoemaking). The term energeia thus 
literally means something like ‘being in action’ i.e. ‘doing work’ or ‘exercise’ (Johnson 2005: 87).  
It is therefore a state or mode of  being in which an actual power can find itself  in; but a 
property not in act is not thereby not actual in our sense. Act and potency are both, 
according to Aristotle, features of  the actual power. The fact is, Aristotle does not seem to 
care one bit about the status of  the manifestation: he only seems to be concerned with the 
power.  
 Anna Marmodoro (2016) has argued that the contemporary insistence on powers 
and manifestations as distinct entities is misguided, and that we should adopt a theory of  
powers that matches more closely the Aristotelian picture sketched above, where 
manifestations are to be understood as the energeiai of  powers without being distinct 
entities.   40
 This becomes even more evident if  we consider the debate between Aristotle and the Megarians: 39
There are some who say, as the Megaric school does, that a thing can act only when it is acting, and 
when it is not acting it cannot act, e.g. he who is not building cannot build, but only he who is build-
ing, when he is building (Metaph. IX 3, 1046b28-32). It is clear that what the Megarians are denying 
is that there could be un-exercised powers— that is, they just deny Independence. 
 What follows is but the snapshot of  the stage in an ongoing discussion with Marmodoro; al40 -
though I hope to have represented her view accurately and I think that my objections are sound, I 
would be surprised if  this were to be the last word in the discussion.  
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  Marmodoro’s key move is that she ‘takes the manifestation of  a power to be the 
activated state of  the very same power, and not the occurrence of  a new 
power’ (Marmodoro 2016: 57). In short, she claims that:   
the activation of  a power is an internal “transition” from one state to another of  the very same 
power: its manifestation is not the occurrence of  a new power; rather it is simply a different state of  
the original power: an activated state […] The powerfulness of  a power is its capacity to actively 
engage in an activity (ibid.). 
She concludes that powers are not relational in nature: for the manifestation of  a power is 
not something else, but just itself  in a different state, its state of  activation. The upshot is that 
the whole Too Much Possibility argument rests on a misunderstanding of  powers 
metaphysics and is ultimately a pseudo-problem: powers and manifestations are numerically 
the same entities, so the existence and ontological status of  manifestations is no more 
problematic than the existence of  powers themselves. We cannot and should not solve Too 
Much Possibility, because it ultimately is a pseudo-problem. Let’s consider her position in 
more detail.  
 According to the view, powers only act in concert—they require mutual disposition 
partners. Say that there are two powers, P and Q, that are mutual disposition partners and 
end up interacting. The result of  their interaction (their mutual manifestation) is not some 
other power G, or some event e and so on. The result, rather, is that they both change their 
state. They both become activated. Within the interaction, we can distinguish two roles that 
the powers might have: the Agent and the Patient. The activated state of  the Agent consist 
in some activity which influences the Patient. On the other hand, the activated state of  the 
Patient is (or brings about—this ambiguity is crucial, I will argue) some change in the power 
or its bearer: ‘when a power is activated, it engages in the activity it is for, or it suffers the 
activity of  its power-partner’.  
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 Here energeia is understood as being the activity, the playing out of  something’s 
proper function. A power to see in potency, when activated, results in seeing. The 
manifestation of  the power to see just is the power to see, activated: the activity of  seeing. 
So, claims Marmodoro, there is no elusive manifestation whose metaphysical status is 
mysterious. There is just the same power, in another state. Her Aristotelian solution consists 
in a change of  framework, resulting in the dissolution of  the problem.  
 I think that her account suffers from a number of  difficulties, and this in turn is 
enough to undermine the idea that Too Much Possibility is a pseudo-problem. I will focus 
on two issues. The first concerns the ontological status of  the power’s states: what are they, 
exactly? Doesn’t Too Much Possibility risk to re-surface at the level of  the active states, 
instead of  at the level of  manifestations? The second concerns how Marmodoro’s theory 
can account for change and our explanations thereof: how can we use her powers to make 
sense of  the fact that the two massy objects were attracted to each other, as opposed to 
being repulsed, or that I walked left instead of  right?  
 Let’s start from the first issue. What are the states that powers can be in? What is an 
activated state, before the power enters in it? The identity of  a power, since it cannot rely 
on the manifestation (for the manifestation is numerically identical with the power), must be 
connected to the qualitative state that occurs when the power is activated, when it 
encounters its dispositional partners. Surely, the identity of  a power must encode what kind 
of  states the power can enter. And, surely, Independence demands that certain activated 
states never obtain: a power can exist without ever entering its activated state.  
 If  we are allowed to reify such states, then it seems that we can offer a version of  
Too Much Possibility that targets states instead of  manifestations. Roughly, the argument 
runs as follows:  
i) Powers are directed at their activated states  
ii) Therefore, there are activated states  
iii) Powers can exist without their activated state existing  
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iv) Therefore, there are non-existing activated states  
Why should talk of  a power’s various qualitative states, some of  which can fail to occur, be 
any different and less problematic than talk of  a numerically distinct manifestation? I find it 
quite natural to consider activated and non-activated states to be just states of  affairs which 
share some of  their components, namely the power involved in them.  
 I suspect that the options available to Marmodoro to avoid this version of  Too 
Much Possibility targeted at states will closely resemble those employed by the defenders of  
the ‘Physical Intentionality’ strategy against Armstrong’s original argument which I will 
discuss, and ultimately find inadequate, in chapter 4, and for this reason, I will not focus on 
this objection excessively here.   
2.2 Changes and Activities  
Even if  we momentarily discard the issue of  the ontological status and nature of  
“qualitative states”, there is another problem that afflicts Marmodoro’s theory and which 
ultimately makes it an unsatisfactory metaphysics of  powers. The problem is how 
Marmodoro’s theory can account for ordinary changes, and in particular for contrastive 
explanations of  these changes.  
 The world is a constantly evolving place: things acquire and lose properties, move 
around in space, and so on, and the activity of  powers is (at least sometimes) what makes 
things change and evolve. But if  all that powers do is just pass from their potential state to 
their active state, how can we account for such change? How can we justify that nothing 
remains the same? Note that this is not the old, standard accusation that powers are always 
packing, never travelling or that all there is to change is a ‘passing powers around’. There is 
no problem with passing powers around, as long as different entities (e.g. different 
properties) are involved. The water first had the power to dissolve salt, and now, having 
effectively dissolved the salt, it has the power of  making humans who drink it dehydrate. 
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No problem here (Mumford 2009). What I do not understand is how there can be change 
when the powers that are passed around turn out to be the same power.   
 Take, for instance change in spatial location. At t0, a is at some location L. At t1, it is 
at L*. Why? The obvious answer is that something made it move: there is a nearby massive 
object, b, that has pushed a from L to L*. Our run-of-the-mill power theorist will say: b had 
some power P whose manifestation was the truthmaker for ‘a is at L*’ (be it some event, 
state of  affairs, what have you). But, according to Marmodoro, the only power that a and b 
can have is that of  entering in their activated state. So, in this case, a would have the patient 
power of  being pushed, and b the agent power of  being pushing. But how does this, alone, 
explain the fact that a has actually moved to L*? And how can it account for the fact that it 
has moved to L* instead of  L**? How is it that being in the activated state of  being moved 
results in an actual change that is not just the change <a is in state P, a is in state A>?  
 Perhaps the difficulty can be made clearer if  we adopt the following schematic 
reconstruction of  the interaction. ‘AP’ and ‘PP’ stand for ‘Agent Power’ and ‘Patient Power’, 
respectively. The subscripts ‘a’ and ‘p’ stand for activated state and potentiality state. The 
following are the stages of  an interaction between two powers, according to Marmodoro’s 
theory:   
I) APp and PPp are not interacting (hence their both being in a potentiality state)  
II) AP and PP are in a position to interact and they both activate: APp becomes APa and 
PPp becomes PPa 
III) APa is engaged in the activity it is for, and PPa ‘suffers the activity of  its power-partner’ 
IV) Change C occurs: e.g. PP and its bearer are now located in a different place L*.  
The problematic passage is the one from III to IV. How is it that being in an activated state 
generates certain events or brings certain states of  affairs about, such as being located at 
L*? Why doesn’t the interaction only result in both powers being in a different state? That is 
to say, why doesn’t the model stop at step III)? 
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 Marmodoro suggests that ‘an important feature that can ground classifying a power 
as active is if  the power is bringing about change in another power (or its bearer)... If  the 
power’s activity brings about change, then the effect of  the power’s activity is a new power 
that is generated in the process’ (Marmodoro 2016: 74). How does this work? How can a 
new power be generated, if  the only thing that happens in an interaction is a transition from 
one state to the other?   
 The most natural explanation I can think of  is that a being in an active state is a 
power whose manifestation is the generation of  a new power, or some other appropriate 
numerically distinct manifestation: events, states of  affairs, etc. But that is exactly what 
Marmodoro’s theory purports to deny. So there must be a different story.  41
 According to her theory, the activation of  the patient power brings about a change: 
‘The power fulfilling the active causal role is activated, while the power fulfilling the passive causal 
role is activated, and, often, changes as well’ (Marmodoro 2016: 70, my emphasis). But this change 
is not the manifestation of  the power, but only a by-product, as it were, of  the power being in 
its activated state. How can there be by-products without powers being involved? These by-
products are caused or brought about by something (the patient power being activated), but 
they are not the manifestations of  that activity, and hence are not its effects.  
 Consider the case of  mass. Marmodoro will presumably maintain that its activated 
state is the existence of  a gravitational field. So far, so good: the gravitational field is the 
power being activated. But then, the gravitational field makes objects move: the forces of  the 
field result in a change in the location of  massy objects. This seems to be the manifestation 
of  mass, or of  the action of  the gravitational field, which is the same power. It is these events, 
namely the changes in location of  the massy objects, that we have been concerned with so 
far. Marmodoro can deny that they are manifestations of  mass, strictly speaking: the 
gravitational field is (similarly, Cartwright & Pemberton 2013 distinguish between 
 Marmodoro pointed out in personal correspondence that in her account not all effects are mani41 -
festations of  powers But, if  their possibility is not grounded upon powers, then her theory is not 
suitable to ground Dispositionalism, even in its modest form, so her proposal would automatically 
be disqualified. Given that this is the project I am interested in, I have to assume that there is some 
way in which her theory can ground all property instantiations in time and space upon powers.
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manifestations and effects). But then she still has to tell us a story that links the gravitational 
field and these further changes.  42
 I suspect that this difficulty is rooted in too narrow a focus on a certain kind of  
Aristotelian changes, namely those that he calls ‘activities’ (energeiai). In Metaphysics IX 6., 
Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of  dunameis: one, commonsensical, that brings 
about movements (kinesis) and another, more elusive kind which is the real target of  his 
discussion, resulting in activities (energeiai).  The difference between a kinesis and an energeia is 
this. Movements have their end (telos) outside themselves. For instance, walking to the 
marketplace has its end in being at the market, which is something distinct from walking 
there. (Coope 2007). Similarly, building a house is a movement, because its end is an 
artefact, e.g. the built house.  Note that, since the realisation of  movements lies outside the 43
movements themselves, they cannot be co-present: there cannot be at the same time the 
movement (my walking to the market, my building the house) and its completion or goal 
(me being at the market, the finished house).  
 However, there is another kind of  capacities, whose realisation or end lies precisely 
in their very activation (Witt 2003, Kosman 2013). These are called ‘activities’. The goal of  
strolling is just being strolling—so, the power to stroll being exercised coincides with its end 
goal. There is no ‘pointing towards’ any further or external goal here: strolling is just the 
activation of  the capacity to stroll, and does not require any reference to anything further in 
order to be understood. Metaphysically speaking, the identity of  strolling does not depend 
on any further entity.  The relation between a first and a second entelechy is of  this kind: 44
 The point resembles the proposal of  adopting processes as manifestation for powers that I will 42
discuss in the next chapter. 
 To be fair, this is controversial: one can also think that the telos of  the dunamis to build is the pro43 -
cess of  building. See Ross (1949) for a classic argument to the effect that the telos of  building is the 
artifact.
 Aristotle does not distinguish between these two directly in this way: he offers a linguistic test for 44
distinguishing these two, the so-called ‘tense test’. The test, in short, is this: activities, but not 
movements, allow us to infer the perfect tense of  the verb from the present tense. This is harder to 
understand in English, since the perfect tense is expressed with the past tense, but an example 
would be: if  I am strolling, it is true at each moment that I have completed the strolling. In the case 
of  movements, on the other hand, the inference does not go through: if  I am building it does not 
follow that I have completed the building. 
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the end of  the capacity to speak French is actually speaking French, and of  being able to see 
is actually the activity of  seeing.   45
 I suspect that Marmodoro, in saying that the manifestation of  every power is its 
being in a state of  activation, has extended the peculiarities of  activities to every power: she 
treats every power as if  it were the dunamis for an energeia. But, despite playing a key role in 
Aristotle’s philosophy, capacities for activities do not exhaust the field of  properties or 
powers. Indeed, most powers that are commonly discussed would be among those that 
produce movements. And such powers make reference to something besides themselves: 
namely, an external telos. The power to build makes reference to the house that will be 
eventually produced, the power to walk to the marketplace makes reference to the state of  
affairs  of  being in the marketplace (Coope 2007). And it is precisely that status of  the 46
house, or the state of  affairs of  being in the market, that concerned us under the header of  
‘manifestation’. Therefore, Marmodoro’s account is, at best, incomplete: it stops short of  
the problem that was puzzling us. To see why this is the case, consider the role of  
contrastive explanations in our understanding of  changes. 
2.3 Activities and Contrastive Explanations  
It seems to me relatively unproblematic to say that the sort of  activities described by 
Aristotle and Marmodoro do produce and result in specific changes: my strolling in the 
park brings it about that I am near the fountain at t1 and near the bench at t2. These changes 
are causally brought about by the activity of  strolling, even if  strolling was not directed at 
being near the bench. So, the problem with Marmodoro’s account is not that it is 
mysterious how the agent and patient power’s being in an activated state can result in some 
change C. My activity of  strolling produced the change of  me going from my room to the 
bench in the park. The problem is that, ordinarily, we do also want to know something 
about why an activity produced a given by-product, as opposed to another: why did I end 
 See Arist. EN X 4, 1174a14-b6, and especially de An 2.5, 417a21-30. 45
 For a convincing argument to the effect that Aristotle adopted an ontology of  states of  affairs, 46
see Crivelli (2004).
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up at the bench, rather than near the supermarket, as a result of  my activity? That is, we 
need to offer an explanation of  the particular changes resulting from activities.    
 We can formulate a dilemma: since these changes are distinct from the activity of  
strolling, either i) they are produced by it and powers are involved, in which case there is not 
always numerical identity between a power and its manifestation, or ii) they are not 
produced by it, in which case Marmodoro can maintain that there is always numerical 
identity between a power and its manifestations, but her theory of  powers cannot account 
for a considerable portion of  the changes and goings-on in the world. Compare this case 
with the previous example of  mass, gravitational fields, and actual displacement of  massy 
objects. A theory of  gravitation that could explain gravitational fields but not, in turn, the 
movements of  massy objects would not be a good physical theory: it would be no use in 
predicting whether the rocket will reach Mars or not.  
 To this point Marmodoro will object something along these lines:  
The lack of  a directedness relation does not mean that there is not causation or production of  
changes of  any kind. The activity of  strolling results, as an incidental by-product, in my change of  
location: I was strolling in the woods and ended up in Shincliffe. Strolling is not directed at being in 
Shincliffe, but it is obvious that it is my strolling that brought it about that I’m there. The difference 
between i) strolling and ending up in Shincliffe and ii) walking to Shincliffe is that the former 
activity can be understood without mentioning the village, whereas the motion depends on it for its 
identity: walking to Shincliffe is not the same as walking to Neville’s Cross. Activities such as 
strolling, then, can bring about changes, even if  these are not essential to their identity. 
 So, Marmodoro could say that her account only describes a subset of  powers —activities—
but can perfectly explain how these in turn produce other changes. She can then re-state her 
claim: a significant class of  powers work that way, and it is misguided to look for a distinct 
manifestation for those.  
 This account cannot be complete. Firstly, I take it that Marmodoro is committed to 
the thesis that powers being exercised have some important connection with causal goings-
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on. This, superficially, seems to be the case on her account: it is, after all, the activation of  
my power to stroll that caused my being in Shincliffe. However, the state of  affairs [GG is 
in Shincliffe at t1] is an accidental by-product of  the activity of  the power: the manifestation 
of  the power of  strolling is just strolling—the whole point of  the identity account is that 
no reference to anything but the power is required. So far, so good. The problem is that this 
theory does not allow us to formulate any contrastive explanation for the fact that I am in 
Shincliffe: it cannot account why I am in Shincliffe rather than in Gilesgate at t1. After all, 
both states of  affairs could be accidental by-products of  the activation of  the power to 
stroll. Or, indeed, I could have been strolling in circles in my own room the whole time. But 
an account of  causation that does not ground contrastive explanations cannot be 
satisfactory: it is contrastive explanations that we care about, most of  the time, when we 
talk about causation and changes. When I ask why the window is broken, I am interested in 
knowing why it is broken rather than intact. It is hard not to be suspicious of  a theory of  
powers that cannot ground such contrastive explanations. The account seem to have 
nothing to say about the link between the activated power and what happens in the world, 
even if  we concede that activated powers do bring about changes.   
 Secondly, I have spoken so far of  the activated state of  a power (its activity) as a 
process. But, obviously, it cannot be a process, if  Marmodoro’s position is really an identity 
theory: powers are properties, and processes, well, are processes. In short, the initial 
question that I have laid aside re-surfaces:: what is an activated state? Either i) it is a process, 
or ii) it is not. 
 If  the activated state is not a process, but the activation of  powers does incidentally 
generate processes or events such as changes, it is not easy to understand what link there is 
between activated state and the by-product state of  affairs or process. The activated state 
would be a middleman between a dormant power and a state of  affairs or process. But then 
it is unclear what is its role: what does the activated state bring to the table, given that it is 
not directed towards the process? If  we accept that identity is transitive, and powers are 
distinct from processes, then identity theory has to break down somewhere: either the 
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activation of  a power is not identical with the power, or it is not identical with the resulting 
process or state of  affairs.  
 Assume that the activated state is a process, then. If  we want to retain the specificity 
of  Marmodoro’s identity identity theory, then she has to maintain that there is no 
categorical distinction between processes and properties. The activated state just is a 
process, but is also identical with the power, because power and process are one and the 
same thing. I find this idea quite hard to understand. Let me just note this puzzling 
consequence: the identity between powers and processes would entail that there are ‘inactive 
processes’, corresponding to inactive powers. But what is an inactive process? What is the 
difference with an active one?  
 Perhaps none of  the arguments above are knock-down; but I find the resulting 
picture to be rather perplexing. Marmodoro’s rejection of  Too Much Possibility as a 
pseudo-problem was based on the adoption of  her identity theory of  powers; but her 
theory seems to raise harder questions and more problems. So, I suggest that we abandon 
Marmodoro’s proposal for dissolving  Too Much Possibility.  
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Chapter 3. Dissolving the Problem II: Processes   
Discussing Marmodoro’s theory, we have seen that it seems to involve three elements: 
powers, their activated states, and processes. I have argued that, in this picture, it is unclear 
what role activated states were supposed to play, and that postulating an identity between 
activated states and either powers or processes did lead to a number of  somewhat baffling 
results. However, the idea that the exercising of  powers results in the unfolding of  a 
process has some plausibility and appeal (Mumford and Anjum 2011). Maintaining that 
processes are the manifestations of  powers offers unexpected resources for thinking that 
Too Much Possibility can be dissolved: the fact that they are homoeomerous (like-parted); 
this means that, if  a process is occurring during an interval, then the very same  process is 47
also occurring during any of  its sub-intervals. This unique feature allows us to say that there 
is numerical identity between a process that develops fully and reaches its natural endpoint 
and one that is interrupted before reaching its endpoint. After presenting the two main 
theories of  processes in §§3.2-3, in §3.4 I suggest that, if  we think that processes are the 
manifestations of  powers, we can perhaps abandon Independence in favour of  a weaker 
thesis, Interrupt, according to which every power must produce the process that it is for, 
but it need not complete it, and thus disarm Too Much Possibility. In §3.5 I will argue, 
however, that adopting processes as manifestations of  powers is not the way forward.  
3.1 Processes  
A metaphysics of  processes offers some unexpected resources, I believe, to deal with Too 
Much Possibility. Processes prima facie allow us to resist and dissolve the argument, by 
distinguishing between two ambiguous readings of  Independence. This would be an 
interesting result, because the appeal to irreducible processes is linked with Dynamism and 
as such is considered to be part and parcel of  radical powers metaphysics. Recall:  
 Standardly, being homoeomerous is taken to require only type-identity between whole and parts. 47
However, as it will become apparent in the following sections, some (namely Stout) invoke a 
stronger notion, which requires token identity between a whole process and its parts. 
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Dynamism Powers are dynamic and active. A world of  powers is not a passive mechanism 
that receives its activity from an external source, but is itself  the source of  change.  
The most convincing way to cash out Dynamism involves the idea that exercised powers 
give rise to an irreducible process  terminating, eventually, in what we have so far referred 48
to as the manifestation of  the power. This suggests that there is a certain ambiguity in the 
notion of  a manifestation of  a power: it could refer either to the process or to its endpoint 
or telos. It is precisely this ambiguity that might be exploited to reconcile Directedness and 
Independence; or so the idea goes. This would mean that stronger and more contentious 
versions of  powers metaphysics are better placed to avoid the fatal contradiction threatened 
by Armstrong’s argument.  49
  Unfortunately, powers theorists who cash out Dynamism in terms of  processes 
tend not to offer much attention to the metaphysical characterisation of  process ontologies: 
both Handfield (2008) and Mumford & Anjum (2011), for instance, focus mainly on the 
formal models that could be employed to represent certain causal processes (Feynman 
diagrams and vector spaces, respectively). As a result, there is some underdetermination as 
far as the precise theory of  processes that is involved in radical powers metaphysics. I will 
quickly examine two theories of  irreducible processes, namely Mass Process Theories, 
proposed inter alios by Alexander Mourelatos, Jennifer Hornsby, and Thomas Crowther, and 
Individual Process Theories (also known as ‘Occurrent Continuants’), defended among 
others by Rowland Stout, Helen Steward, and Antony Galton, and see whether they can 
help us dissolving Too Much Possibility.  
 For this reason, I will not engage in Neil Williams’ assessment and critique of  processes as mani48 -
festations, as he considers them to be nothing over and above ‘protracted, structured events’ (Willi-
ams 2019: 131). See also Giannini (ms.).
 Proponents of  Dynamism include Stephen Mumford & Rani Anjum (2011, 2018) Ruth Groff  49
(2013, ms.), and arguably Toby Handfield (2008) and Nancy Cartwright and John Pemberton (2013). 
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3.2 Mass Process Theories 
The first requirement for a theory of  primitive processes is to clearly distinguish them from 
events. In particular, it is paramount that processes are not reduced to a series of  events: 
‘processes have no motionless parts. Indeed, in no real sense does a process have parts at 
all... The process is, in reality, an indivisible unity’ (Mumford and Anjum 2018b: 71). 
However, moving past the negative characterisation is not easy. Let’s start with a linguistic 
detour.   
 Alexander Mourelatos (1978) argued that the distinction between events, states, and 
processes is not to be traced to families of  lexical verb types, as Vendler (1957) and Kenny 
(1963) thought. Rather, the difference emerges at the predicative level. He noted that there 
is a feature of  Indo-European languages that marks such difference: verbal aspect. In 
particular, events are expressed via perfective predications, whereas imperfective 
predications express processes: this can be clearly observed in sentences such as ‘John was 
reading [activity, imperfective] when I entered [achievement, perfective]’ (Mourelatos 1978: 
418).   
 Importantly, this is no mere grammatical feature; rather, our language  tracks a 50
fundamental metaphysical distinction. This is made evident when we operate a 
nominalisation transcription on the sentence in question, which involves ‘rewriting a basic 
predication in such a way that the predication becomes an explicit quantification and the 
main verb is transformed into a kind of  noun; the nominalization therefore can be thought 
of  as revealing the hidden quantification that many philosophers and linguists have 
discerned lurking beneath the structure of  many sentences which do not look, on the face 
of  it, to be quantificational in form’ (Steward 2012: 759)—a strategy not unlike the one 
adopted by Davidson (1967) to show how ordinary predications  presuppose an ontology 
of  events.  
 By this I mean Indo-European languages—unfortunately I have to admit that I do not know how 50
widespread this feature is in other languages. Thanks to Jiwon Kim for pointing this out. 
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 When we operate such a nominalisation, a striking difference emerges between 
perfective and imperfective sentences. Consider the two following sentences and their two 
nominalisations:  
i) Jones pushed the cart to the top of  the hill (Perfective)  
ii) Jones pushed the cart for hours (Imperfective) 
iii) Jones was painting the Nativity (Progressive)  
iv) There was a pushing of  the cart to the top of  the hill by Jones (Nominalisation of  
perfective) 
v) There was pushing of  the cart for hours by Jones (Nominalisation of  imperfective)  
vi) There was painting of  the Nativity by Jones (Nominalisation of  progressive) 
The quantifiers in the nominalisations of  the perfective sentences range over countable 
individuals—things like books, teapots, or persons, which we refer to using sortal terms. 
This is not so in the case of  imperfective sentences: they seem to quantify over stuff, the 
sort of  thing we refer to with mass-nouns, like water or gold. As Mourelatos notes:  
The pushing and the painting in these contexts do not have the terminus or closure that would 
allow us to speak of  a pushing or a painting—we are not told that the cart was pushed some place, 
or that the Nativity did get painted. The parallel with simple nouns for these transcriptions is not in 
sentences of  the form ‘There is at least one K’; it is rather in sentences of  the same form as ‘There 
is snow on the roof,’ or ‘There is gold in this mountain’ (Mourelatos 1978: 427).  
From this observation Mourelatos, Hornsby (1980; 2012), and Crowther (2011; ms.) draw 
the analogy that Things : Stuff  = Events : Processes. They argue that we should attribute to 
processes similar features to those we attribute to stuff; in particular, the fact that they are 
not countable individuals. There are not token processes, but only types. There cannot be two 
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waters; just more or less water. Similarly, there cannot be two pushings; just more or less 
pushing. We can then formulate the first feature of  mass theories of  processes:  
Process Type: Processes come only in types. There are no token processes, no individual 
processes.  
The things/events  and stuff/processes analogies lead Mourelatos to single out another key 
feature of  processes, which will be extraordinarily important in what follows. He notes that:  
a substance is not homogeneous—or, to use the more precise term used by the ancients, 
homoeomerous, “like-parted”. A clock is not made of  clocks. Correspondingly, an event E is not 
made up of  E-events: the capsizing of  a boat is not made up of  boat-capsizing. Stuffs are 
homoeomerous: if  X is gold, then all parts of  X are gold. Processes are homoeomerous. 
(Mourelatos 1978: 430)  
More precisely, we can express this property with the following principle:    




then O was φ-ing during 
any subinterval between t1 and t2.  
From this principle, we can conclude that processes’ identity, unlike that of  events, is not 
determined at all by their temporal boundaries—the very same φ-ing goes on between 
distinct stretches of  time. And indeed, if  there are only types of  processes, it is hard to think 
how their spatiotemporal coordinates could play an essential role in fixing their identity.  
 Note that this does not mean that processes have to be such that every interval has 
to be indistinguishable from any other, and not composed of  qualitatively different sub-
processes. That is a further property, which Crowther (2011) calls Homogenity. We don’t 
have to think that all processes need to be homogeneous, as the uniform acceleration of  a 
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body described in Newtonian laws of  motion would be, for instance. Processes can be 
varied and have different stages—different things happen when I am digesting, say: 
mastication is quite different from the action of  hydrochloric acid and pepsin in the 
stomach. However, there is a sense in which the same process is occurring in both occasions: 
digesting. At each moment is true that I am digesting, even if  digestion is made of  
qualitatively different sub-processes. That is to say: we can maintain that processes are 
homoeomerous and recognise that complex processes can consist of  different, non-
homogeneous phases.  51
 Secondly, we have to recognise that the analogy with many ordinary mass nouns is 
not perfect and might break down. Consider the case of  the referents of  mass terms such 
as water or gold. As a rule of  thumb, the inference from ‘O is made of  water’ to ‘a proper 
part of  O is made of  water’ works. But obviously at a certain point it breaks down, and 
therefore we cannot consider it a valid inference: if  O is a single molecule of  water, then its 
proper part won’t be water itself, but rather an atom of  oxygen or hydrogen. Similarly, with 
simple chemical elements: if  we divide a piece of  gold enough times, we will end up not 
with gold, but with just a couple of  fundamental particles—say, a couple of  electrons. This 
is not the case for stuff-like processes: if  I am walking from t1 to t2, then it must be the case 
that I am walking at any sub-interval, even an extremely short one, even if  it would not be 
possible to complete an act of  walking in that interval. In short, the analogy only works if  
we consider those mass nouns that refer to entities that really are stuff, all the way down, and 
not just stuff  that can be reduced to countable entities.   52
 Finally, one might be tempted to assimilate Mourelatos’ processes to Aristotle’s 
activities (energeiai), which, as we saw in the previous chapter, he contrasts with movements. 
The assimilation is tempting because Aristotle offers a test, known as the ‘tense test’, to 
individuate activities that seems to rely on Homoeomerous:  
 This is particularly important for the powers theorist who wants to understand causal processes 51
along the lines of  Mumford and Anjum’s ‘sweet solution’ (2011:121).
 For instance, the metaphysics of  Anaxagoras could be a good example (Marmodoro 2017b). In 52
Aristotelian science, that would work with the elements, e.g. earth or water.
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at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking 
and have thought: but it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or are 
being cured and have been cured. At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and are 
happy and have been happy. If  not, the process would have had sometime to cease, as the process 
of  making thin ceases: but, as it is, it does not cease; we are living and have lived. Of  these 
processes, then, we must call the one set movements (kineseis), and the other actualities (energeias) 
(Metaph. IX 6 1048b).  
I think that such an assimilation would be a mistake. Aristotle’s distinction between 
movement and activity, as we have seen in the section on Marmodoro’s proposal, is based 
on their different telic structure, that is, the different relations that these acts have with their 
endpoint, and the tense test is just a way to make such a structure explicit: movements are 
the sort of  acts that have their goal beyond themselves (indeed, reaching the goal brings the 
movement to an end), whereas activities have an immanent goal, as it were—the goal is 
within the activity itself.  It is the activity itself. Compare the case of  building a house with 53
just playing at building a house.  The former is a movement, because its telos is something 54
different from itself  (namely, the completed house), while the latter is an activity, because its 
goal is within the action itself: the point of  playing is playing, not anything that might be 
produced as a result of  the activity. This is made evident if  we attend the success conditions 
of  the two activities: if  a builder stops halfway through and just forgets to build a roof  on 
the house we would think that she’s a bad builder and that she has not done her job: we 
would not be happy to pay for the house. On the other hand, if  a child was building a 
house as part of  a game (or making-believe that she was a builder) and stopped before 
installing the roof, we would not think that she has failed in her activity. She has not failed 
to successfully play.  
 Aristotle’s distinction is closer to the one offered by Vendler and Kenny, based on different famil53 -
ies of  verb types. 
 ‘For example, in the building of  a house, the product is not the act of  building or of  being built, 54
but the building, that is, the house itself, which results from this act.’ (Kosman 1969: 41).
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 Mourelatos’ account of  processes is, instead, perfectly neutral on the telic structure 
of  said processes (Mourelatos 1993). It is based on their quantificational behaviour, not on 
their relation to an end or goal. Indeed, no indication is provided on the role or importance 
of  the terminus or telos of  the process, if  there is one at all; his account is more general. 
This can easily be seen from the fact that actions such as walking do correspond to 
processes in Mourelatos’ theory, whereas they are paradigmatic cases of  movements for 
Aristotle: ‘For every movement is incomplete—making thin, learning, walking, building; 
these are movements, and incomplete movements’ (Arist. Metaph. XI 6 1048b29).  
3.3 Individual Process Theories  
Not all theories of  irreducible processes take the analogy with stuff  and mass-nouns as 
their starting point, however. In particular, Rowland Stout (1997; 2016) Antony Galton 
(Galton 2003; 2006; Galton and Mizoguchi 2009) and Helen Steward (2013; 2015) all admit 
individual processes—that is, they maintain that there are token processes, as well as types. 
This is possible because the distinction between processes and events is not based on the 
different quantificational structure of  perfective/imperfective sentences. Processes are not 
distinguished from events because they behave like stuff.  55
 Rather, according to Stout, the difference between processes and events lies in the 
different way they exist in time. Events, he argues, are temporally extended thanks to the 
fact that they spread out across time, much like the objects persist according to perdurantism. 
Processes, on the other hand, extend in time in quite a different way than how they extend 
in space: they persist by enduring, much like three-dimensional objects. This means, 
according to Stout, that processes bear properties at a time, whereas events bear properties 
atemporally.   56
 To be fair, this is not precisely true of  Steward (2013), who adopts the Mourelatos conception 55
and attempts to then extend it to individual processes. I will focus on Stout’s theory in what follows. 
 It is not fully clear to me how to flesh out this idea in detail: I suspect that what Stout has in mind 56
is close to an adverbialist position about persistence (e.g. Lowe 1988, Haslanger 1989), so that for an 
entity to have properties at a time just means that instantiation is time-indexed (the apple is green t-
ly and is red t’-ly). That is to say, for something to have a property at a time just is for it to have a 
time-indexed relation of  instantiation. 
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 Since processes are to be distinguished from events on the basis of  the way they 
occupy time, rather than their stuff-like behaviour, we have no particular reason to believe 
that they are not countable, and that there are no token processes. To support his point, he 
maintains that there could be non-trivial questions of  re-identification of  processes, such as 
the following, which couldn’t arise if  processes were only type-like entities, like Mourelatos, 
Hornsby, and Crowther think:   
Suppose I see a bush fire spreading through one bit of  countryside and then some time later see a 
bush fire spreading through another bit. There is one sense in which it is fairly obvious that what is 
happening in each case is the same thing—namely a bush fire spreading through the countryside. 
But there is a further question which we may be interested in, and which is naturally expressed by 
asking whether it is the very same process of  fire spreading which is observed on both occasions 
(Stout 1997: 21).  
If  such questions are intelligible and not trivially answerable, then we have to recognise that 
there are individual processes, thus accepting:  
Process Token: The type/token distinction applies to processes, and there are token 
processes.  
Stout thinks that the fact processes are continuants also allows us to derive a stronger 
version of  Homoeomerous involving sameness of  numerical identity between a process 
and one of  its sub-intervals. The identity of  a process, much like that of  a three-
dimensional substance, has little to do with its temporal location: Napoleon at 45 was 
identical to Napoleon at 25. Similarly, a process at the later stages of  its development is 
strictly identical to that process at its earlier stages. This is the case also with transworld 
identity:  Napoleon in @ is identical to the Napoleon in w who died before becoming 57
 Naturally, the argument presupposes that there is genuine numerical identity between individuals 57
in different possible worlds. 
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emperor. Similarly, for processes: if  a particular apple a undergoes a token process of  
decaying at @, then if  same apple at some other world w undergoes decaying will undergo 
the numerically same token process. This is the case even if  at w the process is prematurely 
interrupted:   
We want to say at one stage of  the apple’s decay that the very same process was going on as was 
going on at an earlier stage. But suppose that something interfered with the process so that the later 
stage never happened—perhaps the half-rotten apple was put into deep-freeze. This would not 
affect the identity of  the process at the earlier stage before the interference. What was happening 
before the interference is not affected by whether or not the interference occurred (Stout 1997: 21).  
The argument can be reconstructed as follows:  
1. x at @ = x at w. 
2. x’s φ-ing at @ =  x’s φ-ing at w. 
3. Complete (x’s φ-ing at @). 
4. Interrupted (x’s φ-ing at w). 
5. Interrupted (x’s φ-ing at w)  = Proper Part of  x’s φ-ing at @. 
6. Therefore, x’s φ-ing at @ = Proper Part of  x’s φ-ing at @ (From Indiscernibility of  
Identicals, 2., 5.).  
The conclusion amounts to saying that the stronger, token version of   Homoeomerous 
holds: if  it is true that o was φ-ing between t1 and t2, then o was φ-ing during any subinterval 
between t1 and t2.  58
 Note that Aristotle would conceded that this principole holds only for activities, which we have 58
seen constitute a  more restricted class than processes (they are processes with a particular telic 
structure).  
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3.4 Dissolving Too Much Possibility 
How are processes, thus understood, supposed to help with Armstrong’s argument? Prima 
facie, processes do not seem to be in a better position than events, states of  affairs and the 
like when it comes to dealing with Too Much Possibility; if  we take Independence to mean 
that processes might not take place, then it does not seem that we can make sense of  the 
directedness of  powers without appealing to merely possible processes and their ilk—therefore 
having to distinguish between actual and non-actual processes. We have already seen that this 
is not very helpful. What is interesting about processes, however, is that they allow us to 
distinguish between two formulations of  Independence and to think that the principle is 
ambiguous.  
 The distinction that I have in mind is between the process itself  and its terminus or 
telos, that is to say, its completion point, its goal. This distinction obviously applies only to 
those processes that Aristotle would have categorised as movements—processes whose telos is 
not immanent to the process itself—which is why it was important to distinguish processes 
from Aristotelian activities. With regard to these processes, we can interpret Independence 
in two distinct ways, one stronger and one weaker.  
IND-Process:  The manifestation M of  a power P is a certain process, φ-ing. The power 
can exist without there ever be any φ-ing.  
IND-Telos: The manifestation M of  a power P is a certain process, φ-ing, which has a 
certain telos T. The power can exist and produce the process of  φ-ing, which however might 
not be completed, and thus without T occurring.   
IND-Process is stronger than IND-Telos in the sense that IND-Process entails IND-Telos, 
but not vice versa: if  a power directed at some process φ-ing can exist without the φ-ing 
occurring, a fortiori it can exist without the endpoint or telos of  that process occurring. On 
the other hand, if  a power directed at some φ-ing can exist without the telos T of  φ-ing 
occurring, this does not mean that it can exist without any φ-ing occurring.  
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 It is at least somewhat ambiguous whether the manifestation of  a power is the 
process, or the process’ telos is:   59
Powers are not just for the end point of  the causal transaction, such as the property of  being 
dissolved that is the end point of  solubility. The power is for the whole process that takes a sugar 
cube from being in liquid to being dissolved (Mumford & Anjum 2018b: 66). 
This ambiguity can offer us, perhaps, enough elbow room to escape Too Much Possibility. 
If  we disambiguate IND as IND-Process the account will face the usual difficulties: we 
need to distinguish between an actual and a merely possible process. But it is not 
immediately clear that the problem emerges if  we take IND-Telos instead. The reason for 
this has to do with Homoeomerous. If  we adopt IND-Telos, the process theorist can say 
that the manifestation qua process is always and necessarily occurring—it is as actual as the 
power. Every time that there is a power, there is the process that the power manifests. Only, 
certain processes reach their telos and complete, and others do not, so that their telos might 
not be actualised. Processes can be interrupted before they reach, and bring about, their 
natural endpoint. Because of  Homoeomerous, an interrupted process is identical 
(numerically and in kind) to a non-interrupted process: we can just consider the interrupted 
process to be a sub-interval of  the interrupted one, which by Homoeomerous is identical 
to the whole. In short, the proposal is to turn Independence into a milder principle:  
Interrupt: The manifestation of  powers can be interrupted, interfered or tampered with 
before it reaches its telos.  
How is this supposed to help with Armstrong’s argument? The idea is simple: just replace 
Independence with Interrupt, while preserving the intuition that supported the thesis, as 
 Perhaps Marmodoro’s attempt to dissolve Too Much Possibility relies on exploiting a similar am59 -
biguity, and her strategy is not too different from the one available to process theorists. In that case, 
we can consider the arguments against the latter to also carry some weight against the former. 
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well as all the work that Independence was supposed to do. If  we do so, then it is always 
the case that powers do manifest, for the manifestation of  powers is the process, and 
powers always bring about the process, even if  the process is later interrupted, because an 
interrupted process is numerically identical to a non-interrupted one. Thus, we do not need 
to worry about the status of  unmanifested manifestations, because, strictly speaking, there 
are no such things. We can capture everything that Independence was supposed to convey 
by using Interrupt—maintaining that every manifestation-process can be interrupted. But 
an interrupted process is the same entity as a non-interrupted one, so nothing 
metaphysically weird goes on in those cases. 
 Consider a case of  interruption discussed by Neil Williams: 
Two brothers, Angus and Malcolm, are hiking in Australia when Angus has the misfortune of  being 
bitten by a highly venomous Tiger Snake. His foot swells at the location of  the bite, and Angus 
starts to sweat as his breathing becomes laboured. Lucky for him, Malcolm is no stranger to snake 
bites, so quickly splints and binds the area, thereby limiting the flow of  venom. Nevertheless, a small 
amount of  the potent neurotoxin in the venom begins to work its way through Angus’s system, and 
he starts finding it harder and harder to move. Malcolm resorts to carrying Angus, and in due time 
arrives at a local emergency ward, where an anti-venom is administered. Angus recovers, and has 
little to show for his encounter beyond a minor wound and an exciting tale (Williams 2019: 132).  
Williams thinks that processes are not fit to account for such cases, and hence even if  the 
adopting of  a process ontology allows us to weaken Independence into cases of  
interruption, it would still not do the trick. His argument is, in short, that processes come as 
complete packages:  
What was initially attractive about treating this case as a process was that as a structured entity its 
cleavages allowed us to distinguish partially completed processes from those that run to completion 
or never start. But now this is denied us once more. Manifestations as processes looks to be an all-
or-nothing affair: they either come about or they do not. It is their structure that makes them 
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appealing, but this proposal undermines that feature. If  we are to exploit the cleavages, we need a 
means of  accessing them (Williams 2019: 133).  
But Williams does not consider Homoeomerous. A corollary of  the principle is that the 
identity of  the process is not affected by the process’ reaching its telos or not: a complete φ-
ing is numerically identical to an incomplete one—it is the very same process, albeit it is 
clearly ‘at an earlier stage’. Assume that φ-ing reached its goal at @ after extending for the 
interval t1-t3, and that the same φ-ing was interrupted at t2 before reaching its goal at w. 
Given Homoeomerous, we can say that φ-ing at @ is numerically identical to φ-ing at w, 
but the latter ex hypothesis did not reach its endpoint. So, in a sense, it's not true that 
processes are an’ all-or-nothing affair’ that lack the suitable ‘cleavages’.  
 On the contrary, it seems that the process can be interrupted, after all, and that we 
can make sense of  near-fatal poisonings without having to invoke possibilia. So, if  we can 
safely replace Independence with Interrupt, we can avoid Armstrong’s argument 
altogether. Or so the radical powers theorist argues. Is this (dis)solution of  the problem 
satisfactory?  
 I take it that one of  the reasons friends of  powers are so deeply committed to 
Independence is that the principle seems to be involved in every case of  finks, masks, 
antidotes, and all the other cases used as counterexamples to the reductive analyses of  
powers in terms of  conditionals or counterfactuals. Note that I am not saying that most 
powers theorists think that the reductive analysis cannot work because there are such 
counterexamples: plausibly, the impossibility of  the reduction has a deeper and more 
general explanation—my two cents is that the root of  the irreducibility is due to different 
sensitivity to contextual shifts, which is (somehow) connected to the fact that powers are 
local, while counterfactuals are global matters.  
 However, these counterexamples still play an important role in justifying a 
metaphysics of  powers (presentations of  powers metaphysics as recent as McKitrick 2018 
still devote considerable attention to them) and they all seem to involve the fact that 
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powers, for one reason or the other, fail to manifest. Can we reasonably abandon 
Independence and save the intuition by invoking Interrupt? Interrupt works well with 
cases in which powers are not manifested because an antidote is involved, that is, an 
‘interference with the temporal succession of  causal events starting with the disposition’s 
stimulus s and (possibly) ending with manifestation r’ (Schrenk 2010; see Bird 1998). These 
are cases like the near-fatal poisoning discussed by Williams. So, in the case of  antidotes, we 
can abandon Independence in favour of  Interrupt without much troubles. Indeed, it 
arguably provides a better model (Mumford and Anjum 2011; 2018b).  
 Finks also do not offer any reason to accept the one over the other, because finkish 
cases are not really about Independence (Martin 1994). Rather, they are concerned with the 
fact that powers can be gained and lost by their bearers; that is, counterexamples based on 
finks work to undermine counterfactual reductions because they highlight the fact that 
powers are properties. If  powers can be lost or gained at a time, they allow for the possibility 
of  unlucky worlds where powers are lost every time that the appropriate stimulus ‘hits’ their 
previous bearer, and are re-gained right afterwards, invalidating the counterfactual ‘if  x were 
to undergo S, then M would occur’. This is perfectly compatible with both principles.  
 The cases that seem to offer better evidence for Independence over Interrupt are 
the prevention ones—masking and so on (Johnston 1992, Lewis 1997, Ellis 2001, Handfield 
and Bird 2008). Cases of  prevention are harder to square with Interrupt because it seems 
that here the mishap occurred before any process could even start: if  the hammer was 
prevented by a layer of  styrofoam to hit the glass and shatter it, it would seem that the 
process of  shattering (the manifestation of  the glass’ fragility) did not even begin to take 
place, not that it was interrupted. In short, cases of  prevention seem best interpreted as 
cases of  IND-Process: cases where the process does not occur. But IND-Process does not 
solve Armstrong’s problem: they re-introduce ‘non-actual’ entities, in this case non-actual 
processes. Interrupt would not be enough to explain every case in which we think that 
Independence is involved, and hence would not offer a satisfactory solution to Too Much 
Possibility.  
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 Process theorists still have a card up their sleeve, though. She could argue that there 
are no such thing as cases of  prevention, and that they can all be understood as cases of  
antidotes: what we treat as prevented processes are nothing but interrupted, larger processes. 
Case in point: we can re-describe the example of  the styrofoam preventing the hammer to 
trigger the glass’ fragility as a case in which the larger process of  hitting the glass with a 
hammer and shattering it has been interrupted by an antidote, namely the styrofoam. 
Suppose that the strategy generalises; there is no such thing as genuine prevention, but only 
cases of  antidotes, which are explained better by Interrupt.  
 This is a Pyrrhic victory for friends of  processes, however, for it highlights one of  
the cruxes of  process ontologies, namely how to individuate them. I will argue that the only 
way to individuate processes with the minimal fineness of  grain required involves specifying 
the relation that processes have with their telos; however, this relation makes Too Much 
Possibility re-surface, thus making the appeal to processes as manifestations as a way to 
dissolve Armstrong’s argument useless. Before moving forward with the objection, let me 
introduce one desideratum for the manifestation of  powers.  
3.5. Precision and the Identity of  Processes  
I suggest that the following requirement is a desideratum for every minimal metaphysics of  
powers, and even more so if  said metaphysics is aimed at grounding our modal discourse.   
Precision: ‘The identity of  dispositional tropes is as determinate, but no more so, than the 
identity of  the manifestation events towards which the dispositions are directed’ (Molnar 
2003: 60). Manifestations must be fine-grained enough to differentiate between distinct 
powers. 
Assume, for the time being, that distinctness of  manifestations is the only relevant element 
in determining the identity of  a power. Thus, two powers P and P* differ only in virtue of  
having M and M* as manifestations, respectively, and not for their degrees, bearers, stimuli, 
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and so on. In this scenario, the ontological category of  manifestations must make it 
possible to differentiate between the manifestations that two distinct powers tend towards. 
If  processes make it hard to meet Precision, then we have good reasons to doubt that 
processes are the manifestations of  powers.  
 If  we adopt a (somewhat) sparse conception of  properties (as I have done, 
implicitly, so far) and think that it is not the case that every predicate corresponds to a 
genuine property, it becomes quite difficult to establish a priori how fine-grained the 
manifestations (and therefore the powers) need to be: there is no telling from the armchair 
how many genuine properties there are out there, and how many and how diverse different 
predicates refer to one and the same worldly entity. Therefore, one might be suspicious that 
Precision can carry any weight at all when it comes to measuring the theoretical virtues of  
one account: how do we know that any sort of  fineness of  grain and distinction between 
predicates is not merely a feature of  our language, and all there is out there is just a handful 
of  ontic properties? This is a hard question indeed, which I cannot hope to address 
properly without being led too far astray.  
 In what follows I will assume that, even if  we adopt a sparse conception of  
properties, we can retain at least some intuitions from the manifest and scientific images to 
the effect that there is more than one property, and that predicates differing wildly in their 
extension or intension can generally be thought of  as referring to different properties (this 
inference can be defeated and falsified, naturally). I will suggest that process ontologies lack 
precise identity criteria and are therefore threatened to systematically undermine this 
assumption.    
 Before considering this point in more depth, I need to address a possible objection 
to my use of  Precision, which runs as follows: ‘powers never act alone, and are usually 
multi-track; Precision is misleading, since it requires to only consider a power at a time, in 
isolation. Wouldn’t the collective nature of  the action of  powers drastically change the 
requirements of  Precision?’  The objection raises two points:  60
 Thanks to Alexander Carruth for raising this objection. 60
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i) Powers do not act alone; they have dispositional partners.  61
ii) Powers are multitrack; there is more than one manifestation  associated with each of  62
them. 
The points are obviously interrelated, but I will try to address them separately—hopefully 
this will not distort the discussion.  
 Some observations about the first point: I do not need to claim that manifestations 
are the only determining factor for a power’s identity. Perhaps its manifestation partners do 
play a role: perhaps the full description of  a power includes all the ‘constellations’ (Williams 
2019) it can find itself  in. But this does not influence the demand for precision as far as 
manifestations are concerned: what the criterion demands is that manifestations, insofar as they 
determine the identity of  a power, be fine-grained enough to do their job. Secondly, 
perhaps we can maintain that disposition partners do not play any role in fixing the identity 
of  a power: perhaps we can offer a reductionistic explanation of  the interaction of  powers 
simply based on sameness of  manifestations—in short, we could think that A is a 
disposition partner of  P if  and only if  and because both P and A are directed towards the 
same manifestation, M, so that only the precision of  manifestations determines the 
precision of  the power. I shall not explore this point further, but I hope that it shows that 
acknowledging that powers do not act alone does little to undermine the need for precision 
as far as manifestations are concerned.  
 Consider now the second point, concerning multi-track powers. By ‘multi-track 
powers’ I just mean a power that is directed to more than one manifestation (token). This is 
how Neil Williams presents the idea:  
 Or stimuli conditions, if  we were to adopt a Bird-style counterfactual view of  powers. 61
 Or pairs of  stimulus and manifestation, if  we were to adopt a Bird-style counterfactual view of  62
powers. 
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Here is a straightforward example. Consider the three-dimensional shape of  a lump of  sugar—its 
cubicness—and assume, for argument’s sake, that this is a power.
 
In virtue of  the cube having the 
shape it does, it can fit through certain sorts of  openings, but not others. It will also cast specific 
sorts of  shadows, resist tumbling down inclined planes, stack neatly with other cubes, make certain 
impressions in soft clay, and so on. All of  this it can do—and a great deal more to boot—in virtue 
of  its cubicness. This is what it is for a power to be multi-track (Williams 2019: 81).  
I don’t see how increasing the number of  manifestations would affect how fine-grained the 
manifestation needs to be. We can consider a power multitrack if  it has a disjunctive 
manifestation:  P is for M or M1 or ... Mn. If  anything, this is less discriminating than a 63
single track, for a disjunction is always less discriminating than one of  its disjuncts. The 
difference that considerations about dispositional partners and multi-track dispositions 
might make concerns Independence, in case—not Precision.   64
 If  we concede that Precision is a desideratum for powers ontologies, we can ask 
ourselves how fine-grained processes can be, and how we do individuate them. 
Homoeomerous is based on the hypothesis that the overarching process has already been 
identified, and allows us to establish the identity of  one of  its more limited components: it 
stated that if  there was φ-ing between t1 and tn, then there was φ-ing at an subinterval tk - ti 
of  t1 - tn. However, it is unclear how we are to go about when in the opposite situation—
that is, when we have the identity of  a shorter process, and want to know whether a longer 
process is identical with it or not. The converse of  Homoeomerous is clearly untenable:  
Shomoeomerous: if  it is true that o was φ-ing between t1 and t2 then o was φ-ing during any 
interval between t1 and t3 that has t1 and t2 as subinterval.  
 Since I do not consider powers to ground counterfactuals, but simple possibility claims, this is not 63
problematic. The trouble of  thinking multi-track powers as disjunctions, as Bird correctly points 
out, affects those who think that a power makes true a counterfactual, because a disjunction of  
counterfactuals is not equivalent to a single counterfactual with disjunctive antecedent and con-
sequent. (see Bird 2007: 21-24). 
 Indeed, they can be used to deny Independence. See Williams (2019).64
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Holding Shomoeomerous would warrant the conclusion that every process is infinitely 
long, which not only seems counterintuitive, but greatly diminishes how fine-grained the 
manifestations can be. Invoking spatiotemporal continuity seem even worse: it would be 
both too strong and too weak a criterion. Too strong, because it would not allow us to 
admit intermittent processes (e.g. John’s morning and afternoon sessions of  painting the 
same portrait can reasonably be thought of  as being part of  the same process) and too 
weak, because it would identify and conflate different processes, such as John’s sleeping, 
waking up and starting to paint the portrait—even John’s living, dying and decaying.   
 Indeed, were we to accept a criterion based on spatiotemporal continuity, we could 
easily formulate a ‘slingshot’-like argument to the conclusion that the entire history of  the 
universe is nothing but one single process, under the assumption that spacetime is 
continuous—a sort of  faux slingshot for processes. But this is clearly untenable: we would 
be forced to admit only one global power which could not be interrupted, for what could 
be the antidote of  a power that includes everything whatsoever? 
 The situation is particularly dire if  we subscribe to a Mourelatos/Hornsby stuff-like 
view of  processes: since processes are types only, we cannot appeal to the token identity of  
the ‘bearers’ of  the process, for they cannot figure in the identity of  the type. But individual 
process theories, such as those defended by Stout, do not fare much better. Although they 
accept something along the lines of  
Process Bearer Identity. The identity of  an individual process φ-ing depends on the 
identity of  the substances involved in φ-ing. 
  
it is not clear what they take to be the criteria to individuate substances, or bearers: 
obviously, they cannot invoke their properties (for these are powers, whose identity depend 
on the process they give rise to, generating a tight circle). 
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 Unfortunately, it is not clear what they invoke, instead. Stout (1997) gestures 
towards a criterion of  spatiotemporal continuity,  but we have seen that this won’t do. 65
Stout (2016) offers two sets of  considerations regarding the identity of  processes. First, he 
suggests that the only intelligible way to think about the identity of  individual processes is 
epistemological, in terms of  re-identification: ‘the identification and individuation of  the 
things or activity referred to in answering the “What is happening?” question is grounded in 
the basic skill of  keeping track of  these things just as the identification and individuation of  
concrete objects is’ (Stout 2016: 58). 
 Even if  we think that matters of  identity ought to be reduced to problems of  re-
identification à la Strawson (1959), we are not given much detail about this capacity of  ours 
to do so: and, indeed, our capacity for re-identification seems to be yet another power (or 
complex disposition), whose manifestation is supposedly a process that we need, in turn, to 
be able to re-identify in order for it to have a precise identity. A regress looms large.  
 Given the vague way in which I have spelled out the assumption about the fineness 
of  grain for powers, it is not easy to gauge how serious this problem is. I take it that any 
theory of  processes that allows for a slingshot argument to the effect that ultimately there is 
just one, all-encompassing process would evidently violate the commonsensical assumption; 
similarly, I take it that an ontology that would systematically blur most of  our scientific 
distinctions (e.g. between mass, charge, spin, and so on)  would also clearly violate 66
Precision. In the present context, where we are interested in developing a metaphysics of  
powers for Dispositionalism, we might want to require an even more stringent constraint of  
 ‘Associated with this distinction is the existence of  identity conditions for token processes across 65
time. It seems that these conditions might depend on spatio-temporal continuity’ (Stout 1997: 21). 
 Note that the list need not include only terms employed by fundamental physics: I do not intend 66
to commit to any form of  microphysical reductionism; the predicates of  special sciences such as 
chemistry and biology might well refer to sparse properties! In other words, I do not intend to 
maintain the equation between sparse properties and fundamental properties (especially because, in 
a metaphysics of  powers, it is hard to individuate absolutely fundamental properties: I will return to 
this in chapter 8): I am happy to subscribe to a more liberal view of  sparse properties that relies on 
the ‘scientific conception’ of  sparse properties (Schaffer 2004) or an ‘explanatory’ view (Dorr and 
Hawthorne 2013, Vetter 2018b).  
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precision and fineness of  grain, especially if  we adopt truthmaker semantics (Fine 2014; 
107; 2017b).  
 It seems to me that the only  reasonable way to identify processes with the required 67
(albeit vague) degree of  precision, provided that nothing like Shomoeomerous or anything 
involving spatio-temporal continuity might work, is a criterion involving the telos  of  the 68
process. Processes are individuated by what they are for. How do we distinguish between 
melting and freezing, if  not by saying that one’s natural endpoint is that water is in liquid 
state, and the other’s natural endpoint is water in a solid state? This, however, threatens to 
bring us back to Armstrong’s problem. For what is the relation between a process and its 
telos, if  not the relation that holds between a power and its manifestation? Aren’t we saying 
that a process has the identity it has because it is directed to a certain natural endpoint, and 
that at the same time that such process can fail to bring about its endpoint? If  it is 
impossible to offer precise identity conditions for processes without invoking their telos, 
then invoking processes as manifestations of  powers and substituting Independence with 
Interrupt will have just swiped the problem under the carpet—the bump will reappear 
down the line. An argument perfectly similar to Armstrong’s Too Much Possibility (which 
should be familiar enough at this point, so I will not rehearse it) will be formulated invoking 
the following two principles:  
Process Identity: the identity of  a process depends upon its telos.  
Interrupt: every process can be interrupted before it brings about its telos.  
 It is unclear to me whether DiFrisco is offering a distinct proposal when he writes that ‘processes 67
lack the categorial features of  numerical identity over time, persisting instead by having temporal 
parts, and they are individuated primarily by causal relations rather than by location’ (DiFrisco 2018: 
79), because it is not wholly clear what theory of  causality he has in mind and therefore whether by 
‘causal relations’ occur just in case certain counterfactual conditionals hold, or whether he adopts a 
powerful theory of  causation, in which case his proposal would be the same as mine, or whether he 
has some other, perhaps primitivist, theory of  causation in mind.
 Steward (2013) speaks of  ‘form’, which I take to be closely linked with the telos. If  this is not so, 68
I have to confess that I am not sure to understand what she might mean by that. 
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This poses a challenge for process theorists: they need to be able to offer suitably fine-
grained criteria of  identity for processes (so that they could differentiate all the powers) and 
avoid slingshot-like arguments for the existence of  a single massive process, and do so in a 
way that does not invoke the sort of  directedness relation that occurs between powers and 
manifestations, which would re-introduce Too Much Possibility, the problem that the 
adoption of  process ontologies was supposed to dissolve. I do not have a knock-down 
argument to the effect that the challenge cannot be met; however, the burden of  the proof  
lies on the side of  process theorists; furthermore, given the fact that our current main 
preoccupation is how to solve Too Much Possibility, and that process theories loop back to 
it, it seems that adopting processes is nothing but an unnecessary detour. Therefore, we 
have to conclude that processes do not allow for a swift side-stepping of  the problem at 
hand, and we have to go back to the task of  finding a credible answer to Key Question and 
face Armstrong’s challenge head-on. In order to do this, it is time to consider whether 
adopting universals as manifestations of  powers offers us unique and special resources to 
do so.   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Chapter 4. Solving the Problem: Physical Intentionality  
I have argued that attempts at dissolving Too Much Possibility, either by adopting an 
identity theory between powers and manifestations or adopting a process ontology for 
manifestations and substituting Independence with Interrupt are ultimately unsuccessful. 
We should recognise that Too Much Possibility is a genuine problem, whose solution 
requires adopting a substantial metaphysical position, by rejecting one of  the background 
assumptions to the argument.  
4.1 Recap of  the Problem 
Recall that we considered two versions of  Too Much Possibility. The first was couched in 
terms of  a broadly Quinean metaontology: 
i) Our best overall theory includes sentences quantifying over powers (powers 
metaphysics)  
ii) We are ontologically committed to the entities quantified over our best overall theory 
(Quinean metaontology)  
iii) Therefore, we are ontologically committed to powers (i, ii).  
iv) Powers are directed to their manifestations (Directedness) 
v) Being directed is a relation (assumption I) 
vi) Therefore, we are ontologically committed to their manifestations (ii, iii, Directedness) 
vii) Some powers can fail to bring about their manifestations (Independence) 
viii)Some powers exist and their manifestation does not exist (Independence + assumption 
III)  
ix) Therefore, we are not ontologically committed to the manifestations of  powers that do 
not bring about their manifestations (viii) and we are ontologically committed to them 
(vi)  
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 This argument relies on the following background assumptions:  
I. Directedness is a relation. 
II. Existential Generalisation is admitted. 
III. Being manifested = coming into existence/becoming something.  
IV. Existence is captured by unrestricted existential quantified translations of  our best 
theories. 
V. The formalisation of  some of  our best theories involves quantification over powers 
The second formulation, on the other hand, involved introducing an inner and an outer 
quantifier:  
i) There exist (inner quantifier) powers (powers metaphysics)  
ii) Powers are directed to their manifestations (Directedness)   
iii) Directedness is a relation (assumption A)  
iv) Powers are related to their manifestations (ii, iii) 
v) There are (outer quantifier) manifestations (iv, Existential Generalisation)  
vi) Some powers can fail to bring about their manifestations (Independence) 
vii) Some powers exist and their manifestation does not exist (Independence, assumption 
C) 
viii) Therefore, there are (outer quantifier) some manifestations that do not exist (inner 
quantifier) (v, vii)  
ix) Therefore, there are things that do not exist  
The argument requires the following background assumptions:  
A. Directedness is a relation  
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B. There are two existential quantifiers (an inner and and outer), and only for the latter 
does Existential Generalisation holds  
C. Being manifested = coming into existence  
D. Existence is captured by the inner existential quantified translations of  our best theories  
E. The formalisation of  some of  our best theories involves inner quantification over 
powers  
It is time to consider strategies to resist the argument. There are only two common 
background assumptions between the two arguments: I./A. (directedness is a relation) and 
III./C. (being manifested = coming into existence). Presumably, then, the culprit of  our 
troubles must lie in one of  them.   
 In this chapter I will examine, and ultimately reject, an influential strategy, which 
involves the rejection of  I/A: it denies that directedness is a relation. I dub this strategy the 
‘Physical Intentionality Route’. I will argue that the Physical Intentionality Route ultimately 
fails, and that the most promising solution to Too Much Possibility therefore involves 
rejecting III), being manifested = coming into existence/becoming something — what I 
will call the ‘Actualisation Route’.    
4.2. The Physical Intentionality Route   
A number of  philosophers (e.g. Molnar 2003, Heil 2003, Martin 2008) have maintained that 
directedness is not a genuine relation. The reason is that they think that powers are 
intentional properties—they display ‘Physical Intentionality’, and thus a power is directed 
towards its manifestation in the same way that a belief  or a desire is directed towards its 
object. And, the argument goes, (mental) intentional states can notoriously be directed 
towards non-existing (even impossible) objects, without having to commit to their existence 
(they are, after all, non-existents). Holding such a position entails either admitting that 
intentionality is a relation, but a sui generis one which resists existential generalisation, or is 
not a relation at all (therefore there is no second relatum that can be subject to existential 
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generalisation). The latter strategy seems more promising. So, if  powers are intentional, we 
have to think that then directedness is not a relation at all. We block existential generalisation 
in Too Much Possibility because there is no second relatum to generalise from. Therefore, 
no commitment to manifestations stems from Directedness. This in turn means that there 
is no contradiction with Independence (if  we adopt the Quinean version of  the argument) 
or that we are not committed to saying that ‘there are things that do not exist’ (if  we adopt 
the Meinongian version of  the argument).  
 The Physical Intentionality strategy against the Quinean formulation of  Too Much 
Possibility  runs as follows:  69
1. Intentional states and properties are not related to their objects. 
2. If  there is no relation, we cannot quantify upon the intentional object as a result of  
applying existential generalisation to the relation. 
3. If  we cannot quantify upon intentional objects that way, we cannot quantify on them at 
all. 
4. We are only ontologically committed to what is within the scope of  the ‘basic’ 
existential quantifier.   
5. Powers are intentional. 
6. Therefore, we are not committed to non-actualised manifestations.  
7. Therefore, we can resist Too Much Possibility by rejecting its premisses 1. and 2.   
Most attention has been devoted to premiss 5. of  Physical Intentionality, concerning the 
question whether powers actually are intentional. It is indeed not easy to understand what 
are the ‘marks’ of  intentionality (Crane 2001; 2008; 2009, Nes 2008) and whether powers 
actually display them (Martin & Pfeifer 1986, Place 1996, Molnar 2003, Heil 2003, Martin 
2008, Bird 2007, Mumford 1999, Bauer 2016). It is far from clear that premiss 5. can be 
 I will stick to this formulation of  the problem in what follows. Translating the arguments to target 69
the Meinongian version is fairly straightforward — I will leave it to the reader who is sympathetic to 
that understanding of  Too Much Possibility. Nothing of  importance hangs on this choice.  
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established: for instance, when Molnar (2003) examines the standard ‘marks’ of  
intentionality in order to show that powers display very similar features, he includes the fact 
that they admit of  non-existent intentional objects. But such ‘mark’ is obviously what is at 
stake here, and thus it would appear that those who embrace Physical Intentionality to 
escape Too Much Possibility commit a blatantly circular reasoning:  
1. A power being directed towards its manifestation does not commit to the existence of  
the manifestation because powers are intentional.  
2. Powers are intentional because, inter alia, they can be directed towards non-existent 
objects.  
However, this only shows that Molnar’s reasons to accept premiss 5. are bad—not that the 
strategy is in itself  hopeless. Perhaps there are independent reasons for thinking that 
directedness is not to be conceived as a relation and thus that there is nothing to operate 
the Existential Generalisation on. Perhaps we can forget every reference to intentionality 
and offer independent reasons to the effect that directedness is not a relation, and 
reformulate Physical Intentionality accordingly.  
 I want to offer a stronger reason to reject the strategy. This will involve rejecting 
premiss 3. of  the argument above: I will argue that even if  directedness is not a relation and we 
cannot operate Existential Generalisation upon the two relata, we can nevertheless quantify 
upon the manifestations and thus generate ontological commitment towards unmanifested 
manifestations in virtue of  other obtaining relations between the two.  
4.3 Let’s Not Get Physical (Intentionality)  
Here’s my proposal to the effect that the Physical Intentionality route is not going to work. 
I will argue that even if  directedness itself  is not a relation, a metaphysics of  powers that 
accepts Directedness (that is, the idea that the identity of  powers is determined by their 
manifestations) presupposes that there are other relations between powers and their 
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manifestations, which make the commitment to the existence of  manifestations inescapable. 
This in itself  does not prove that there is a relation of  directedness between powers and their 
manifestations, and therefore that assumption I. is legitimate. However, the main reason—
at least in the present dialectical context—to doubt that there is such a relation was the 
desire to avoid ontological commitment to unmanifested manifestations. Once we are 
forced to conclude that such commitment is unavoidable, we might as well concede that 
there is such a thing as directedness.   70
 My argument is based on a reading of  Directedness according to which the 
identity of  powers is fixed, or determined, by their manifestation. That is to say, two powers 
are different because they tend towards different manifestations. I think that such a 
principle must be shared by the proponents of  Physical Intentionality: if  they give up on 
the idea that powers are the properties they are in virtue of  what they are for, then I do not 
think that we are talking of  the same thing anymore. 
 Manifestations, by determining the identity of  powers, give rise to the criteria of  
identity and principles of  individuation of  powers. The difference between these two relies on 
two different notions of  identity. ‘A criterion of  identity for entities of  a kind K’, according 
to Lowe (2010: 9), ‘is supposed to be a principle which specifies the identity (and thereby 
the distinctness) conditions of  Ks in an informative or non-trivial way’. The principle can 
be stated thus:  
 It is tempting to be more ambitious, and identify the directedness relation with the metaphysical 70
relation that I will argue links powers and manifestations and commits us to unmanifested manifest-
ations. However, I think that such temptation is best resisted—not so much because it would 
muddle my dialectical situation with regard to the supporter of  Physical Intentionality (although it 
would), but mainly because I want to say that there is a multiplicity of  dependence relations link 
powers and manifestations (see especially §8). So, we cannot just identify directedness and meta-
physical dependence—presumably, we should identify it with the conjunction or the plurality of  all 
the relevant dependencies. But this is risky for the minimal metaphysics, because I want to maintain 
that Weak Productivity is optional for powers theorists. Saying that Productive Dependence consti-
tutes directedness would mean that people who reject Weak Productivity and people who accept it 
are talking about radically different entities—which would be unfortunate, and violate the integra-
tion desideratum. So, I find it preferable to say that directedness is quite distinct from the various de-
pendence relations (although it might ground them). Thanks to Anna Marmodoro for pressing me 
on this point.   
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Criterion of  Identity: If  x and y are entities of  kind K, then x=y iff x and y stand to one 
another in the relation RK, where RK denotes some equivalence relation (other than identity 
itself) on entities of  kind K.  
According to Lowe, criteria of  identity only ‘concern “identity” as a relation–the relation that 
logicians standardly represent by means of  the equality sign, “=”’ (Lowe 2010: 9).  
 Principles of  Individuation, on the other hand, are stronger than mere criteria of  
identity: they establish what an entity is. In short, Principles of  Individuation are concerned 
with ‘which entity of  its kind y is’ (Lowe 2010: 9) and thus:  
the notion of  “identity” at play here is not the one symbolized with the “equals” sign, i.e., “=”. 
Rather, we mean “identity” in the sense of what a thing is, or which thing of  a certain kind a thing is 
(Lowe & Tahko 2015). 
In short, it is the sense of  identity that is employed when we discuss something’s nature: it 
is meant to capture what it is to be that very thing. It is this latter sense of  identity (we can 
refer to it as ‘thick identity’) that I am interested in here. So, by saying that the identity of  
powers are fixed or determined by the identity of  their manifestations I mean that which 
entity a power is, in the thick sense, is fixed by which entities its manifestation(s) are, in the 
thick sense.  
 Following Lowe (1998; 2006), I maintain that if  x fixes or determines the identity of  
y, then y depends for its identity upon x. Therefore, my starting point is that powers depend 
for their identity on the identity of  their manifestations. We can express this idea thus:  
MD: A power P depends for its identity upon the identity of  its manifestation M: P is what 
it is in virtue of  M’s being what it is.  
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I will formalise this notion of  thick identity rather inelegantly by introducing a thick identity 
predicate, ID, so that ‘what x is’ will be represented by ‘IDx’. We can then re-formulate MD 
as follows:  
MD*: ID(P) depends upon of  ID(M).  
We can call such kind of  Identity Dependence also ‘Metaphysical Dependence’ (Lowe 1989; 
2006; 2009, and Tahko & Lowe 2015);  in what follows I will use the two terms 71
interchangeably.   
 Now, to the key move in my argument. Tahko and Lowe (2015) maintain that the 
following principle holds:  
Identity-Existence: If x depends for its identity upon  y, then, necessarily, x  exists only 
if y exists.  
That is, they claim that identity dependence entails rigid existential dependence, at least if  
we express it in modal/existential terms. If  the principle holds, it would mean that it is not 
the case that some object x exists without the entities yy that determine its identity also 
existing. But, we have said, every friend of  powers is committed to the idea that powers 
depend for their identity upon their manifestations, by Directedness. Since powers owe 
their identity to their manifestations even when they are not manifested, this means that 
powers theorists are committed to the existence of  unmanifested manifestations if  they 
accept Identity-Existence. The argument runs as follows:  
1. Powers depend for their identity upon their manifestations. 
 Some might be surprised by the idea that it is the power which depends on the manifestation, and 71
not vice versa: after all, powers are supposed to bring about the manifestations, and surely that in-
volves some sort of  dependence! I will discuss this at some length in §8.1 and §8.2  
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2. If  x depends for its identity upon y, then x exists only if  y exists.   72
3. Powers do not change their identity when they bring about their manifestation.  73
4. Therefore, unmanifested manifestations exist.  
So, in order to show that powers are ontologically committed to their manifestations, we 
just need to show that 2. is true, i.e. that Identity-Existence holds.  
 The formulation of  metaphysical dependence given above in MD* leaves 
undetermined how, exactly, we are to understand the relation of  dependence between ID(P) 
and ID(M). There is a vast number of  suggestions in the literature on how, precisely, we 
should understand metaphysical dependence. Instead of  examining every one of  them and 
showing that Identity-Existence follows from each, I will offer a more general argument, 
to the effect that regardless of  how we cash out MD*, (modal/existential) rigid existential 
dependence follows from it.   74
 The plan is this: instead of  focusing on what, exactly, metaphysical dependence is, I 
propose to focus on how we express dependence and the explanations involving them. There 
are two options available, as far as I can see: i) a relational approach, which employs a 
relational predicate linking the entities that are dependent with the entities upon which they 
depend, or ii) an operational approach, which introduces a sentential operator linking the 
sentences or propositions expressing or referring to what is determined with sentences or 
propositions expressing what does the determining. The situation mirrors that of  
 Here I am only concerned with existence simpliciter, the one understood along the Quine-van In72 -
wagen lines delineated in the metaontological assumptions I presented in fn. 32. 
 I am here assuming this premiss: it seems innocuous enough and I did not want to add a further 73
detour to the argument.
 It is fairly common to think that Metaphysical Dependence is to be captured with the help of  a 74
non-modal essence operator: see for instance Lowe (2006) and Tahko and Lowe (2015). For a 
powers-related example, Jaag writes that  ‘If  ƐP
 
(Px → NMx), then Px is essentially dependent upon 
NMx’ (Jaag 2014: 9). Note that Jaag uses the symbol ƐP to express primitive essence just in the same 
way that I will use the Finean operator □P. They express the same notion. However, not everybody 
agree that Finean essences should be used to characterise metaphysical dependence (Koslicki 2012b) 
and some even take it to be a primitive notion (Barnes 2018). So, despite my sympathies for cashing 
out MD in terms of  essence, I think it is better to offer a completely general argument here which 
does not rely on such reading. 
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grounding:  although it is probably best to keep metaphysical dependence and grounding 75
separated (Schnieder 2017, Barnes 2018), it is quite natural to think that the options 
regarding how to express grounding in metaphysical explanations are the same as those to 
express metaphysical dependence.  
 If  we pick a predicational approach, we can think of  the relata as being facts 
concerning the thick identities of  the particulars involved. Therefore, metaphysical 
dependence will have this form:  
Relational MD: R([IDx], [IDy]) 
Different theories of  dependence will differ with regard to how, exactly, the relation R 
involved will be cashed out: it might even be a primitive relation (Barnes 2013). These 
details are not important here. What is important is that, ex hypothesis, [ID(P)] obtains: we 
are concerned about actually instantiated powers that have a definite identity, so the fact 
that P is what it is obtains. From any account of  dependence it will follow that, if  it is the 
case that R([IDx], [IDy]) and [IDx] obtain, then [IDy] obtains, too. Now note that y is a 
constituent of  the obtaining fact [IDy]. So, M is a constituent of  [ID(M)]. We can then 
easily derive the ontological commitment to y by appealing to the uncontroversial principle 
that the constituents of  an obtaining fact do exist—a fact could not obtain if  one of  its 
constituents did not exist. If  [Caesar speaks in the senate] obtains, then Caesar exists, 
because [Caesar speaks in the senate] could not obtain if  there were no Caesar, no speaking, 
or no senate. So, given the fact that M is a constituent of  the obtaining fact [ID(M)], we can 
conclude that M exist. Expressing ‘the fact [Fa] obtains’ as O[Fa], we can formalise the 
argument as follows:  
1. R([IDx], [IDy])                 Predicational reading of  MD* 
 See for example Correia (2010), Correia & Schieder (2011), Fine (2012), Audi (2012), Rosen 75
(2010), Dasgupta (2014), Sider (2012) Raven (2015).  
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2. O[IDx]                             Assumption 
3. O[IDy]                             1,2 
4. ∀x (O[Fx] → ∃z (z=x))   Constituents of  obtaining states of  affairs exist 
5. ∃z (z=y)                           3, 4 
 The situation is not much different if  we choose an operationalist approach, 
perhaps more surprisingly. If  we adopt this view, the dependence would be expressed by a 
sentential operator flanked by two sentences (or propositions). Let’s use sentences:  
Operational MD: ‘IDx’ because ‘IDy’  
Again, we assume that it is the case that the power has the identity it has, and therefore it 
will be true that ‘IDx’. From this it follows that it must be true that ‘IDy’. Now we can ask 
what is the truthmaker for ‘IDy’. I can see only two options: either it is the fact [IDy], in 
which case the same reasoning as above applies, or it can be y itself. Either way, if  the power 
exist, so does the manifestation it is a power for: power metaphysics are committed to the 
existence of  unmanifested manifestations. 
 Alex Skiles has suggested to me in personal conversation that Metaphysical 
Dependence could be also expressed via generalised identity—as a ‘just-is’ sentence, along 
these lines [IDx] ≡ [IDy] or ‘IDx’ ≡ ‘IDy’. The benefit of  adopting this strategy would be 
that, according to the generalised identity theorists (e.g. Rayo 2013, Correia & Skiles 2017), 
two sentences flanking the generalised identity sign do not differ in their ontological 
commitments: ‘What it takes for [For Susan to be a sibling just is for her to share a parent 
with someone else] to be true is for there to be no difference between Susan’s having a 
sibling and Susan’s sharing a parent with someone else’ (Rayo 2013: 4) and that the two 
sentences flanking the operator are ‘full and accurate descriptions of  the same feature of  
reality’ (Rayo 2013: 5). Rayo intends to use just-is statements to offer various ontologically 
deflationary positions, in particular when applied to abstraction principles in mathematics: 
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he thinks he can reap all the benefits of  Neo-Fregeanism without having to pay the cost 
(see Linnebo 2019 for a detailed discussion). Similarly, the proponents of  the Physical 
Intentionality Route might use this feature to deny that ‘the identity of  P depends on the 
identity of  M’ commits us to the existence of  M any more than ‘P is directed to M’ does; 
since they assume that the latter bears no ontological commitment to manifestations, they 
can concluded that neither does the latter. Therefore, my argument begs the question, and 
the discussion with Physical Intentionality theorist has reached a dialectical impasse.  
 Even conceding that the strategy is in general viable (see Linnebo 2014; 2019 for 
critiques), what I find problematic in Skiles’ suggestion is that metaphysical dependence 
seems to be very poorly captured by generalised identity: they seem to be wildly different 
phenomena. The problem is not merely that generalised identity is symmetrical and 
metaphysical dependence is not, because we could perhaps cash out metaphysical 
dependence in terms of  the asymmetric ‘partial generalised identity’ developed in Correia & 
Skiles (2017). The problem, rather, is that the whole point of  talk of  generalised identity is 
to discuss ‘same feature of  reality’—but this is not what the powers theorist want to do 
with Directedness: powers are, in some sense at least, distinct from their manifestations! 
Powers are not the same feature of  reality than their manifestations, differently described or 
conceptualised—they are something distinct, although closely linked. Even those who, like 
Marmodoro (2017), think that powers are numerically identical with their manifestations, 
would resist the idea that powers and manifestations are the same feature of  reality; for 
instance, Marmodoro still stresses that manifestations are different states of  powers 
(whatever ‘states’ are). A way to make this point more vivid: Kovacs (forthcoming) notes 
that we can distinguish between dependence relations that constitute and dependence 
relations that determine. Metaphysical dependence, as it occurs between a power and its 
manifestation, seem to be of  the determinative kind; (partial) generalised identity, on the 
other hand, seems to be relevant to the constitutive kind of  dependence. 
 Early critics of  powers, such as Armstrong (1997), often complained that if  one 
were to adopt a metaphysics of  powers, there would be no real change in the world, just 
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passing powers around. Defenders of  powers have responded by noting that ‘passing 
powers around’ is a perfectly legitimate kind of  change (Mumford 2009). A thing was 
fragile, and then it is no longer fragile: it is broken, instead. This is a real change, even if  
being broken is, in turn, a power. But if  we accepted that powers just are (even just partially) 
their manifestations, this defence would no longer be available—it would seem that 
Armstrong had a point, after all. This does not show that the idea of  understanding 
metaphysical dependence in terms of  generalised identity is necessarily misguided. But it 
does show that it is not a view that a powers theorist should feel at all inclined to accept, 
because it would spell considerable problems for their metaphysics in general. Therefore, 
although the idea would deserve further discussion, I think that for our current purposes 
we can safely dismiss it: the metaphysical dependence between powers and manifestations is 
not generalised identity.  
4.4 Primitive Identities for Powers? 
I want to conclude that we are ontologically committed to the existence of  unmanifested 
manifestations, because powers metaphysically depend upon their manifestations, and 
metaphysical dependence commits us to the existence of  the determined entities as well as 
the determining entities. Now, friends of  Physical Intentionality will protest that it is 
unjustified to assume that powers depend for their identity upon their manifestations, and it 
was unwarranted on my part to attribute them that assumption: although everybody agrees 
that powers are for something, they will contend that there is no metaphysical determination 
involved. Such a position is exposed for example by Ingthorsson (2012), Jacobs (2011), and 
Contessa (forthcoming).  Since the consequences of  the argument against physical 76
intentionality are very important in what follows, it is worth examining the complaint in 
some detail.  
 I suspect that Williams (2019) is also sympathetic to it, but his case is less clear-cut than the oth76 -
ers. 
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 Valdi Ingthorsson (2012) argues that we should resist the idea that the identity of  
powers is determined by the identity of  their manifestations: instead, according to him, 
powers have primitive identities. The idea that powers metaphysically depend upon their 
manifestation would derive from a confusion between a conceptual or epistemological 
characterisation of  powers and their nature: we conflate what we can perceive of  a property 
with what it really is: ‘Powers are believed to be essentially related to a manifestation 
because manifestations, as opposed to powers, have been thought to belong to the domain 
of  the perceptible’ (Ingthorsson 2012: 73). He argues that friends of  powers should invoke 
a form of  Ramseyian humility (Lewis 2009) when it comes to the nature of  properties. 
Once we abandon the idea that the whole nature of  a property has to be within the realm 
of  the perceptible, we do not have any particular reason to think that the identity of  a 
power is determined by the identity of  its manifestation:  
I will suppose that the property represented by the phenomenal quality has a determinate nature 
independently of  the character of  the phenomenal quality [...] and I suggest that we can calmly 
assume that a property that gives rise to a manifold of  ‘outcomes’ can nevertheless have a 
determinate nature independently of  the character of  those ‘outcomes’ because the property is not 
identical to these outcomes (Ingthorsson 2012: 73).  
I think there is a problem for the view that powers have a primitive identity, and hence that 
Ingthorsson’s proposal should be abandoned. The problem is this: Powers have their 
modal/nomic profile fixed. This is the minimal characterisation of  what it is to be a power: 
they could not exist in another world and give rise to different possibility claims or 
counterfactuals.  Obviously, the modal/nomic profile of  a power includes its 77
manifestations.  
 I have so far operated under a much stronger conception of  power, one according to which the 77
modal profile is essential to it. However, to avoid begging the question against Ingthorsson, in this 
context I will operate with this weaker characterisation. 
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 The question is: how are we to link the power to its necessary modal/nomic profile? 
A natural answer is this: a power P has its modal/nomic profile N necessarily because it is 
essential to P that it has profile N, where ‘essential to’ is to be understood in non-modalist 
terms (Fine 1994). Finean essences cannot be analysed in modal terms, but have modal 
consequences: following Fine’s formalisation, □x p →□p. Hence it is necessary that P has 
profile N. This is the as good a candidate for a bedrock explanation as we are going to get 
(Glazier 2017). But if  N is part of  the essence of  P, then P will depend for its identity upon 
N. Even if  we do not wish to equate metaphysical dependence to essential dependence (as 
Lowe 2006), it is hard to deny that essential dependence is at least a species of  metaphysical 
dependence. According to the Finean picture, entities are ontologically dependent upon 
what is mentioned in their essence: that’s why {Socrates} depends upon Socrates and not 
vice versa. The modal/nomic profile of  P—call it ‘NP’, includes the manifestations of  P, M. 
So P depends metaphysically upon M, contra Ingthorsson’s hypothesis. Since this essentialist 
explanation is not available to those who think that powers have primitive identities, they 
need to offer an alternative explanations of  the necessary link between a power and its 
profile.  
 It is unclear what strategy for filling the gap between a power and its necessary 
nomic profile is available to the primitivist, however. Obviously she could not appeal to 
laws of  nature or such, for that would defeat the whole point of  powers metaphysics: it is 
powers and their nomic profile that ground and explain laws of  nature (if  there are any), 
not vice versa: this would bring us back to a DTA conception of  laws. Similarly, invoking 
brute necessary links would seem to be unjustified and costly: it becomes just mysterious 
why powers are necessarily linked with their nomic profile and not others.  Maybe the 78
primitivist can offer a convincing story, or maybe essentialist explanations are not better 
than primitivist ones, contra Glazier. But I think that Glazier offers us good reasons to prefer 
an essentialist explanation to a primitivist one, and thus reject Ingthorsson’s suggestion that 
 A somewhat similar argument can be found in Neil Williams’ discussion of  ‘B-type property dual78 -
ism’ (Williams 2019: 102-12). 
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powers have their identities primitively. So, I think we should maintain that it is preferable 
to think that powers depend for their identity upon their manifestations.  
 If  this is the case, then the argument against physical intentionality does still apply, 
and hence that we are committed to unmanifested manifestations. Thus, the tension 
remains: we need to find another way to dispel it. The only way that I can see to do so is to 
think that there is some other property which manifested manifestations have, and 
unmanifested manifestations lack. In other words, we need to reject assumption III. More 
perspicuously:  
1) ∃F ∀x ((Manifested(x)   F(x)) ∧ (¬Manifested(x)   ¬F(x)))  
2) F ≠ λx. ∃z (z=x) 
Rejecting assumption III) and the idea that the difference between being manifested and 
being unmanifested is existing or not, however, does not tell us anything about how that 
difference is to be understood in more positive terms. This means that the question we 
need to answer in order to avoid the contradiction is the following:  
Key Question: What is the feature which differentiates being manifested and being 
unmanifested? 
In the next chapter, I will consider and reject some popular proposals as how the Key 
Question can be answered, before developing my account in chapter 6.  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Chapter 5. The Actualisation Route 
Once we recognise that Physical Intentionality is not viable and that we have to go down 
the Actualisation route, it becomes pressing to answer Key Question: what is the property 
that distinguishes manifested and unmanifested manifestations?  
 It is very tempting to take cue from the name of  the strategy itself, and suggest that 
the relevant property is that of  being actual. I will briefly argue that this strategy is not 
promising before turning to a more serious contender: the idea that the manifestations of  
powers are universals, and therefore the difference-maker between being manifested and 
being non-manifested in being instantiated or not.  
5.1. Actualism   
Can we simply think that the answer to Key Question is that manifested manifestations are 
actual, in the contemporary sense of  the term, and non-manifested ones are non-actual? 
The idea might seem tempting at first, but should be resisted, for two reasons. The first is 
that the proposal would not advance much our understanding Key Question: despite the 
fact that talk of  actuality is pervasive in contemporary metaphysics, it is surprisingly hard to 
find an illuminating elucidation of  its meaning—especially once we abandon the framework 
of  possible worlds talk. The second reason is that such understanding would undermine 
one of  the key elements and points of  appeal of  Dispositionalism: the fact that it is 
supposed to be a Hardcore Actualist (or ‘New Actualist') theory of  modality (Contessa 
2009, Vetter 2013).  
 The first problem boils down to the fact that it is not clear what, exactly, we take 
‘actual’ to mean. I suspect that some philosophers just take ‘actual’ to be the same as ‘being 
(something)’. This would collapse our solution into the contradiction offered by Too Much 
Possibility, for it would entail that everything whatsoever (including unmanifested 
manifestations) is actual.  
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 Since the position is of  no help to the problem at hand, we can dismiss it: ‘being 
actual had better be actually doing something harder than just being, otherwise the 
supposed dispute is just silly’ (Williamson 2013: 22-3). Similarly, we can dismiss those 
classical possibilist positions that distinguish between being, on one hand, and existence or 
actuality on the other (e.g. Russell 1903) for they qualify as Meinongian according to the 
characterisation of  the position offered in §1.3.   
 There are other conceptions of  actuality that do not equate it with being something 
simpliciter. One is the Lewisian one, which treats ‘actual’ as an indexical meaning roughly 
‘having spatiotemporal relations with the utterer of  the sentence’. Or we can take an 
‘ersatzer’ meaning of  the term, roughly indicating a set of  sentences or states of  affairs (in 
the representational sense used by Plantinga 1974) that do not perfectly match the world. 
These readings of  ‘actual’ are intelligible and do ‘something harder than just being’, but they 
are unhelpful for powers ontologies. The Lewisian proposal only makes sense if  one does 
have the whole plurality of  concrete possible worlds—but that is something that the 
Dispositionalist clearly has to do without. As for the linguistic (or in general, primitivist 
representational) ersatzer: how are powers supposed to turn a representation or sentence 
into flesh, when they bring about (and thus actualise) their manifestation?  
 Philip Bricker is an interesting example of  a reading of  ‘actual’ that would be 
helpful for a powers ontology. He supports a Lewisian Genuine Realist ontology of  
concrete possible worlds, but refuses to adopt Lewis’ deflationary reading of  ‘actual’—a 
position that he labels ‘Leibnizian Realism’ (Bricker 2006). Worlds are concrete particulars, 
but only one (ours) has the special, absolute property of  being actual. However, when it 
comes to explaining what this vital property is, Bricker is forced to say that the property is 
primitive, and cannot characterise it any better than saying that 
What I mean by “is actual” is, more or less, what the Meinongian means by “exists”. What I mean 
by “exists” is, more or less, what the Meinongian means by “is” or “has being”. I say: whatever is, 
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exists. The Meinongian says: there are some things—for example, merely possible objects—which 
do not exist (Bricker 2006: 44).  
Now, this clarification is either wrong or unilluminating. I think it is fairly safe to say that 
existence entails being spatiotemporally located, for the Meinongian, so if  we followed 
Bricker’s translation, every world would be actual. On the other hand, if  the term is not 
cashed out in these terms, then it becomes mysterious again. We seem to be confronted 
with a recurring problem: either being actual is a trivial property, in which case the proposal 
cannot do any work to solve Too Much Possibility, or being actual is a substantive property, 
but we seem to be unable to provide an elucidation of  it.  
 The second problem of  the proposal is that Dispositionalism is supposed to be a 
hardcore actualist theory of  modality—that is, it is committed to the idea that everything 
whatsoever that exists is actual. Leibniz biconditionals are not metaphysically illuminating 
because they talk about other possible worlds (whatever their nature), when, according to 
the hardcore actualist, there are none. If  everything that goes on at our world is actual, and 
there is only our world, then being actual is a trivial property and we cannot hope to solve Too 
Much Possibility by denying that some entities (unmanifested manifestations) are actual: 
they could be so only if  they existed in some other possible world, but ex hypothesis there are 
none. It is clear that this is not a promising way to answer Key Question.  
5.2 Aristotelian Universals  
We have seen that ‘actuality’ is not a good candidate to answer Key Question and clarify 
what is involved in the Actualisation Route. However, there is another popular option on 
the market that I have not considered yet. The idea is to adopt universals as the 
manifestations of  powers, and take the distinguishing feature that separates manifested 
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from unmanifested manifestations to be the property of  being instantiated.  79
Manifestations are universals: manifested manifestations are instantiated universals, whereas 
unmanifested manifestations are uninstantiated universals.  
 The idea, to my knowledge, was first suggested (somewhat obliquely) by Stephen 
Mumford (2004) and is perhaps the most commonly adopted solution to Too Much 
Possibility (Tugby 2013, Vetter 2015, McKitrick 2018):  
Can we say that the powers are directed towards the properties rather than the particular 
instantiations of  those properties at particular times and places? In a significant sense, yes. For the 
power is indeterminate in respect of  time and place of  its manifestation. Each manifestation will be 
somewhere and somewhen but the somewhere and somewhen are not necessary for the having of  
the power. They are among the contingent details of  its manifestation. What is necessary to its 
manifestation is the universal only. This universal exists, whether or not manifested by some 
particular power. So if  the universal is what a power is for, then its existence is not Meinongian 
(Mumford 2004: 194). 
The crucial point, I take it, is that universals can be multiply, wholly instantiated.  If  a 80
token power P is directed towards universal U, then we can concede that directedness is a 
genuine relation, entailing the existence of  its relata, even if  this particular token P fails to 
bring about the manifestation: U exists anyway, and it is the very same universal that would have 
been instantiated yet another time, had P manifested, or that is manifesting in virtue of  the 
 Note that this presupposes that there is something such as the higher-order, extrinsic property of  79
'being instantiated’. The proposal might seem a non-starter for this reason, as it threatens an ugly 
Bradley-regress. However, for the sake of  argument I will largely ignore this, as I will not insist too 
forcefully, in what follows, on the fact that it is highly unclear and mysterious what exactly instanti-
ation is supposed to be. Perhaps we can make sense of  the idea that instantiation is a ‘non-relational 
tie’ which gives raise to sui generis higher order extrinsic properties without generating a vicious re-
gress. Although I will not press on this point much, these further problems should also be kept in 
the back of  one’s mind when considering universals as the solution to Key Question.
 I take universals to be minimally characterised by the following two theses: i) universals are the 80
only kind of  thing that can be instantiated: ‘the difference between particulars and universals is that, 
simply in virtue of  its being a particular, nothing whatever can instantiate a particular’ (Lowe 2006); 
and ii) universals can wholly present in multiple places at the same time. Taking the possibility of  
simultaneous multiple instantiation as defining trait of  universals might beg the question against the 
theories of  Platonic haecceities that I will discuss in the next section: my argument against these will 
not crucially rely on this part of  the definition. 
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success of  P*. No need for possibilia: only actual universals involved. A manifestation is 
manifested if  the universal in question happens to be instantiated in a specific 
spatiotemporal location  as a result of  the action of  the token power,  and unmanifested 81 82
if  the very same universal is uninstantiated in that specific place and time (despite the action 
of  the token power).  
 The view, naturally, amounts to the idea that powers only have Type-identities in 
virtue of  their manifestation. This will become relevant for the purposes of  developing a 
theory of  powers that is apt to ground modal truths, for it will invite a dilemma when it 
comes to explain the truth of  de re modal sentences: either we have to introduce very fine-
grained universals, or we admit that powers do not have much to say about the modal 
properties of  specific individuals and particulars. I will come back to this in the next 
section. For the time being, let’s consider a bit more in depth what we are talking about 
when we talk about universals.  
 In this context, it is particularly important to be clear about the relation between the 
existence of  universals and their particular instances. A significant distinction within 
theories of  universals can be drawn between those that maintain that universals 
ontologically generically depend upon their being instantiated and those who regard them 
as being independent. Call the former ‘Aristotelian’ and the latter ‘Platonist’ theories of  
universals.  
 In short, friends of  Aristotelian Universals accept the following ‘Principle of  
Instantiation’, according to which each property or universal ‘demand[s] that it is a property 
of  some particular[, and f]or each relation universal [it must] be the case that there are 
 Or particular—the details of  our theory of  the instantiators do not matter greatly at this stage. 81
 In some sense of  ‘as a result of ’. The most natural reading would be to treat this as a causal ex82 -
planation, but the power theorists who reject Strong Causality and concede that there are non-
causal powers will probably resist such reading. Still, even who admits non-causal powers has to find 
a way to say that the pattern of  instantiation of  universals at a certain moment tn must be in some 
way due to the action of  some powers are some other time tm, otherwise it would be unclear what 
work the powers are doing, and how such a picture would differ from a Humean mosaic. That is the 
reading of  ‘because’ that is relevant here. 
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particulars between which the relation holds’ (Armstrong 1989: 75, quoted in Vetter 2015), 
whereas Platonists reject it. Their position can be summarised as follows:   
Aristotelian Universals: A universal F exists iff  there is some particular x such that x 
instantiates F.  83
Platonic Universals: A universal F is an abstract  entity which exists necessarily at all 84
times, independently of  being instantiated.  
The majority of  power theorists embrace Aristotelian Universals (Ellis 2001, Mumford 
2004, Vetter 2015, and arguably—pace her professed neutrality—McKitrick 2018). I take it 
that one of  the main reasons for adopting an Aristotelian view of  universals is that it allows 
us to maintain Ontological Naturalism, which is ‘the doctrine that reality consists of  
nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal system’ (Armstrong 1981: 149). That is 
to say, the view does not need to invoke in our scientific and metaphysical explanations the 
actions or relevance of  entities that are not causally efficacious and within our epistemic 
grasp: all there is, is right in front of  our eyes.  
 More importantly, adopting an Aristotelian theory is helpful to clarify what universals 
are supposed to be and how they are supposed to be instantiated. A common reason to adopt 
the idea that universals (generically)  ontologically depend upon their instances is that 85
properties, when everything is said and done, are nothing over and above ways things are. 
David Armstrong, who more than anybody in the last decades has contributed to establish 
 Aristotelian theories of  universals can be further differentiated once the temporal dimension is 83
factored in. To avoid an excessively cumbersome discussion, I will only deal with the most liberal 
version: A universal F exists at some time t iff  there is some particular x such that x instantiates F at 
some t’, where either t≥ ’ t or t’ ≥ t. This is the position adopted by Armstrong: ‘We certainly 
should not demand that every universal should be instantiated now...The principle of  instantiation 
should be interpreted as ranging over all time’ (Armstrong 2008: 65)
 Note that by ‘abstract entity’ I do not mean the Aristotelian or (Neo)Fregean ‘entity produced by 84
an operation (psychological or else) of  abstraction from a non-abstract one’. 
 By generic ontological dependence I mean non-rigid, pluralised modal/existential dependence: x 85
depends generically for its existence upon the Fs =df Necessarily, x exists only if  some F exist. See 
Lowe (1998; 2006), Correia (2008) and Lowe & Tahko (2015). 
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in rebus universals as respectable entities, in the last years of  his life (see in particular 
Armstrong 2004) defended an ontology of  states of  affairs according to which these are the 
fundamental building block of  reality—they are not posterior or dependent in any way on 
their ‘components’. On the contrary, their components (bare particulars and immanent 
universals) are just ‘abstractions’ from the fundamental states of  affairs.  Universals and 86
thin particulars are aspects of  states of  affairs, or thick particulars (Heil 2015). He argued 
that  
[universals] are mere constituents of  states of  affairs... If  a particular a has the property-universal F, 
then the state of  affairs is a’s being F. For convenience we may continue often to refer to the 
universal by the mere letter ‘F’. But it is best thought of  as _’s being F. Similarly, we have _’s having 
R to _. The universal is a gutted state of  affairs; it is everything that is left in the state of  affairs after 
the particular particulars involved in the state of  affairs have been abstracted away in thought 
(Armstrong 1997: 28-9). 
A comparison with the linguistic case is helpful here: assume that states of  affairs are best 
referred to or described by atomic sentences such as ‘Fa’. In order to obtain the best 
description of  the universal (that is, the predicate that ‘corresponds’ to it), we will just need 
to use an abstraction operator—say, the one provided by λ-calculus. The predicate ‘being F’ 
is thus abstracted from Fa by lambda, resulting in ‘λx.Fx’. According to Armstrong, 
something similar goes on at the metaphysical level. Universals or properties are just aspects 
of  things, they are ‘gutted states of  affairs’: that is why they depend upon them. This helps 
to dispel the idea that universals are some mysterious kind of  entity that somehow are 
related, by means of  an equally mysterious relation of  instantiation (or participation, etc) to 
ordinary things. That is to say, I take it that adopting an Aristotelian theory of  universals 
partially succeeds in minimising the role of  instantiation and therefore the potential 
troubles connected to it. We don’t have to really worry about instantiation if  all properties 
 The components of  states of  affairs, such as universals, ‘only exist at the limit of  86
abstraction’ (Armstrong 2009).  
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are just way things are, abstracted from other irrelevant details. It would seem that 
Aristotelians have one less mystery to solve, and so ceteris paribus be preferable. The problem 
is that such view of  universals does not help much when it comes to Too Much Possibility, 
when it is articulated employing Type-Independence, as I have argued in chapter 1. that it 
should.  
 Those who are committed to the idea that the manifestations of  powers are 
Aristotelian Universals face a tension between the following three  theses:  87
i) Manifestations of  powers are Universals. 
ii) Universals exist only if  (ever) instantiated: A universal (type) exists iff  it has an 
instantiated token.   
iii) There are type-unmanifested powers. 
A terminological note: this tension has often been associated to the problem of  ‘alien 
properties’ for actualist possible-world metaphysics (Tugby 2013). I think we should be 
careful in associating the two debates here, because the term ‘alien properties’ is ambiguous: 
it might be read weakly, as ‘properties that are not (or ever will be) instantiated at the actual 
world’. But it might also be read more strongly, as ‘properties that cannot be instantiated at 
the actual world’. To avoid confusions, let me refer to the latter set of  properties as ‘super-
aliens’ (Vetter 2015: 269).  
 The problem presented above concerns aliens only: Independence only shows that 
there are kinds of  powers that might never manifest—nothing is being said about super-
aliens. For what has been said so far, the power theorist is not committed to the existence of  
 Matthew Tugby presented a very similar objection, but added a fourth point in order to bring out 87
the inconsistency, which he called the ‘intrinsicness platitude’, which states that ‘many disposition 
instantiations are intrinsic to their possessors’ (Tugby 2013: 454). His main reason for doing so, as 
far as I can see it, is to prevent the Aristotelian from biting the bullet and simply deny that unmani-
festing powers exist, and that there are laws that concern them. However, if  we accept the strongest 
version of  Independence, as I have argued we should, then such a denial is no longer viable, and 
we can establish the inconsistency without having to invoke the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, which 
is somewhat muddled when it comes to powers. Aside from this detail, the argument is very similar 
to that offered by Tugby. 
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the latter, so she might simply deny their possibility and incur in no internal tension 
(Giannini & Tugby forthcoming). Given Type-Independence, powers ontologies are 
committed to aliens. But how can there be Aristotelian alien universals, if  universals 
(generically) depend upon their instances for their existence? The point of  adopting 
universals was that they could exist even if  they failed to be instantiated in some particular 
occasion. But, according to the Aristotelian conception, they need to be instantiated at some 
point by something in order to exist. But aliens, by definition, are never instantiated. Yet, 
powers are directed at them, so they need to exist. How is this possible? Vetter recognises 
the problem and relaxes the principle of  instantiation enunciated by Aristotelian 
Universals as follows: 
PPI. Every universal must be at least potentially instantiated: there is a property universal of  being F 
only if  there is some particular thing which is F, is potentially F, or is potentially such that something 
is F (Vetter 2015: 272). 
Vetter then explains how this modified principle of  instantiation gets around the problem 
of  unmanifested dispositions:  
the claim that something has a potentiality to have (or produce or constitute something which has) 
the actually uninstantiated property of  being F is not in jeopardy because there might be no 
property of  being F. Rather, that claim, if  true, guarantees that there is such a property, because this 
is precisely what it takes for there to be a property of  being F (Vetter 2015: 272). 
Her proposal obviously avoids Armstrong’s objection: unmanifested manifestations do exist 
because for a universal to exist just is for it to be the manifestation of  a power, to be what a 
power is directed at. I have two worries about Vetter’s solution; although I do not think that 
they will amount to a refutation, I think they are enough to spur us to find an alternative 
solution.  
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 The first is whether her proposal still qualifies as Ontologically Naturalistic. On 
Vetter’s weakened Principle of  Instantiation, the theory of  universals is no longer 
naturalistic, because  
it was not the fact that properties are dependent upon something that made them naturalistically 
kosher, but rather the fact that they were located in space-time: they were located where their 
instances were. But now consider the uninstantiated Aristotelian universals allowed by PPI: where in 
space-time are they? Surely they are not located where their instances are, because there are none. 
But they cannot be located where the potentialities directed to them are, either, because i) nothing 
grants that the manifestation is co-located with the potentiality, and ii) if  they were located there, 
then by Aristotelian lights they would be instantiated by the bearers of  the potentiality, which would 
catastrophically mean that every power is always already manifested (Tugby & Giannini 
forthcoming).  
I suspect that many philosophers who are attracted to Ontological Naturalism consider it to 
be a somewhat weaker reformulation of  the Eleatic Principle, the thesis that everything 
which exists simpliciter is involved in causation.  However, Ontological Naturalism is not a 88
non-negotiable axiom of  any good philosophy: it can be abandoned, if  need be, so Vetter 
ought not be too worried by this consequence.  89
 The second objection to Vetter’s brand of  Aristotelianism is more significant: it is 
no longer Aristotelian, at least in a useful way. It remains Aristotelian in so far as it keeps 
hold of  the generic ontological dependence between universal and its instantiations. But 
this dependence does not do much work anymore, in terms of  both elucidating what 
universals are, and minimising the role of  instantiation. If  Aristotelian universals are, ceteris 
 It might be preferred to the Eleatic Principle because ‘being involved in causation’ is frustratingly 88
vague, but it is hard to formulate the principle more precisely (Oddie 1982, Cowling 2015). Perhaps, 
Ontological Naturalism manages to capture the spirit of  the Eleatic Principle without incurring in 
the same problems: after all, being spatiotemporally located is often taken to be a necessary condi-
tion for being causally active. I suspect that Ontological Naturalism does a poor job in capturing the 
Eleatic Principle, for it does not exclude the existence of  idlers. 
 And I think that here, need be: I suspect that any solution to Too Much Possibility will have to be 89
non-naturalistic. 
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paribus, to be preferred because they successfully minimise the role of  (the somewhat 
mysterious) instantiation and elucidate what it is to be a universal, then a theory of  
universals that does not qualify as Aristotelian loses some of  its appeal, insofar as it is 
burdened with the additional task of  offering an illuminating theory of  instantiation.  
 I think that adopting PPI undermines the understanding that many friends of  
Aristotelian universals have of  what it is to be a universal, and thus undermines the main 
motivation for the theory. Adopting Vetter’s picture, we can no longer say that universals 
are ways things are, for they no longer need to be instantiated. They become ways things can be. 
But it is no longer clear what is the argument that the abstraction operation is acting upon, 
here: are there possible states of  affairs upon which we operate the ‘metaphysical 
abstraction’? Aren’t we just smuggling in possible worlds back again? Would that still be 
hardcore actualism?  What distinguishes possible states of  affairs from actual states of  90
affairs? We cannot, obviously, just invoke the property of  actuality, because we have already 
dismissed it as moot and unhelpful. 
 PPI, while obviously disarming Too Much Possibility by recognising the existence 
of  unmanifested manifestation, does not say much about their status—that is, it does little 
to answer Key Question. Invoking universals was supposed to help because we knew what 
the difference between an instantiated and non-instantiated universal was supposed to be. 
The manifestation was the same old familiar universal—the aspect of  something—and 
saying that it was not instantiated by a particular object or region of  spacetime simply 
meant that such object or region did not have that aspect. But if  we admit potential 
universals, it is no longer clear what the region or object does not display: it does not 
instantiate the aspect that no thing has. What does this mean? Once we give up on the 
orthodox understanding of  Aristotelian universals in rebus, it seems that we need to invoke a 
primitive relation of  instantiation, and use it to define the property of  being instantiated 
which elucidates the difference between being manifested and unmanifested. That is to say, 
 Compare here with a Stalnakerian account of  possible worlds as ‘ways things might be’. See for 90
instance Stalnaker (1976; 2003; 2012).
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we need to do much of  the work that those who adopt a Platonist theory of  universals have 
to do. This suggests that Vetter’s proposal is much closer to Platonism than Aristotelianism: 
they are only divided by a dependency claim that has lost much of  its raison d’être (Giannini 
& Tugby forthcoming). Therefore, we should now consider Platonic Universals and 
examine if  they are good candidates for being manifestations of  powers.  
  
5.3 Platonic Universals  
Matthew Tugby (2013) has argued that invoking universals to solve Too Much Possibility is 
only available if  we accept a Platonist conception of  universals, according to which they are 
not ontologically dependent upon their instances. Otherwise, it is hard to make sense of  
dispositional properties that have never been (and never will) been exercised, but which are 
nevertheless perfectly real. How can there be an uninstantiated Aristotelian universal, if  the 
existence of  the universal generically depends upon its instances? We have seen that the 
only Aristotelian view that is able to deal with the issue (namely, Vetter’s) is very close to 
Platonism in spirit, and so for all purposes it might be assimilated.   
 Those who think that the manifestations of  powers are Platonic Universals should 
not be troubled by Type-Independence, as Platonic Universals exist necessarily and can 
exist uninstantiated:  
On the Platonic picture proposed, manifestation universals exist even if  they are never instantiated. 
Thus, the directedness (and so identity) of  a disposition is secured regardless of  the contingent 
circumstances that possessors of  those dispositions find themselves in (Tugby 2013: 467).  
 There are two difficulties for those who think that invoking Platonic Universals as 
manifestations of  powers is the best solution to Armstrong’s argument and correctly 
answers Key Question, I think. The first is that, if  powers were directed only towards 
Platonic universals, it would be very hard to develop a credible Dispositonalist theory of  de 
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re modality. The second is that they have a hard time making sense of  Independence at all. 
Let's start with the first.  
 Recall: according to Dispositionalism, ‘possibly p’ is true iff  there is a power such 
that its manifestation is a truthmaker for p. But if  the manifestation is a universal, how 
could dispositionalists account for sentences involving specific individuals? How are we to 
make sense of  my power to make Jamie angry, if  powers are directed at universals only? This 
is to say: how are we to make sense of  ‘individualistic’ truths (in the sense of  Dasgupta 
2014) on a Platonic conception of  properties? Another way to put the point is to note that 
universals are notoriously bad truthmakers for singular contingent claims, such as ‘this rose 
is red’ (Armstrong 1997; 2004). If  powers can only point to universals, how are they going 
to provide the truthmakers for ‘it is possible for Priscilla (and not her duplicate) to be queen 
of  the desert?’ and not just ‘it is possible that someone who is thus-and-so is queen of  the 
desert?’. In short, I think that we can pose the following dilemma for Dispositionalist 
powers ontologies that invoke universals as manifestations: either i) they cannot account for 
a significant class of  de re truths or ii) they have to commit to independently unappealing 
metaphysical positions, such as Platonic haecceities.  
 Of  course, the Platonist can deny that there are individualistic facts and hence de re 
truths of  that kind (this seems to be also the strategy of  Jubien 1993; 1996). This might be 
acceptable for those who aim to ground nomological modality upon powers, when this is 
understood as being the sort of  modality that only concerns laws of  nature, or the 
phenomena that laws of  nature are supposed to govern—regularities in property 
instantiation and so forth, for they all seem to involve only de dicto modal truths (Tugby 
forthcoming, Mumford 2004). But the outcome does not seem to be acceptable for those 
who intend to develop a metaphysics of  powers to ground modality tout court—or even just 
the more modest project of  grounding natural modality, when this is understood in the 
sense that I have sketched in the Introduction. If  you recall, I characterised natural modality 
as a restricted form of  modality that only concerns spatiotemporally located entities. And 
there is no reason to think that there are no de re truth about them: Jamie is located in 
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spacetime, and I am interested in whether I can make him angry. In short, this option does 
not seem to be available to the Dispositionalist, because de re truths were supposed to be 
Dispositionalism’s bread and butter.  91
 Having dismissed the first horn of  the dilemma and recognised that 
Dispositionalism needs to account for de re truths, the only other solution I can envisage  is 92
invoke individual universals. This seems to be Vetter’s strategy. She adopts a very 
lightweight, abundant conception of  properties, according to which any predicate that can 
be obtained via lambda-calculus corresponds to a property, and hence has no problems 
admitting individual properties. Call ‘impure individual properties’ the ontic correspondents of  
impure predicates, such as ‘sitting next to Max’, ‘being in love with Mary’ and so on. Call 
‘pure individual properties’ those that correspond to predicates such as ‘being Quine’, 
‘being Napoleon’, etc. Given her generous ontology, Vetter has no problem admitting 
impure and pure individual properties, as long as these concern actual individuals—in the case of  
pure individual properties, she can just abstract them from the actual identity relations that 
every actual thing has with itself: from Quine’s being self-identical, she can abstract the 
property of  being identical to Quine.  
 However, she has a problem in accounting for individual (pure and impure) 
properties concerning merely possible individuals. How is she going to introduce a merely 
possible individual, such as Dory, my merely possible granddaughter? And my property of  
skating with her, or her potentiality to be a painter? Note that I am here interested in the 
 Jacobs (2010) is the exception: he recognises that powers-based theories of  modality can only 91
make sense of  de dicto truths, and invokes a version of  counterpart theory to account for de re. I 
think that counterpart theory has some fatal shortcoming, both expressive (Fara & Williamson 
2005) and foundational, and so is not really a viable alternative. In short, the latter objection is that 
the counterpart relation can be legitimately thought to be relevant for the truth-conditions of  a de re 
sentence only if  we presuppose that counterparts represent each other; but this representation can-
not be grounded in the usual ways and has to be thought to be primitive and just as ‘magical’ as er-
satzists’ theories criticised by Lewis (1986). 
 I have already dismissed the possibility of  adopting counterpart theory in the previous footnote. 92
Similarly, invoking Dasgupta (2014)’s solution, according to which individual facts are collectively 
but not individually grounded by the qualitative facts, will not do here, because a Dispositionalist 
will need to spell out the truth-conditions of  de re claims such as ‘Giacomo has the capacity to 
make Jamie angry’. Pointing at the universe as a whole—the totality of  the qualitiative facts, all the 
platonic universals—seems a peculiarly bad answer. 
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possibility of  Dory herself (fist banging on the table, name written in italics) being possibly 
a painter—not just the possibility that somebody thus-and-so (e.g. someone who is my 
granddaughter, named ‘Dory’) is a painter: in order to have the impure property, we need to 
abstract from Dory’s being self-identical, and not just the de dicto truth that everything 
(including something that is my granddaughter) is self-identical. But if  there is no Dory, 
how are we to abstract the property of  being Dory by lambda operator?  
 This point bears strong similarities to the arguments presented by Jessica Leech 
(2017) concerning Dispositionalism’s ability to account for statements of  contingent 
existence. Leech focuses on whether we can maintain that Barbara Vetter's parents had, 
prior to her birth, the non-maximal power to generate BV, which is supposedly the source 
of  BV’s contingent existence. My point is, as a matter of  fact, a generalisation of  Leech’s 
point: I take contingent existence — and therefore, the possibility of  non-existence— as 
just one case where Dispositionalist rely on de re predications concerning mere possibilia: 
saying that BV might not have existed in a Dispositionalist framework means attributing to 
her ancestors powers that involve BV herself, in a context where she has to be treated as a 
mere possible entity (and not just a future one). The upshot is that, if  one is moved by 
Leech’s objection, then they ought to recognise that a solution to her problem will involve 
devising a way to increase the expressive powers of  Dispositionalism in a way that allows 
for accounting for de re truths about mere possibilia in general, even if  one is, like Stalnaker 
(2012), skeptical of  other cases of  talk involving them. The moral I want to draw is this: if  
we are to account for contingent existence, then we must be able to account for mere 
possibilia in general. And once we can do that, we might as well make full use of  our 
expanded expressive powers. My and Leech’s objections, conversely, highlights the fact that 
there is a tension between the idea that Too Much Possibility can be solved by invoking 
some feature of  universals, and that pure and impure properties are abstracted painlessly 
from individuals.  
 The last alternative I can think of  is to renounce the lightweight, abstractionist view 
on pure and impure individual properties, and invoke full blown Platonic haecceities, of  the 
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kind used by Plantinga (1974).  Such individual essences, as Plantinga calls them, have a 93
(justly, I think) bad reputation. I will not rehearse here all the arguments that have been 
moved against them: I will only briefly report an argument by Menziel that I find 
particularly convincing in this footnote.  94
 There is a second, quite unrelated difficulty for the Platonist—one that cuts even 
deeper. The problem is how to make sense of  Independence: if  Platonic universals are 
necessary existents, and they are the manifestation of  powers, then how could a power fail 
to bring them about? Indeed, it would seem that every power is always manifested—for the 
universal exists necessarily, with no interruption. Note that a Platonist about universals has 
to sharply distinguish between a universal and its instances: Platonic universals are abstract, 
 More recently, Jubien (2009) pursues a similar project, trying to reduce individuals to properties. 93
His account is partially vulnerable to the same objections that have been moved against Plantinga. 
He can deflect some because he avails himself  of  an independently structured and metric spacetime 
(and stuff  occupying it)—a move that is hardly compatible with General Relativity. I doubt that the 
powers theorist could remedy to this by adopting a qualitativist approach along the lines of  
Dasgupta (2014), according to which the individualistic (or haeccetistic) facts or properties are col-
lectively grounded by the qualitative properties. The reason is this: assume that collectively the fun-
damental qualitative properties determine the structure and metric of  spacetime, in keeping with 
GR. Given a structured spacetime, we could then apply Jubien’s strategy to produce ‘individual 
properties’: physical objects are just property instantiations. The problem is that, if  such properties 
are real and legitimate, then they must have been mentioned among the manifestations of  the ori-
ginal properties: which would be enough to individuate them, making them haecceitistic from the 
get-go. 
 ‘Define a property or relation to be  logically simple (simple, for short) if  it is not itself  a negation, 94
conjunction, disjunction, quantification, modalization, etc. of  any other properties or 
relations...Next, say that a property P is general if  it is possible both that (i) something x exemplify P 
and that (ii) possibly, something y distinct from x exemplify P. Intuitively, then, a property is general 
if  it can be exemplified by more than one thing, albeit perhaps only at different times or in different 
possible worlds... Now, haecceities are either simple or they are not. Both options are problematic... 
If  haecceities are logically complex, the central question is: In what does this logical complexity con-
sist? An appealing and quite popular answer dating back to Russell is that logical complexity, at least 
in part, involves a certain type of  metaphysical complexity: a logically complex property, proposi-
tion, or relation is literally constituted by less complex metaphysical parts...And, most relevantly, singu-
lar properties and relations like being a student of  Quine that involve expressions for a relation 
and an individual are constituted by those very entities, in this case, in this case, the relation being a 
student of and Quine himself... If  this account is correct, then Quine is a literal metaphysical com-
ponent of  the haecceity being identical with Quine. If  so, however, then it seems that haecceities 
are ontologically dependent on their instances; no haecceity exists uninstantiated’. If  individual es-
sences are taken to be simple, on the other hand, ‘haecceities are logically simple but non-general 
properties. But this seems a very odd combination. Intuitively, at first blush anyway, properties and 
relations are common, general, repeatable characteristics of, or connections between, things — red-
ness, wisdom, humanity, marriage, adjacency, etc. Recognition of  shareability among many particu-
lars, awareness of  a one over many, is what gave rise to the concept of  a property in the first place. 
In fact, of  course, not all properties are general. But, intuitively again, non-generality comes about 
by virtue of  logical complexity, by virtue of  the manner in which the components of  a complex 
property are “woven together” logically... Hence, it follows from these intuitions that, necessarily, all 
logically simple properties are general’ (Menzies 2014). 
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necessary objects, while their instances are (mostly) concrete and contingent. Universals and 
their instances are linked by means of  a relation of  instantiation.  But this seems absurd—95
surely these are not the powers we had in mind. Platonism was invoked especially to make 
sense of  some pesky cases of  Independence; it cannot turn out that every power is 
necessarily perpetually manifesting.  
 We can imagine  that the Platonist will reply: ‘that’s a straw-man! Obviously, powers 96
do not bring about the universal; rather, they make it the case that the universal is 
instantiated; if  they bring about anything, then this is the instantiation of  said universal’. This 
reply, although initially convincing,  does not stand to scrutiny once we attempt to state it 
more clearly and flesh it out. Consider these three ways of  specifying it: 
a) The manifestation of  a power is not the Platonic universal, but rather its instantiation.  
b) The power is directed towards the universal, but brings about something else.  
c) Directedness is not to be understood as ‘tends to’ or ‘brings about that’, but rather 
‘tends to instantiate’. 
The first option states that there is a unambiguous sense of  ‘bringing about’ that is closely 
linked with the directedness relation of  a power towards its manifestations, and that powers 
are directed to, not the Platonic universal, but its instantiation, and so it is the instantiation 
that they bring about when successfully exercised. This response would be disastrous for 
the Platonist, because instantiations of  a (first order) universal are not, in turn, universals. 
Rather, they are events, or states of  affairs, tropes, etc. Claiming that the manifestation of  a 
power is the instantiation of  a universal brings us back to the initial conflict highlighted by 
 I take it that Vetter’s universals cannot be concrete, either, since they may fail to be anywhere in 95
space and time. 
 I could not find any Platonist who explicitly addresses this point in print, so I must present the 96
Platonist’s reply as a somewhat speculative reconstruction, mainly based on personal conversations 
and correspondence. In particular, what follows results from an on-going discussion with Matthew 
Tugby; although I hope to have offered a charitable and accurate reconstruction of  his ideas (as 
presented at the time of  our conversations), I do not wish to claim that he is definitively committed 
to any of  the following specifications of  the Platonist defence, so I will keep a fictionalised Platonist 
as my foe.    
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Too Much Possibility: we are committed to the existence of  unmanifested manifestations by 
Directedness, and Independence has to be taken as asserting their possible non-
existence. The contradiction still follows, and invoking universals was a useless detour. The 
question of  what unmanifested instantiations are is not solved by saying that they are 
instantiations of  necessarily existing Platonic Universals.  
 The second option suggests that we distinguish between what determines the 
identity of  the power and what is brought about: the power is directed towards the universal, 
which fixes the power’s identity, but what is brought about is some state of  affairs produced 
by or relevantly connected to the successful exercising of  the power. If  I understand him 
correctly, this seems to be Tugby’s preferred response to the argument. Thus understood, 
the Platonist would be maintaining that ‘manifestation’ is ambiguous—a strategy not unlike 
Interrupt adopted by the process theorist. Directedness only commits us to the universal, 
but Independence is concerned with the state of  affairs. The problem with this approach 
is that universals and states of  affairs better be suitably related, or we would end up 
rescinding the link between a power’s identity and the property instantiated in the world as a 
result of  powers’ activity—thus facing a similar problem as the one that afflicts 
Marmodoro’s account (§2). 
 The position of  the Platonist might even be more uneasy than the one Marmodoro 
is in. For how are we to understand the relation between universal and its instantiation? We 
cannot simply say that there is an entity, the possible instance of  U—call it u—which is 
appropriately related to the universal U, because that would commit us to the existence of  
all instances, all over again. Nor can we just say that there is a high-order relation between 
Directed(P,U) and the extrinsic higher order property of  the universal of  being instantiatied, 
Instantiated(U), because then the obtaining of  the relation would simply entail the existence 
of  [Instantiated(U)], which presumably is incompatible with the universal failing to be 
instantiated, as per Independence.  But how else can the two be linked? There might be 97
some other, credible ways to flesh out this idea, but I must confess that I cannot think of  
 It would amount to saying that universals are necessarily instantiated. 97
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any. Hopefully, an ingenious Platonist will be up to the task. Until then, however, I will 
consider this answer to be unsatisfactory.  
 The final option is to suggest that we re-interpret ‘directed towards’ as ‘tending to 
instantiate’. Saying that P is directed towards U only means that P tends to instantiate U: the 
link with u and Instantiated(U) is built into the directedness relation itself, as it were; and 
tendencies can fail, so we could grant Independence. Or something along those lines. The 
proposal seems to me to be riddled with problems, possibly because I have a hard time 
formulating it clearly in the first place. First of  all, one might worry that understanding 
‘directed towards’ as ‘tends to instantiate’ will generate a regress, for what is ‘tendency’ if  
not what powers have with regard to their manifestations? This is a worry perhaps similar 
to the regress objection to pure powers presented by Psillos (2006). Assume for the sake of  
argument that the regress is not vicious, and hence a Psillos-style argument is not damning. 
Even so, the account is troubling, for it only postpones the problem: how is the tendency to 
instantiate linked to the states of  affairs [Instantiated(U)] or to its instance, u, and how does 
this link exist without entailing the existence of  the relata? How can this tendency not 
generate the contradiction? It seems that the only way to do so is to embrace the Physical 
Intentionality Route and reject Existential Generalisation. But the appeal to (Platonic) 
universals was meant to be an alternative to Physical Intentionality! If  this is correct, then it 
would turn out to be that this third way to flesh out the Platonic universals-based solution 
to Too Much Possibility appeals to Physical Intentionality; insofar as the latter is misguided, 
so will be also this last Platonist’s strategy. 
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Chapter 6. The Minimal Metaphysics of  Powers   
There is a better way to cash out the difference-maker between manifested and 
unmanifested manifestations. The alternative solution that I intend to develop is that 
unmanifested manifestations are akin to Timothy Williamson’s merely logical existents. The 
idea that manifestations ‘in potency’ can be linked to logical existents has been already 
suggested by Alexander Bird (2006; 2007), but was not sufficiently elaborated. In particular, 
Bird does not move past the analogy and does not develop a systematic account of  what, 
exactly, a mere logical existent is supposed to be, within a metaphysics of  powers. I will start 
by drawing an analogy between Dispositionalism and Necessitism (§6.1), and then consider 
Williamson’s proposals to cash out the idea of  mere logical existence in terms of  individuals 
that only have modal properties (§6.2) and that are contingently not located in spacetime 
(§6.3). I will argue that both characterisations are problematic in the context of  a powers 
metaphysics for Dispositionalism, and offer an alternative proposal, which relies on a 
primitive notion of  essence (§6.4) and characterises unmanifested manifestations as non-
essentially non-located entities. This will represent the core of  the minimal metaphysics of  
powers that I develop in this thesis. I conclude the chapter by discussing some of  the 
consequences of  the view for the Dispositionalist project at large (§6.5-6), and in particular 
in connection with the compatibility of  essences and mere logical existents (§6.7) and with 
some puzzles connected stemming from the idea that the unmanifested manifestations of  
powers are not located in spacetime (§6.8).  
6.1. A Williamsonian Analogy 
The problem that powers theorists face with regard to unmanifested manifestations bears 
strong similarities with a situation confronted by necessitism: I will suggest that some of  
the strategies employed by the latter could be of  help to powers metaphysics.  
 Necessitism is the thesis that necessarily, everything that exists exists necessarily. 
The thesis, defended by Timothy Williamson (2002; 2016), is highly controversial. A 
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reason  for this is that most of  us have the intuition that sentences like the following are 98
true: ‘I do not have a brother, but I could have had’, ‘My teapot could have not been 
created’, ‘People cease to exist when they die’, etc. The natural and commonsensical reading 
of  these sentences is to take them at face value, as attributing contingent existence to 
people and teapots.  
 There are two responses available to the necessitist to such worries: One is to bite 
the bullet and simply claim that the intuitions are, after all, false or unreliable: the 
necessitist’s metaphysical thesis rests on more secure rational ground than mysterious pre-
theoretical intuitions. In case of  disagreement, all the worse for the intuitions.  Call this the 99
‘hard error theory’ strategy. The other option—call it ‘soft error theory’—is to maintain 
that these sentences are false, but that there are true sentences very similar to them, and it is 
these other facts that our intuitions are really about. We are mistaken in thinking that there is 
something that could be nothing, but there is a true proposition that serves the same 
purposes in everyday life, and our common-sense and pre-theoretical intuitions are about 
that one. I think that this is the route that the necessitist should take. Soft error theory 
would characterise the contrast between necessitism and, say, the truth of  ‘my teapot Cocca 
could have not been’ not as  
1. □∀x □ (∃y y=x)                   
2. ∃x (x=Cocca ∧ ◇ ¬∃x (x=Cocca)   
Which in English read:  
1. Necessarily, everything is necessarily  something  
2. Cocca is something and possibly it is not something 
 Not necessarily a good reason, of  course. 98
 Perhaps intuitions play no role at all. See Cappelen (2012).99
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But rather as  
A. □∀x (∃y y=x)                                             
B. ∃x (x=Cocca ∧ F(Cocca) ∧ ◇¬F(Cocca)     
In English:  
A. Necessarily, everything is necessarily something 
B. Cocca is something and is F and possibly Cocca is not F 
where F is a property that existents can have or lack and that can be used to make sense of  
our common-sense intuitions of  contingency. While 1. and 2. are inconsistent, A. and B. are 
not. The soft error theory solution bears striking similarities to the Actualisation Route. So, 
we should take a closer look at how the necessitist interprets the ‘F’ involved in B.   
 Williamson (2002) interprets the ‘F’ involved in B. as ‘being concrete’, and maintains 
that what we are really gesturing towards when we utter ‘Cocca might have not existed’ really 
just is ‘my teapot might have not been concrete’. Furthermore, he does not think that being 
not-F is to be understood as ‘being abstract’: ‘It is a fallacy to treat “abstract” and 
“concrete” as contradictories, although they might be contraries’ (Williamson 2016: 7). The 
reason why we should not treat them as contradictories is that it seems to be central to our 
understanding of  what it is to be abstract that abstract entities are necessarily and always so: 
abstractness is not a property that something can gain or lose. On the other hand, 
Williamson maintains that concreteness is something objects can gain or lose. The point is 
introduced in temporal terms:  
What kind of  thing has the Inn become, if  it is no longer a river? Given that abstractness is not a 
temporary property, it has not become an abstract object (Williamson 1998: 266). 
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If  this point is correct, then we should not think of  concreteness and abstractness to be 
contradictories. It is possible for something to be neither concrete nor abstract. Such entity 
exists in the ‘logical sense of  “exists”’ (Williamson 2002: 245). Call these objects ‘merely 
logical existents’ or ‘MLEs’. Bird (2006) suggests that unmanifested manifestations (entities 
in potency) can be understood as merely logical existents. I think he is on the right track. In 
order to understand and evaluate the suggestion, however, we have to say something more 
as to what it is to exist in the ‘logical sense’, or we will just have swapped one technical term 
for another and not gained much understanding.   
 Williamson offers two distinct characterisations of  what it means to exist in the 
logical sense. According to the first, merely logical existents are those entities that only have 
modal properties. According to the second, they are contingently non-located in spacetime. 
In what follows, I will treat them as independent and competing accounts.    
6.2. Mere Logical Existents as Only Modal  
Williamson suggests that one way to characterise the difference between logical existence 
and concreta/abstracta is that the latter have non-modal properties as well as modal ones, 
while logical existents have modal properties only.  A concrete entity, such as myself, 100
could be thus-and-so, but also is so-and-so: there is a way I am. On the other hand, a merely 
logically existent object, such as my putative brother Franklin, could be thus-and-so (he 
could be tall or short, funny or boring, etc.) but there is no way in which he is: he is neither 
tall nor short. The ways in which he could be are his only properties.  This is the conception 101
of  logical existence that Bird adopts in Potency and Modality: 
The main difference between the realised and the unrealised possibilities is, roughly speaking, that 
only the former have non-modalised properties. That is, someone who does make an origami swan 
 Supposedly, then, we can distinguish between concreta and abstracta subsequently by adding a fur100 -
ther, unspecified, clause. 
 Obviously, we have to exclude negative properties in order for this theory to work—my brother 101
is not tall because he lacks the property of  being tall, and not because he has the (negative) property 
of  being not-tall. 
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has created something with the property of  looking like a swan, but the possible origami swan that I 
could have made but didn’t, does not have this property. Rather it is such that it possibly looks like a 
swan (Bird 2006: 503). 
This understanding of  merely logical existence is problematic for the dispositionalist. The 
reason is this: it is all too natural for her to identify modal properties with powers, and non-
modal properties with categorical properties. Powers and dispositions are, after all, 
irreducibly modal properties: what else there is to powers that what they could do? We can 
then articulate the suggested analogy as follows:  
Non Modal: An entity is actualised (namely, concrete or abstract) iff  it has powers as well 
as categorical properties, and is merely logically existent iff  it only has powers.  
Non Modal has obvious unpalatable consequences for many theories of  powers: if  
pandispositionalism is true, i.e. the thesis that all properties are powers, then it would follow 
that no manifestation is manifested or actualised, and everything is merely potential. But 
this would amount to a refutation of  pandispositionalism and a vindication of  Armstrong’s 
(1997) ‘always packing, never travelling’ objection.  Of  course, one could argue that this is 102
a positive consequence, since Pandispositionalism is an unpalatable position anyway.  103
Although I do believe that Pandispositionalism is ultimately untenable, I do not think that 
the question whether it is true ought to be settled by our theory of  unmanifested 
manifestations, so I take this as a bad result.  
 Furthermore, Non Modal produces unwelcome consequences even for those 
dualistic metaphysics that admit both dispositional and categorical properties, such as Lowe 
 Also known as the ‘reality regress’. See Ingthorsson (2015). 102
 The belief  that pandispositionalism is untenable is usually linked with the idea that it entails a 103
vicious regress: see for instance Swinburne (1980), Foster (1982), Blackburn (1990), Armstrong 
(1997), Heil (2003), but especially Lowe (2006; 2010).
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(2006; 2010), Molnar (2003), and Cartwright's (1989).  Consider the most common 104
candidates for categorical properties that dualist powers theorists usually recognise: 
a) Qualia or phenomenal properties.  
b) Mathematical, geometrical, or in general ‘structural’ properties. 
c) Orientations, relative spatiotemporal locations. 
It is prima facie plausible to map the distinction between phenomenal and psychological 
properties with the distinction between categorical and dispositional—and thus think that 
phenomenal properties such as qualia are categorical (Mumford 1998, Jacobs 2011, and in a 
sense Williams 2019). But it would be disastrous for power metaphysics if  it turned out that 
only mental properties (of  the phenomenal kind) can be actualised: an unpalatable form of  
idealism would follow. So, let’s discard a) without further ado.  
 The second option is apparently more tempting: both concrete and abstract objects 
seem to have mathematical or structural properties, regardless of  their being mental or not. 
The problem is to find a notion of  ‘structural properties’ permissive enough to fit all concreta 
and abstracta, but austere enough to not apply to any unmanifested manifestation. I am not 
very optimistic that it can be done: whatever mathematical structure sets or numbers have 
can plausibly be applied to possibilia: possiblia can be counted (Williamson 1998), ordered, 
and in general modelled. Indeed, there is no reason why concrete and abstract entities can 
be modelled mathematically or geometrically and possibilia cannot. Isn’t possible world 
semantics a perfect example of  how to model possibilities with abstract entities such as sets, 
after all? Presumably, if  an entity can be modelled, then it has the corresponding structural 
or mathematical property. 
 As well as those Powerful Qualities view that take ‘Qualities’ to be categorical—perhaps Heil 104
(2003) would qualify. 
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 Our best shot seems to be c., spatiotemporal location. Concede that spatiotemporal 
locations are the only categorial properties (Molnar 2003).  The suggestion is, then, that 105
merely logical existents (umanifested manifestations) do not have a location and hence are 
purely modal, whereas concrete beings (manifested manifestations) do, and hence are also 
categorial—and thus, in act. The suggestion is prima facie appealing. Even if  we resist a 
reduction of  concreteness to spatiotemporal location (Cowling 2017) the two are clearly 
closely intertwined. The problem is that this, alone, is not enough to characterise 
satisfactorily what it is to be merely logically existent. For also abstract objects, such as pure 
sets, numbers, or Platonic universals, lack spatiotemporal location. This would mean that 
abstracta, too, only have modal properties, and hence are mere logical existents? The whole 
point of  introducing the ‘logical sense’ of  existence was to deny that non-concrete entities 
have to be abstract. 
6.3. Mere Logical Existents as Contingently Non-Located 
Even leaving Non Modal aside, it is hard to shake off  the idea that spatiotemporal location 
is a key element in distinguishing between the three categories. We have seen, however, that 
spatiotemporal location alone cannot deliver the right results. Williamson (1998; 2002; 2013) 
suggests that mere logical existents are distinct from abstracta because the former lack 
spatiotemporal location only contingently, whereas the latter lack it necessarily. This also 
seems to be the characterisation endorsed by Bird in Nature’s Metaphysics.  
 I think that power theorists should not embrace this characterisation, either. The 
problem with it is that it spells trouble if  one wants to embrace also a dispositionalist theory 
of  modality—which is the project that ultimately interests me here. That is to say: while I 
think that Williamson’s second characterisation is viable for a metaphysics of  powers in 
general, it is not viable for a metaphysics of  powers that aims to ground modality. Since ex 
hypothesis the minimal acceptable metaphysics of  powers must give Dispositionalism a shot, 
 Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) also suggest as much, when they talk about the stage-ar105 -
rangement of  nomological machines. 
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we cannot accept Williamson’s second characterisation nor Bird’s proposal. Recall: 
Dispositionalism can be minimally characterised as the conjunction of  the following:  
DPoss: ‘possibly p’ is true iff  and because there is some power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘p’ true.  
DNec: ‘necessarily p’ is true iff  and because there is no power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘not-p’ true.  
It is hard to square Dispositionalism and the view according to which mere logical existents 
are contingently non-located entities. The problem is this. Assume as a starting point that 
there are unmanifested powers, as stated by Independence. This means that some power 
has a manifestation which is in potency (in what follows, I use being in potency and being 
unmanifested interchangeably for mere reasons of  readability). If  we understand being in 
potency as being contingently non-located, we have the following situation:  
Independence: For some power P, i) P is directed to M, ii) M is not spatiotemporally 
located and iii) it is possible that M is spatiotemporally located. 
Given Dispositionalism, the global modality occurring in clause iii) is to be grounded upon, 
explained by, or reduced to a power. Accordingly, the kosher way to express Independence 
should be the following:  
Independence*: For some power P, i) P is directed to M, ii) M is not spatiotemporally 
located and iii) there is a power P* whose manifestation is that M is spatiotemporally 
located.  
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But of  course P* is in turn a power whose manifestation is unmanifested, because 
otherwise M would be located and hence manifested. This means that Independence* 
entails: 
Independence**: For some power P, i) P is directed to M, ii) M is not spatiotemporally 
located and iii) there is a power P* whose manifestation (that M is spatiotemporally located) 
is unmanifested.  
Again, we would have to analyse being in potency in terms of  being contingently non-
located, which in turn is to be understood in terms of  unmanifested powers. An infinite 
regress ensues. I think this regress is vicious.  106
A subset of  vicious infinite regresses are generated as a consequence of  continually attempting to 
overcome an explanatory failure that arises at the first level of  the analysis. The problem in the case 
of, at least a subset of, vicious infinite regresses arises at the first level of  analysis, and continues to 
recur at each level thereafter (Bliss 2013: 410). 
In short, Bliss suggests that the fact that there is an infinite regress is merely symptomatic 
that something went wrong at the very first step:  
The explanatory failure that occurs at the first level of  the analysis consists in the fact that the 
explanans is of  the same form as the explanandum: the phenomenon for which we are seeking an 
explanation reappears as its own explanation... As with the turtle’s case. In order to explain what 
holds the world up in space, we posit the existence of  a world turtle. In order to explain what keeps 
the world plus world turtle up, we supply a second world turtle, and so on. What we are seeking to 
explain is how something stays up in space, and, yet, at each stage of  the analysis we posit the 
existence of  something whose capacity to stay up in space is in need of  explanation. Invoking turtle 
 There are a number of  different accounts of  what constitutes viciousness, and they do not al106 -
ways line up nicely. For instance, confront the account that I present here with Maurin's (2007) pro-
cedural theory, or Aikin’s (2005) distinction between global and mediate perspective regresses. 
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qua object of  support after turtle qua object of  support shows us that we have explained nothing 
about how anything is supported at all (Bliss 2013). 
  
I think that the regress above qualifies as vicious, according to Bliss’ theory.  We started 107
off  by asking ourselves ‘what it is to be unmanifested?’ and we realised that the answer 
made reference to being unmanifested again. The problem is not that there is an infinite 
sequence of  answers, so that there is no ultimate step that fully and ultimately satisfies us, 
but rather that we do not advance at all, regardless of  the number of  steps taken. Not only 
we are never fully satisfied. We don’t even begin being satisfied by the answer. No 
explanation has been given, because we did not advance by a single step. This is the defining 
feature of  vicious regresses: that the exact same question we asked at the beginning appears 
in the answer.  
 The regress bears similarities with the one presented by Psillos (2006) concerning 
‘whether powers need further powers to act’, which runs as follows: 
to say that, for instance, fragility is directed to its manifestation even when it is not manifested is to 
say that fragility (F) has the power to manifest itself  even when it is not manifested... It seems then 
that there is an answer to the... question [what do powers do when they are not manifested?]: when 
unmanifested, F has the power Q to manifest itself; that’s what it does! (Psillos 2006: 139). 
Whilst it is controversial whether Psillos’ original argument hits the target (Marmodoro 
2010) it is hard to see how we could avoid its close relative, if  we adopt the second 
Williamsonian characterisation. It seems to me that the vicious regress is inevitable if  we 
understand what it is to be unmanifested as being contingently non-located in spacetime 
whilst adopting a dispositional theory of  modality. We need to make some tweaks to the 
proposal.  
 See also Passmore: [I]t is the first step in the regress that counts, for we at once, in taking it, draw 107
attention to the fact that the alleged explanation or justification has failed to advance matters; that if  
there was any difficulty in the original situation, it breaks out in exactly the same form in the alleged 
explanation (Passmore 1961:31).
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6.4 A New Framework 
It is hard to shake off  the idea that there is something right about the previous proposal. 
Spatiotemporal location seems to be precisely the sort of  thing that could explain the 
difference between manifested and unmanifested manifestations perspicuously, but we have 
seen that it is not enough. We need something more to distinguish between MLEs and 
abstracta.  
 If  we think that the problem of  Williamson’s account of  MLEs, when applied to 
the manifestations of  powers, is that it is formulated in modal terms, in a context in which 
the grounding of  modality is the explanandum, then we could escape the problem by 
invoking a different, non-modal explanation. One way to do this is to invoke a non-modal 
notion of  essence (Fine 1994, Hale 2013, Lowe 2016) and re-formulate the principle by 
saying that something is a mere logical existent if  it is not part of  its essence that it is 
spatiotemporally located. Adopting Fine’s symbolism:   
MLE a is a mere logical existent iff  ¬Located(a) ∧ ¬□a ¬Located(a)  
In English: logical existents are the kind of  things that are not located, but it is not part of  
their nature that this is the case. 
 I suggest that this characterisation of  MLEs allows us to clarify what is the 
difference maker between manifested and unmanifested manifestations, and thus solve Too 
Much Possibility via the Actualisation Route. The property that manifested manifestations 
have and that unmanifested manifestations lack is simply that the former have a 
spatiotemporal location, whereas the latter do not. However, this is not enough to conclude 
that unmanifested manifestations are abstract objects, making a mystery of  the actualisation 
of  manifestations: entities in potency are not essentially non-located, and thus can be 
brought about. The Actualisation Route is to be understood thus: 
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This means that the answer to Key Question involves spatiotemporal location—but, 
importantly, that is not the whole story about unmanifested manifestations: to fully grasp 
them, we have to also include information about their essence. Insofar as the properties of  
being spatiotemporally located and Fine’s non-modal essence operator are well understood, 
this proposal seems to finally provide a satisfactory answer to Key Question and an 
informative account of  unmanifested manifestations, one that does not simply swap a 
technical term for another. Of  course, I still need to show that the the proposal is 
convincing. I will spend the rest of  the present chapter, as well as the majority of  the next 
two, in fleshing it out and drawing its consequences. This is important, because cashing out 
the Actualisation Route in this way does more than simply solving Too Much Possibility—it 
has significant and far reaching consequences for powers ontologies in general. Let’s start to 
lay these in the open.   
 By taking spatiotemporal location and its essentiality as factors, we can generate the 
following matrix:  
a) Essentially located entities  
b) Essentially non-located entities  
c) Non-essentially located entities  
d) Non-essentially non-located entities  
1 Directed (P,M) Directedness P is directed to M
2 ∃x (x=M) 1., ∃I M is something
3 Located(P) ∧¬Located(M) Independence P is located and M is 
not located 
4 ∃x (x=M ∧ ¬Located(M)) 2,3 M is something and 
it is not located
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Which allows us, in turn, to offer the following definitions of  being abstract and being 
concrete:   
Concrete: a is a concrete entity iff  it is non-essentially located.  
Formally:  Located(a) ∧ ¬□a Located(a). 
Abstract: a is abstract iff  it is essentially non-located.  
Formally:  ¬Located(a) ∧ □a ¬Located(a). 
This characterisation has some very interesting consequences. For a start, it allows us to 
understand what it is that happens when a power brings its manifestation about, that is, 
when the manifestation is actualised. Becoming actualised is simply to acquire a 
spatiotemporal location. A manifestation is manifested by acquiring a spatiotemporal 
location, thus becoming concrete. I find this characterisation of  what it means to be 
‘brought about’ to be informative and intelligible. We have to note, however, that it has an 
incredibly important consequence for Dispositionalism.  
6.5 Some Consequences  
From this characterisation it follows that powers cannot have abstract entities as their 
manifestation. To see why this is the case, note that according to the schema, abstracta are 
the kind of  things that are not located by their very nature. If  an abstract entity were to be 
the manifestation of  a power, then it would be a power that could not bring about its 
manifestation. This means that it is a power had with minimal degree: a power whose 
manifestation cannot be actualised. But a minimal power (that is, a power with degree zero) 
is not a power at all!  Another way to see this is considering the first thesis about powers 108
that I have assumed, Modal.  
 This is particularly clear if  one adopts Vetter’s semantics for gradable dispositions (Vetter 2015: 108
§3). 
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Modal: Powers being directed to their manifestations tell us what something would or 
could be or do. 
Powers tell us what something could be because having is enough to ground the possibility 
of  its manifestation, as per DPoss. But this only works if  the power can bring about its 
manifestation. But if  the very nature of  the manifestation of  a power prevents the power 
from being successfully exercised, we find ourselves in an inescapable conundrum. Note 
that the situation here is much more serious than the cases of  self-finking or self-preventing 
manifestations (for instance, the power of  a soap bubble to roll is prevented by some other 
property of  the bubble: its stickiness, or its propensity to pop), because those cases involve 
contingent properties: we can always prevent or fink the self-preventer (e.g. freeze the soap 
bubble) in a way that allows for the power to be exercised, in some circumstances. But nothing 
like this can be the case when it is the very essence of  the manifestation that prevents the 
power from acting: there is no changing something’s essence, by definition. A power being 
for something makes it possible. Therefore, there cannot be powers whose manifestation is 
abstract.  109
 This is troubling for the ambitious brand of  Dispositionalism I mentioned in the 
introduction, the one that aims at grounding all truth of  metaphysical modality (Vetter 2015) 
as opposed to just those of  natural modality, when we understand the former kind of  
modality to concern any entity whatsoever—including abstracta. I think that this point cuts 
deeper than David Yates’ (2015) elegant argument against the ambitions of  
Dispositionalism on the basis of  formal inconsistencies. I will discuss these points more in 
detail in chapter 10, but here’s a brief  flash-forward: Yates argued that Vetter’s account of  
necessity, based on 
 This suggests that the presence of  primitive essences might come in handy for the Dispositional109 -
ist, if  her goal is to ground metaphysical modality: she could take a page off  the essentialist page and 
account for the truths of  mathematics and logic by invoking the essences of  numbers and operators 
(Hale 2013). 
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DNec: ‘necessarily p’ is true iff  and because there is no potentiality whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘not-p’ true 
results in an inconsistency, if  we assume that there are no potentialities directed at abstract 
objects (or, in general, at truthmakers for mathematical and logical truths), for it makes it 
necessary that some mathematical sentence and its negations are both necessary. Vetter’s 
(Vetter 2018) reply was centred around the idea that it is OK to postulate very light-weight, 
extrinsic powers (as part of  the ‘plenitude of  powers’) that do have abstracta as their 
manifestations: she argues that her account is not inconsistent because there are powers for it 
to be the case that <2+2=4>, and that it is not ad-hoc to postulate them. I find her 
arguments, as far as they are concerned with resisting the accusation of  ad-hocery, fairly 
convincing (see §10.4-5). But, if  my theory of  unmanifested manifestations, and the 
entailed account of  actualisation are correct, we have to conclude that no such power can 
be posited: powers that are directed at abstract entities cannot bring their manifestations 
about, and therefore are no powers at all, because such entities are not the kind of  thing 
that can become manifested: they cannot acquire a spatiotemporal location.   
 Here’s the upshot. First, this means that we need to find another way to resist Yates’ 
argument from formal inconsistency, or Dispositionalism will collapse. The easiest way to 
do so is to abandon the ambitious version of  Dispositionalism, and maintain that the 
theory can only provide an account for natural modality, where there is no pesky abstract 
entity to spoil everything. This does not quite amount to accepting Causality into our 
metaphysics of  powers—we need something more in order to show that causality and 
powers are inextricably linked, to the effect that all causal interactions involve powers and 
that all powers are causal powers. Although this position does not amount to Causality, it 
is easy to see that the minimal metaphysics that I am presenting here would fit rather 
comfortably with a theory of  powers that aims to ground or identify the activities of  
powers with causation (e.g. the sort of  causal primitivism invoked by Mumford and Anjum 
2011), for at least we know that the entities that are involved in causation are all the entities 
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that can be manifestations of  powers, and we do not have to offer an explanation for why 
certain powers are involved in causal goings-on and others are not. I do not intend to 
discuss the link between powers are causation in any detail in this dissertation; I just wanted 
to point out that the minimal metaphysics that I am presenting could fit easily other 
classical projects of  powers theorists. 
 However, for the purposes of  Ambitious Dispositionalism, the present stance has 
similar consequences as adopting Causality: there is a limit to the reach of  powers, as it 
were; there are entities that are beyond and unfettered by the activities of  powers. More 
colourfully: abstracta (and therefore a number of  modal truths concerning them) do not care 
what powers there are nor what they do. In the Introduction I had characterised the 
difference between natural and metaphysical modality in terms of  a restriction concerning 
the entities that modal truths can be about, so that metaphysical modality concerned every 
entity whatsoever.  
 If  powers cannot have abstract entities as manifestations, then they have nothing to 
do with some of  the modal truths that concern, and are made true by, abstracta; therefore, 
the modality that can be grounded by powers cannot be metaphysical modality, understood 
as the modality that concerns every entity whatsoever. So, Dispositionalism has to retreat to 
a more modest form, and maintain that powers can ground all modal truths concerning 
natural, or non-abstract entities.  If  we aim to account for metaphysical or absolute 110
modality at large, we will have to adopt a more complex theory: perhaps something like 
Yates’ disjunctive ‘Weak Dispositionalism’, according to which 
 One worry that might plague Modest Dispositionalism is that it might be hard to prove that the 110
modal discourse grounded in powers is closed under entailment; Vetter (2015) takes such closure to 
be a key desideratum of  Dispositionalism (it is part and parcel of  the required formal adequacy), so 
Modest Dispositionalism might be a non-starter. But I wonder whether the Dispositionalist could 
not mimic the Essentialist, and draw a similar distinction to that between constitutive and con-
sequential essence, to the effect that powers per se do not need to ground a logically closed modal 
discourse: only the extension of  that modal discourse plus the preferred logic needs to do so. 
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<p> is possible iff  <p> is true or there is a power to bring it about that p. Given interdefinability, 
we get… [that] <p> is necessary iff  <p> is true and there is no power to bring it about that ¬p 
(Yates 2015: 419). 
or we find a way to find a hybrid theory which combines elements of  Essentialism with 
elements of  Dispositionalism (I will return to this in §9 and in the Final Remarks). That is 
to say, one possible reaction to the consequences of  the minimal metaphysics is to think 
that pure Dispositionalism can only be modest; an ambitious Dispositionalism will have to 
incorporate external elements and most likely be disjunctive in some form.  
 There is a different possible reaction, one which doubles down on Ambitious 
Dispositionalism. The way to do so, however, is a difficult one: it involves showing that 
mathematical and logical truths are made true not by abstracta, but by concrete entities—that 
is, to reject mathematical & logical Platonism. Of  course, the project is not unheard of  
(Fields 1980 and Rayo 2013 are the obvious examples that spring to mind), but it is surely a 
formidable task. Both strategies would require a whole lot of  additional work in order to be 
properly assessed and be made workable. But this belongs to the semantic task of  
Dispositionalism, rather than the metaphysical one that this dissertation is concerned about, 
so I will not pursue this line of  inquiry here. Perhaps Ambitious Dispositionalism is not 
doomed, but surely it has a lot of  work to do.  
 A second consequence of  adopting this characterisation of  MLE is that the matrix 
generates a fourth slot—the essentially spatiotemporally located entities. It is not 
immediately clear what these could be. My preferred hypothesis is that they are the space-
time points themselves.  It is hard to conceive how a space-time point could fail to have a 111
location, for it seems to me that their identity is exhausted by being located where they are; 
there is nothing more to what they are than where and when they are. If  so, it seems natural to 
think that they are essentially located: a non-located spacetime point seems to be a 
contradictory entity, just like a square circle. The hypothesis fits more naturally with a 
 Another hypothesis: it could be the substratum of  certain theories of  substance such as Arm111 -
strong (1997) and Moreland (2013). 
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substantivalist view of  spacetime, but I do not see any reason why it couldn’t work within a 
relationalist framework, too: nothing in the schema above suggests that we have to treat any 
of  these entities as fundamental.  We can sum up the results in the following schema:  112
 There is a final consequence that is worth drawing, before moving on. It is another 
cost of  the theory. Understanding mere logical existents in terms of  non-essential non-location 
and therefore formulating the framework for powers ontologies making use of  a primitive 
notion of  essence seems to run counter the very spirit of  Dispositionalism. Finean essences 
are ‘non-modal’ in the sense that they are not reducible to simple metaphysical necessity—not 
that they do not have modal consequences. Indeed, Fine and other essentialists such as Hale 
(2013) propose to ground alethic modality in its entirety upon essences, based on the fact 
that if  it is true in virtue of  the nature of  a that p, then it is necessary that p. This, evidently, 
creates an embarrassment for Dispositionalists, if  their project is to ground metaphysical 
modality tout court upon powers, for it seems that in order to make sense of  powers 
themselves we have to invoke a notion that has modal consequences, and cannot be 
analysed in terms of  powers (or the circularity of  Williamson's second characterisation 
would ensue once again). This results in a further blow to Dispositionalism’s ambitions: not 
only did I suggest that it might not be able to ground the most general kind of  modality, 
but now I am suggesting that it might not be the only source of  natural modality, provided 
Essentially Spatiotemporally located 
Concrete X ✓
Abstract ✓ X
Logical Existence X X
Spacetime points ✓ ✓
 Indeed, if  the considerations presented in §4 are correct, then it follows that no power is abso112 -
lutely fundamental, in the sense that it is not dependent upon anything else: all powers depend upon 
their manifestations. I will return to this point in §8. 
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that we assume that concrete entities have essences, obviously. I set out by saying that I 
wanted to develop the best metaphysics of  powers to help out the Dispositionalist project, 
and yet I am continuously chipping away at its ambitions. One might fear that 
dispositionalists might find the truncated version of  their theory that my metaphysics 
supports to be utterly uninteresting. The point is a fair one, but I would urge not rush to 
dramatic conclusions, either.  
 While I recognise that the appeal to non-modal essences is not ideal, we have to 
keep in mind that essences were going to prove tricky for Dispositionalism anyway. The 
metaphysics that I have proposed gives non-modal essence a key role which other theories 
of  powers do not. But this does not mean that Dispositionalism could ignore essences, just 
because they were not embedded in their metaphysics (or, at least, not so explicitly). 
Dispositionalists still have to say something about essences, and account for the whole set 
of  modal sentences that employ the term: it still makes sense to talk of  the essence of  
{Socrates}, presumably—and more insidiously, of  the fact that the modal (or even causal) 
profile of  a power is essential to it!  
 One way to deal with the phenomenon is to simply adopt a modalist account of  
essence, and argue that there is nothing more to it than mere necessity or a strict 
conditional. In order to do so, they have to deal with what we can call ‘Fine-Sentences’ such 
as:  
Fine Sentence: It is essential to {Socrates} that it has Socrates as a member, but it is not 
essential to Socrates that he is a member of  {Socrates}. 
They can deal with them either by simply rejecting their truth, or by offering an alternative 
explanation. The latter option does not seem promising at all. Alessandro Torza (2015) has 
presented convincing formal arguments against the possibility of  reducing the essence in 
terms of  any operator definable in first order modal language. He also presented some 
interesting arguments against more sophisticated forms of  modalism, involving impossible 
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worlds. But note that it is not necessary to go this far: Dispositionalism does not have the 
expressive means to even talk about impossible worlds. The potentiality operator that Vetter 
uses does not introduce hyperintensional contexts, so it is useless to introduce impossible 
worlds as a way of  modelling hyperintensional phenomena; in general admitting any 
‘disposition impossible’ (Jenkins and Nolan 2012) would fatally undermine DPoss, and with 
it Dispositionalism. This seems to pose the greatest challenge for those who seek to be 
reductionist about essence: they need to do so with merely intensional resources, such as 
powers. But, if  we accept Fine-Sentences, it is obvious that essence is not merely 
intensional!  
 So the only strategy open to the ambitious Dispositionalist is to flatly reject that FS 
is true. Of  course, in absentia a theory-independent epistemology of  modality (which is not 
coming any time soon), to some degree which modal sentence we believe to be true will 
depend upon which theory of  the foundations of  modality we accept—so, it is in principle 
open to dispositionalists to just say that Fine Sentence is false, just like they will bite the 
bullet and concede that ‘there could have been nothing rather than something’ is not true 
(Cameron 2008, Pruss 2002, Vetter 2015: 273 ff). However, I find Fine Sentence 
considerably more plausible than the possibility of  ontic nihilism; it seems to me to be an 
unacceptable cost to pay. I would rather renounce an ambitious form of  Dispositionalism 
than maintain that it is essential for Socrates to be a member of  {Socrates}. But this stands 
on the very shaky grounds of  intuitions and personal idiosyncrasies. It is not an argument, 
and I will not pretend that is one. I am happy to leave the choice to the dispositionalist’s 
philosophical good conscience, to cite Goodman (1954: 32): either treat essence in purely 
intensional, modal terms and reject Fine-sentences as false, or admit that essences cannot 
be reduced to powers and, insofar as they have modal consequences, admit that 
Dispositionalism’s ambitions have to be limited. In what follows, I simply assume that the 
second is preferable.  
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6.6 Mere Logical Existents and Essences  
The consequences of  introducing essences do not raise worries only for a Dispositionalist 
theory of  modality, though, but could prima facie represent a threat to a theory of  merely 
logical existents. One could raise an objection along these lines:  
Suppose that it is essential to Socrates that he is human. Suppose that being human entails that 
Socrates is spatiotemporally located and hence concrete. Thus Socrates cannot be an unmanifested 
manifestation. Yet, it seems exactly the kind of  thing that you want to say can be in potency: surely 
Phaenarete and Sophroniscus had the power to generate Socrates (since they did) and plausibly this 
was a preventable (non-maximal) power: they could have failed to generate him. 
 Schematically, the argument consists of  two moves:  
1. The essence of  Socrates is to be human. 
2. Being human entails being concrete. 
3. Therefore Socrates cannot be a manifestation. 
Consequently, there are two ways to resist it: rejecting either the first or the second premiss. 
Williamson seems to take the former path:  
Necessitists and permanentists typically deny some popular essentialist theses...many philosophers 
regard membership of  a natural kind as essential to its members. Thus a tiger is essentially a tiger, 
and gold is essentially gold. Hence a tiger is always necessarily if  anything a tiger, and gold always 
necessarily if  anything gold. Given those claims, necessitism implies that tigers are necessarily tigers, 
and gold necessarily gold. But presumably there could have been no tigers and no gold: once there 
were no tigers and no gold. Consequently, necessitists and permanentists should reject the 
essentialist theses as stated (Williamson 2013: 8).  
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 Williamson maintains that nothing is lost by rejecting 1., and that the necessitist can 
replace ‘Socrates is essentially human if  anything’ with ‘Socrates is essentially human if  
concrete’ without losing anything: ‘those are just the modifications one would expect in 
switching from a contingentist framework to a necessitist one. They do not affect the 
underlying strategy of  explaining modal matters in terms of  essential natures’ (Williamson 
2013: 391). I think that Williamson underestimates the costs of  such a move. He seems to 
treat the essentialist position as attributing conditional properties to entities: Socrates has 
the property of  being essentially human if  anything. But the essentialist would object: 
essences are simple properties (being human) that are selected by the essentiality operator. 
The clause ‘if  anything’ simply shows that the operator needs to have an argument. The Finean 
operator needs an object to select the essential truths about that entity—it does not 
attribute as a brute fact conditionalised properties such as ‘human if  anything’. So, replacing 
‘if  anything’ with ‘if  concrete’ is not as painless as Williamson makes it to be: it would imply 
that only concrete things can be the argument of  the essentiality operator; that only concreta 
have essences. This does not seem right: we have a better grasp of  the essence of  
mathematical entities than tigers, or so it would seem. For instance, in Cartesian co-
ordinates, we may define the property of  being a sphere of  radius R, centred at (x0, y0, z0), 
as the property of  being an X such that all points (x, y, z) that lie at X’s outer boundary 
satisfy the formula (x - x0)2 + (y - y0)2 + (z - z0)2 = R2. This is surely a better candidate as 
being something’s essence than Socrates’ having the parents he had, or the table being made 
of  this wood, as Kripke (1980) would have it.  
 Of  course, we could, once again, flat out deny that entities have essences, or have 
any essences that entail spatiotemporal location: Socrates is not essentially human. But this 
seems a costly move, and not one that I feel powers theorists can adopt. It would mean 
accepting the essentiality operator but denying almost all common assumptions about the 
results. The move would be legitimate only if  we could offer a non-ad hoc motivation, and it 
is unclear to me how we could do this.  
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 However, I think that rejecting the second point is not as costly. I see no reason for 
a friend of  powers to say that being human entails being spatio-temporally located. Being 
human is either a power, or a structured bundle of  more fundamental powers.  Being 113
concrete is essential to neither of  these features: the only essential feature of  powers is their 
directedness relations.  And of  course powers can be directed even if  they are not located 114
in spacetime: what they cannot do is to bring about their manifestation without being 
actualised. Of  course, no non-concrete entity can act humanly, or do the essential activities 
of  humans. But that simply means that no power which is not actualised can bring about its 
manifestations, which is hardly a surprise. It does not mean that a power lacks its 
directedness when it is not actualised. Even if  we think that being human is a structure of  
more basic powers, there is no reason to think the entailment holds: as noted above, 
abstract entities can display structure and structural properties: indeed, there is not much 
more to a geometrical figure than shape.  
 So, if  being concrete is not essential to being human, how is it entailed? Unless we 
take ‘being human’ as a conjunction that has ‘being concrete’ as a conjunct, it is hard to see 
how it could follow syntactically. But assuming that this is the case would beg the question. 
The best hypothesis that I can think of  is this: the powers (or at least, some of  them) that 
are characteristic of  being human (that is, the powers that being human is directed towards) 
presuppose being embodied, and it is taken as an analytic truth that bodies are in spacetime.  
Assume that it is essential to humans, qua mammals, to lactate, and in order to lactate one 
needs to have a body. Hence concreteness is entailed by being human. I think this train of  
thought is not very dangerous to the picture presented here. What the friend of  powers 
needs to say is that, of  course, being embodied is a pre-condition for a range of  
characteristic essential activities of  humans. But that means only that such essential 
 I take the fact that this position is surprisingly close to the original Aristotelian (Witt 2003, Kos113 -
man 2013) as a positive indication that the two main strands of  Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics 
(powers and essences) can interact in interesting and productive ways. 
 Here it is clear that I am treating powers as ‘pure powers’ and not the ‘mixed powers’ defended 114
by Williams (2019). However, I suspect that even admitting powers with some character could be 
compatible with what I say, but cannot discuss it in detail.
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activities are not immediate manifestations of  being human—that being embodied is a 
necessary intermediate step: the power of  being human (I speak as if  it was a simple unified 
power instead of  a structured cluster just for simplicity’s sake) has as immediate 
manifestation that of  being embodied, and if  that manifestation is prevented from being 
brought about, then of  course none of  the following powers will be able to obtain. A 
defence along these lines, I suggest, allows us to accept much of  the standard essentialist 
(that is, objectual essentialist) claims at face value.  
  
6.7. Some Puzzles About Spatiotemporal Location  
This does not exhaust the worries and puzzles that my proposal has to face. In particular, 
the idea that unmanifested manifestations are not spatiotemporally located is an inviting 
nest for all sorts of  troubles. Let me discuss some that I find particularly pressing.   
 Given my theory, it seems that for a manifestation to become manifested is for it to 
acquire a spatiotemporal location. One might worry that this has unpalatable consequences. 
Prima facie, my account would exclude the possibility of  mental powers ever being actualised 
and their manifestations manifested:  
i) To be actualised is to acquire a spatiotemporal location. Mental properties are not in 
space. Therefore, there cannot be actualised mental powers. 
There are two ways to go about this. Either we bite the bullet, and accept that power 
metaphysics are committed to the view that mental phenomena are located in space 
(perhaps because they are identical to some physical phenomena) or we weaken the 
spatiotemporal locational constraint, and simply maintain that to be actualised something 
simply needs to acquire a temporal location. I have no problem in remaining neutral about 
this. Nothing substantial would change, in what follows, if  we adopt one option rather than 
the other. I will keep speaking of  spatiotemporal location, instead of  mere temporal 
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location, just for terminological consistency, but I think that I would choose the latter 
option if  pressed on this.  
 A second worry is this: according to the characterisation that I have provided, 
unmanifested manifestations are akin to abstract objects, insofar as both are not located in 
spacetime. Asking about the location of  an abstract object seems to be a category mistake: 
‘where is number 22?’ is just the wrong kind of  thing to ask. On the other hand, uttering a 
question about the location of  a manifestation does not seem infelicitous in the same way 
as asking for the location of  a pure set is. Our embarrassment in the case of  manifestations 
seems due to the fact that ‘[w]here, when and in what way this property or distribution of  
events will be manifested is left indeterminate’ (Mumford 2004: 194; see also Oderberg 
2017), rather than the question being a category mistake. And yet, our matrix would have it 
that both are non-located, and so one would expect that the same explanations could be 
given in both cases. In short:  
ii) Asking about the location of  an abstract entity is infelicitous because it is a category 
mistake. Asking about the location of  an unmanifested manifestation does not seem to 
be infelicitous in the same way; perhaps it is not a category mistake. What explains the 
difference? 
 Let’s start by noting that there is one obvious difference between the two cases: 
appealing to simple facts about spatiotemporal location was not enough to distinguish 
abstract entities from mere logical existents. We need essence, too. So, there is a difference 
between the way in which abstract objects are non-located and the way in which objects in 
potency are not. This is enough to dispel the puzzlement, and we can explain why the 
question concerning their location is infelicitous in different ways by adopting a pragmatic 
theory of  category mistakes, along the lines of  Magidor (2013).  
 According to Magidor’s theory, category mistakes are infelicitous because they 
generate presuppositional failures (Magidor 2013: 131-45). Some sentences, when uttered, 
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presuppose that some other sentences are part of  the conversational context. So, for instance, 
uttering ‘the king of  France is bald’ presupposes that there is a king of  France—the 
utterance is felicitous only if  the participants in the conversation presume that sentence to 
be true (or, in a more dynamic picture, have no problem in accepting it among the conversational 
context, that is, they are ready to accommodate the presupposition). Category mistakes are 
infelicitous precisely because we do not and, most importantly, could not accept their 
presuppositions: 
the predicate ‘green’ is a presupposition trigger. In a sentence of  the form ‘x is green’, the predicate 
triggers the presupposition that x is coloured... but in most contexts of  conversation, participants in 
the conversation do not take it for granted that the number two is coloured, and moreover, they take 
it for granted that the number two is not coloured, making it very hard to accommodate this 
presupposition (Magidor 2013: 131-2). 
The hypothesis is that (non-rhetorical) questions carry with them, among other things, the 
presupposition that it is possible to answer them; as Wittgenstein put it: ‘If  a question can 
be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it’ (TLP 4.5). So, in particular, questions of  the 
form ‘where is x?’ carry the presupposition that there is or at least could be a location L 
such that x is at L.  
 Such presupposition cannot be accepted in the case of  numbers, because it is 
essential to abstract objects that they are not located in spacetime; therefore the question is a 
category mistake. On the other hand, it is not part of  mere logical existents’ essence that 
they are not located. Indeed, some of  them eventually end up being located somewhere: 
they are manifested. In their case, the question could be answered. So, the presupposition 
that the question is answerable could be accepted in the conversational context. Indeed, in a 
Stalnakerian framework we can even make sense of  the embarrassment that we experience 
when we try to come up with an answer: given that the manifestation is not actualised at the 
time of  the question, it is both metaphysically and epistemically possible that the 
manifestation will either be located at a number of  spatiotemporal points or nowhere at all. 
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If  we understand a question as a request to rule out some epistemically possible worlds 
from the context, it is evident that the question ‘where is the yet unmanifested 
manifestation of  P?’ will be infelicitous, because the recipient of  the question is not in a 
position to give an answer that would reduce the number of  epistemic possibilities:  she 115
cannot answer in an informative way, because there is no determinate fact of  the matter yet, 
and there might not be one. But this is not a category mistake, because both speakers can 
easily accommodate the presupposition that it is possible to answer the question, because both 
may (truly) believe that the manifestation can be actualised. An approach along these lines 
could dissolve the puzzlement concerning our different attitudes towards questions of  
spatiotemporal location, I believe.   
 A third puzzle about the characterisation of  manifestations being unmanifested (or 
in potency) as being non-located in spacetime concerns the fact that we often think of  
powers as being temporally oriented. It is fairly common, for instance, to think that there is 
a temporal asymmetry between powers and their manifestations: manifestations can be 
located after their powers, but not before them: they are forward-looking. These theses are 
non-trivial (Vetter 2015; Mumford & Anjum 2011). The worry is not as much that adopting 
my categorial scheme would commit us to a particular position in the debate, but rather 
whether we can make sense of  the debate in the first place. Consider a sentence likely to be 
at the heart of  the controversy concerning the forward-looking nature of  powers:  
(1) A power’s manifestation cannot predate the power itself. 
Powers theorists such as Mumford & Anjum will, presumably, think that (1) is true: if  
powers are simultaneous with their manifestations, then a fortiori manifestations cannot 
predate them. But it seems that somebody who wished to deny (1) inhabits a consistent area 
of  logical space (Vetter (2015) suggests that at least in some cases backward-looking 
 This is in line with the idea that, if  assertions are to be informative as per the Gricean first max115 -
im (Grice 1989), the function of  an assertion is to ‘rule out’ a number of  possible worlds. See Stal-
naker (1999). 
 143
potentialities are acceptable). It seems that there could be a genuine disagreement between 
those who think that (1) is true and those who deny it. If  unmanifested manifestations are 
not in time and space, how can we hope to even make sense of  (1)? In short:  
  
iii) How can we make sense of  the debate whether powers are ‘forward-looking’, if  
manifestations are not temporally located at all? How are we to make sense of  sentences 
such as (1)?  
An easy solution would be to trivialise the problem. We could cash (1) out in terms of   
(2) ∀P∀M ∀t ∀t’ (t<t’ → ¬(Pt ∧ Mt’)  
That is, for every power P, manifestation M, and times t and t’, if  t precedes t’ then it is not 
note case that M is located at t and P is located at t’. This would follow trivially from my 
account, according to which for all unactualised manifestation M and every time t, M is not 
located at t: ∀M ∀t (Unactualised(M) → ¬ Mt). If  M is not located at all, then a fortiori it 
cannot be located at a time earlier than P. So my account entails (2). But obviously (2) would 
be an uncharitable reading of  (1). What we really mean by uttering (1) is obviously 
something like   
(3)  ∀P∀M ∀t ∀t’ (t <t’) → (¬◇(Pt ∧ Mt’) ∧ ◇ (∃t” (t< t” ∧ Mt”))) 
In English: No manifestation can predate its power, but it can follow it. Note that nowhere 
in (3) does it appears that M is unmanifested and therefore non-located, which is where the 
putative crux lies. The problem becomes clear when we consider that possibility operator 
appears in the second conjunct, for one might naturally translate (3) in dispositionalist 
terms as follows, where ⇀ stands for ‘is directed towards’:  
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(4) ◇∃t” (t> t” ∧ Mt”) iff  ∃P (Pt ⇀ Mt”) 
In English: there could be a time t” after t such that M occurs at t” only if  there is a power 
P that is directed at M-at-t”. It is (4) that cannot be explained by our current hypothesis, 
according to which potential entities are non-located. If  the manifestation of  a power 
included the time of  actualisation, then the Williamsonian picture that I have sketched would 
be in trouble. The manifestation cannot be a dated state of  affairs.  
 But is it so obvious that we have to make sense of  (3) in terms of  (4)? If  we 
examine it more closely, it becomes apparent that a conception of  manifestations as fine-
grained as that depicted by (4) has problematic consequence for any theory of  powers. 
Consider some object, a, that has a power P for a period of  time t to t”. Assume that 
manifestations are always temporally posterior to their powers—no simultaneous nor 
backward causation is admitted. Presumably, then, at time t, a could bring about that M at 
any ti such that t< ti <t”. Say that the manifestations of  Pa at t are Mt’ and Mt”. At time t’, 
however, a no longer can bring it about that Mt’: its only manifestation is Mt”. Similarly, at 
t”, a can no longer bring about either manifestation. Now recall that the identity of  powers 
is determined by their manifestations. Since P at t has different manifestations than P at t”, 
it cannot be the same power. So, entities change all their powers at every instant. This seems 
implausible.   
 The problem arises only because we decided that (4) was the only way to make 
sense of  (3)—that unactualised manifestations had to have a temporal location. If  we think 
that powers are directed at dated manifestations (that is, entities whose spatiotemporal 
coordinates are part of  the thing’s identity conditions), we cannot help but over-inflate our 
ontology, and incur counter-intuitive consequences as those just sketched. In order to avoid 
these problems, it is common to think that powers are directed at universals, and therefore 
at types and not tokens:  
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Can we say that the powers are directed towards the properties rather than the particular 
instantiations of  those properties at particular times and places? In a significant sense, yes. For the 
power is indeterminate in respect of  time and place of  its manifestation. Each manifestation will be 
somewhere and somewhen but the somewhere and somewhen are not necessary for the having of  
the power. They are among the contingent details of  its manifestation. What is necessary to its 
manifestation is the universal only (Mumford 2004: 194).   
However, we have seen that if  powers are only directed at types and universals, 
Dispositionalism is likely going to incur significant problems. I think that a powers ontology 
for Dispositionalism would be better off  in allowing particulars to be among the 
manifestations of  powers.  And we must do so while avoiding the issues sketched above: 116
ontological over-inflation and the constant change of  the instantiated powers (which would 
result in a sort of  Heraclitean fluxontologie of  the sort described in Plato’s Theaetetus) while 
retaining the ability to discuss meaningfully sentences like (1). Fortunately, these problems 
are not a consequence of  my view. Indeed, they can be dispelled by adopting it. Here’s a 
very quick sketch of  how this can be done (I will return on this in §8).  
 According to my view, unmanifested manifestations are not located in spacetime, 
and therefore cannot be dated themselves: the temporal location cannot be part of  the 
identity conditions of  the manifestation (let it be a state of  affairs, for the time being): 
powers cannot be directed at something like [a being F at t’]. Manifestations are just not that 
fine-grained. In this regard, they resemble  the universals of  Mumford’s proposal. If  this is 
so, then how are we to make sense of  (1)? The answer is simple: in the same way as 
somebody who thinks that powers are directed at universals: by rejecting that (4) is a good 
paraphrase of  (1).  
 My suggestion is that we take a page off  the book of  the radical powers 
metaphysics examined in §3, and admit that powers bring about their manifestation (the 
state of  affairs) through a process unfolding over time. That is to say, if  we think that the 
 I will return to this point at §8.3, where I discuss in more detail the ontological category of  116
manifestations. 
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exercise of  a power just is, or gives raise to, a temporally extended process which terminates 
in the state of  affairs that is the manifestation (this is easier to imagine if  we think that 
states of  affairs are ‘snapshots’ taken out of, or abstracted from, the temporal continuum), 
then we can make sense of  the debate concerning the temporal orientation of  powers 
without having to think that manifestations are dated entities. This is because processes are 
usually temporally extended, and therefore if  powers have to bring about their 
manifestations through a process, this will have to take some time: ‘when mutual 
manifestation partners are together, it takes time for them to have their full 
effect’ (Mumford & Anjum 2018b). Naturally, how much time it takes for a power to bring 
about its manifestation depends on the specific power under consideration—matter of  
study of  empirical investigation.  
 If  this is so, then the disagreement about the forward-looking nature of  powers 
really is nothing over and above a disagreement about the topology and direction of  time. From 
the fact that bringing about a manifestation through a process takes some time and the fact 
that time only flows in one direction, we can explain why one might think that a 
potentiality’s manifestation cannot predate its possession. If, on the other hand, time will in 
fact reverse, or it has a circular structure, or there are loops, or we could build time-
travelling machines, then powers will not be forward-looking, and it will be possible to have 
powers whose manifestation is in the past. There is no need to embed the time-index in the 
manifestation itself: whether manifestations can only be after their power will depend on the 
nature of  the process involved in the power’s exercise, and the structure of  time itself. This 
solution works for those who think that powers are only directed at types as well as it does 
for a theory such as mine which admits also (temporally indeterminate) tokens. This, of  
course, will rule out the idea that we can reduce time’s arrow to the causal arrow via powers: 
I will discuss the relation between powers and time in more detail particular in §8.   
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6.8 Conclusions  
In this chapter I have presented my answer to Key Question and therefore my suggestion as 
to how proceed on the Actualisation Route to solve Too Much Possibility: the difference 
maker between a manifested and an unmanifested manifestation is that the former is 
located in spacetime, whereas the latter is not. This does not suffice to fully capture the 
kind of  metaphysical picture that is involved in a satisfactory answer: we need to add a 
further factor, related to the essentiality (or lack thereof) of  the determinable property of  
being located. This allows us to construct a matrix expressing the difference between being 
concrete, being abstract, being unmanifested, and being a spatiotemporal point, as well as 
accounting for what it is to become actualised. This matrix represents the core of  the 
minimal metaphysics of  powers that I aim to develop: every theory of  powers (for whatever 
purpose) should include at least these categories and entities. Adopting this view has some 
immediate consequences for the Dispositionalist project: in particular, it seems to spell 
troubles for its most ambitious brand, according to which powers can ground metaphysical 
or absolute modality. On the other hand, adopting this framework will allow us to overcome 
some of  the expressive limitations that hampered a dispositionalist treatment of  de re truths 
involving merely possible individuals, thus allowing one to respond to some of  the critiques 
presented in chapter 5.   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Chapter 7. What (Ontological Category) Do We Talk About When We Talk About 
Manifestations? 
Now that we have moved past the obstacle of  Armstrong’s Too Much Possibility and we 
have given a satisfactory answer to Key Question, we can start exploring the metaphysics of  
powers more systematically. In particular, we can turn to the following question: what kind 
of  things can be the manifestations of  powers? To which ontological category can they 
belong? 
 Trying to answer Key Question, we have already discussed universals (both 
Aristotelian and Platonic) and found them somewhat wanting. Furthermore, in presenting 
the four-fold schema we have already noted that one constraint that putative manifestations 
have to meet is not to be essentially spatiotemporally located—I take it that this excludes 
events, whose identity conditions surely include at least their spatiotemporal boundaries.  117
This leaves us with tropes and states of  affairs. An ontology of  tropes for powers is 
defended by Molnar (2003), while Neil Williams has recently argued that the best candidate 
for manifestations are states of  affairs (2019). In order to answer the question, I will adopt 
the following methodology: I will present three desiderata that the manifestation of  powers 
ought to meet, and then check whether the candidates can meet them.  
7.1 The Criteria  
The first, obvious criterion is that they must be able to be mere logical existents and 
concrete: they need not be essentially located or essentially non-located in spacetime. This is 
the only truly mandatory desideratum.  
 Even if  we adopt a theory of  events richer than the traditional Quine-Lemmon one, according 117
to which ‘Physical objects ... are not to be distinguished from events... Each comprises simply the 
content, however heterogeneous, of  some portion of  space-time, however disconnected or gerry-
mandered’ (Quine 1960: 131), such as Kim (1969, 1976) and Cleland (1991), at least the time of  the 
event will always figure in its identity conditions – we just cannot understand what an event outside 
of  spacetime would be.  
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Scheme: Manifestations of  powers (independent) must not be essentially non-located; 
Manifestations of  (independent) powers must not be essentially located.  
I have already introduced the second desideratum while discussing processes in §3, Precision:   
Precision: Manifestations must be fine-grained enough to differentiate between distinct 
powers.  
Finally, the last desideratum of  manifestations of  powers is Generality (Molnar 2003, 
Mumford 2004): 
Generality: Our disposition-ascriptions are ordinarily indeterminate under various respects; 
in particular, the indeterminacy with regard to the time and place of  manifestation is often 
invoked.   
My account allows us to explain Generality of  time and place very straightforwardly: 
manifestations of  powers (whatever they are) are metaphysically indeterminate in that 
regard, at least as long as they are unmanifested—they are not spatiotemporally located, 
they are not dated. This allows me to cut some of  the ontological costs of  the theory. 
Recognising that powers are directed at token entities and not just types such as universals (be 
they tropes, individuals, or states of  affairs, as we will see in a moment) obviously entails a 
certain ontological profligacy (at least quantitatively): there will be a lot of  entities in my 
domain (all my distinct possible grandchildren will be MLEs, and all the possible states of  
affairs that they could find themselves in). However, maintaining that unmanifested 
manifestations are indeterminate with respect of  time and place allows me to cut down the 
numbers a bit: if  I accept states of  affairs, I will have to accept that [Dory paints] and 
[Franklin paints] are two different merely logical existent entities; however, I will not have to 
distinguish between [Dory paints at 12.30 Monday 15 June 2070] and [Dory paints at 17.15 
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Tuesday 20 June 2070]—manifestations are not that fine-grained. Same goes for place, e.g. 
[Franklin sings in the living room] and [Franklin sings in the shower]. So, I will have an 
inflated ontology, but perhaps not as inflated as the one of  the possible worlds theorist, 
either of  the Genuine or Ersatz kind. Hardcore Actualism comes ontologically cheaper 
than possible worlds theories, but it is not the incredible thrift that one could have hoped, 
either.   118
 However, disposition ascriptions can be generic in other ways, apart from time and 
place of  manifestation: for example, they might fail to specify the individual identity of  the 
manifestation: Blaz is funny if  he has the disposition to make people laugh generally—it 
would be weird to say that he is funny if  he has the disposition to make Seren laugh, Sarah 
laugh, Alex laugh, etc. It is fairly uncontroversial, I think, that most of  our disposition 
ascriptions display this kind of  generality; it is this that has led some (e.g. Mumford 2004) to 
hypothesise that powers are directed only towards universals (where it was implicit that 
universals are qualitative and not individualistic, to use Dasgupta’s 2014 terminology).  119
However, this proposal is problematic for Dispositionalism, insofar as the theory aims to 
ground de re modal truths, as we have seen in §3.  
 This seems to present a dilemma for my view: on the one hand, I have to admit that 
powers can be directed towards individualistic entities in order to sidestep the critiques I 
have moved to universals-based theories of  manifestations (§5.2-3) and allow 
Dispositionalism to account for de re truths avoiding Leech-style worries (Leech 2017). For 
that purpose, it is very useful to have individual-specific powers, such as the power to make 
only Jamie, and and not a perfect duplicate of  Jamie, angry. My theory is evidently allowing for 
individualistic manifestations, and in general individuals as manifestations: after all, the 
 Thanks to Stephen Mumford for pressing me on this. 118
 It is hard to offer a precise characterisation of  the distinction—see the discussion in §5.3 on 119
pure and impure universals. Roughly, we can understand ‘individual’ facts as follows: a fact is indi-
vidualistic iff  whether it obtains depends on how things stand with a particular individual (or indi-
viduals) and qualitative otherwise’ (Dasgupta 2014). An easy rough guide to the distinction is wheth-
er it can be expressed only using an individual constant in first order logic or not. For instance, 
[Jeremy smiles] is an individual fact, for it cannot be expressed in FoL without introducing a con-
stant, whereas [somebody smiles] only requires a variable and is therefore qualitative. 
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whole point of  Williamson’s introduction of  mere logical existents is to make sense of  
constant domains of  individuals—insofar as my framework is akin to Williamson’s, then we 
should think that individuals can fail to be located. 
 On the other hand, doing so seems to condemn me to deny Generality, at least as 
far as individual identities are concerned: I cannot say that that the manifestations are 
indeterminate in that way. One way to avoid this problem would be to recognise both 
qualitative and individualistic manifestations, and maintain that powers can be directed at 
both. This would pose a formidable challenge to the task of  finding a unified ontological 
category for manifestations: what category could contain both classes?    120
Fortunately, we can escape the dilemma. Generality is a piece of  evidence of  our linguistic 
behaviour that we need to account for. But such an account does not need to be 
straightforwardly metaphysical: we can either maintain that such indeterminacy is due to the 
metaphysical indeterminacy of  the manifestation (manifestations happen to be entities 
indeterminate just in the right ways; this is not available to me in the case of  individualistic 
facts), but it could also be the case that such indeterminacy of  dispositions ascriptions are 
to be explained by semantic mechanisms. Since the evidence is a linguistic phenomenon, this 
would do equally well: take, for instance, the case of  many theories of  vagueness: the 
indeterminacy detected in our linguistic behaviour is often not explained by a 
corresponding metaphysical indeterminacy, but by semantic (or epistemic) mechanisms. 
However, this solution still poses some constraints on our metaphysics: we need to grant 
that the underlying metaphysics is capable of  grounding the semantic machinery, as it were. 
I will suggest that my preferred candidates to be the manifestation of  powers, tropes and 
states of  affairs, can account for individualistic generality in this way: despite being perfectly 
determined entities under that regard, we can account for our linguistic behaviour tinkering 
with the semantics.  
 Of  course, if  we think that purely and impurely individual universals are unproblematic, then 120
universals would do; however, I have argued (although briefly) that individual universals are prob-
lematic.  
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7.2 Tropes  
Can tropes be merely logical existents? Unless we endorse Schaffer’s (2001) Spatiotemporal 
Identity criterion:  
Spatiotemporal Identity: x and y are distinct tropes iff  they are either not exactly resem-
bling, or at distant locations (Distance(x,y)>0).  
I do not see any reason to think that tropes must be essentially located in spacetime, and, 
indeed, the very possibility that there are non-spatiotemporally located tropes is considered 
to be a good reason to reject Schaffer’s criterion of  identity. One of  the problems that 
afflict Spatiotemporal Identity is that it cannot allow for a one-category ontology, unless 
one is also thoroughly committed to reductionism with regard to everything non-
concrete.  For instance, Campbell notes that:    121
The problem then is this: if  the basic entities are all tropes, and tropes are all particulars, and 
particulars are all located, what of  non-spatiotemporal beings? Can it be a truth of  analytic 
ontology, a truth about the ultimate structure of  the world, that non-spatio-temporal beings are 
impossible? Is it right to rule them all out, in one fell swoop, a priori, without need to consider their 
individual merits? For apart from divinities, spirits and angels, this would banish Platonic Forms, 
Berkeleyan Ideas, Kantian Unities of  Apperception and perhaps sets and numbers too. [...] A 
philosopher of  a naturalistic bent is tempted to view this wholesale exclusion of  other-worldly, 
beyond-nature items with complacency. It does, after all, have the advantage of  theft over honest 
toil. But dialectically, it is an impossibly weak position. (Campbell 1990: 53-4).  
 Admittedly, Schaffer openly assumes Ontological Naturalism, and dismisses the worry about 121
non-located entities: ‘I must confess to not caring about whether the number of  angels dancing on 
the heads of  nonspatiotemporal pins has been counted over-formally or not’. However, there are 
other and more urgent problems for SI than angels: plausibly, Schaffer will want to concede that the 
number two has the property of  being even and prime, while three has the property of  being odd 
and prime. Is the primeness of  two and three a universal they share? Must every trope theorist buy 
into a four-category ontology along the lines of  Lowe (2006), or at least a two-category one? Sup-
posedly, the main reason to buy tropes in the first place was to avoid the mysteries of  universals—it 
would be rather unpleasant to find out that we have to take all those issues on board anyway, having 
lost in the process the benefits that universals usually bring (e.g. explaining similarity).  
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 Most trope theorists that assume that tropes are necessarily or essentially 
spatiotemporal located (Campbell 1981) do so on the basis of  a commitment to 
Ontological Naturalism (Schaffer 2001: 251), understood as ‘the doctrine that reality 
consists of  nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal system’ (Armstrong 1981: 
149). But, of  course, my theory is already at odds with Ontological Naturalism, since it 
countenances both abstract entities and mere logical existents. So, Naturalism definitely 
cannot be the reason why tropes have to be essentially spatio-temporally located, at least if  
we want to integrate them in an ontology of  powers. If  the framework that I am proposing 
is the best categorial scheme for powers metaphysics, then it follows a fortiori that powers 
metaphysics will not fare very well with Naturalism.  Are there other reasons to think that 122
tropes are essentially located?  
 Here’s one suggestion.  One might think that one advantage of  tropes over 123
universals or states of  affairs is that they do not need to invoke a mysterious relation of  
instantiation or non-mereological composition  to explain property possession. The 124
proponent of  Spatiotemporal Identity can say that for a particular x to have a certain 
property F just is for both x and trope F to be co-located. In short:  
Trope Predication: Fa iff  and because i) a is located at R, and ii) F is located at R.  
However, I am not very optimistic that Trope Predication could be a viable theory, and that 
trope theories can have the ideological upper hand in this respect. Consider, for example, 
the case of  a statue and the clay that constitutes it. The statue and the clay are obviously co-
located. However, it is customary to attribute them different properties, both modal and 
not. Modal: the statue would not survive smashing, while the lump of  clay would. Non-
 See Tugby & Giannini (forthcoming) for an argument to the effect that also Vetter (2015) would 122
be better off  abandoning her commitment to it. 
 Another common reason would be this: being a particular is defined in terms of  being located. 123
See Maurin (2002) for an argument that we should take particularity to be a primitive, instead. 
 A trope ‘is part of  the particle. It is not a spatiotemporal part’ (Lewis 1986b: 86). 124
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modal: the statue has aesthetic and representational qualities; the clay, arguably, does not.  125
According to TP, the statue and the lump of  clay should have the same tropes, since they 
are co-located. But then how are we to explain the fact that they have different properties? 
   
 Of  course, some options are available to the trope theorist to salvage Trope 
Predication: for instance, she could adopt a broadly Lewisian solution (Lewis 2003). This 
involves accepting modal realism, counterpart theory, and introducing a qua-operator that 
screens out contextually non-salient counterpart relations, the trope theorist might say that 
in context c1 the object (and its co-located tropes) have certain modal properties in virtue of  
the salient counterpart relations C1 with other-worldly objects, while in context c2 there is 
another salient counterpart relation C2 with some other object, and hence some other 
tropes. Thus, x qua-statue cannot survive smashing because there is no relevant counterpart 
of  x that is both a statue and smashed, whereas qua-lump, x has counterparts that survived 
the smashing. It is not immediately clear how to extend this strategy to the non-modal, 
aesthetic and representational properties, but then again that case was more controversial. 
The problem is that such an account of  modal properties is decidedly not in line with 
Dispositionalism: we have to invoke concrete possible worlds and counterparts to make it 
work. That is, Trope Predication might be salvaged, but not in a Dispositionalist framework.  
 If  we reject Trope Predication, we have to offer a more elaborate theory of  what it 
is for an object to have a trope or for a trope to exist. The explanatory challenges that we 
have to face once we abandon Trope Predication will largely depend on our preferred 
conception of  tropes. So far, I have not distinguished between different families of  trope 
theories, and in particular between those who conceive of  tropes as stand-alone, 
fundamental entities (‘junior substances’ as Armstrong 1989 described them) that compose 
or constitute objects and whose identity is, therefore, independent and prior to the object 
they will compose or the other tropes they will be associated with, and those theories 
according to which tropes are somewhat parasitical on the particulars that they inhere to: 
 This latter thesis is more controversial, admittedly. The modal case is enough, in case. 125
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that is, their identities depend, in part, on the object they belong to. The trope of  Socrates’ 
paleness is the entity that it is also because it is Socrates’ and not Plato’s paleness. Call the 
former entities ‘tropers’ or ‘module tropes’ (Garcia 2015), and the latter ‘modes’ (Lowe 
2006).  
 The friends of  modes will most likely invoke a primitive formal ontological relation 
(see Lowe 2006, Simons 2012, Hakkarainen ms.) to explain what it is for a mode to exist 
and to inherit to a particular (for instance, Lowe invokes a primitive sui generis relation, 
‘characterisation’). Friends of  module tropes, on the other hand, can simply say that a trope 
exists or not, be it in space-time or not—but they will have to offer an account of  bundling 
(one that avoids regress and the possibility of  lone tropes) compatible with tropes (and 
their bundles) not being located.  
 A thorough discussion of  which theory of  tropes is overall preferable would 
obviously outstrip the scope of  this dissertation, and I will not attempt to argue that one 
conception is superior to the other. I will limit myself  to observing that both seem prima 
facie compatible with the minimal metaphysics under discussion, and that there is no 
overwhelming reason for not thinking of  tropes as non-essentially non-located. If  this is so, 
tropes can be in potency, and thus be good manifestations for non-maximal powers. Of  
course, there is more left to say about the complete identity criterion for tropes. But this will 
largely hinge upon independent reasons, such as the role (or existence) of  particular 
substances. All the options available should be compatible with tropes being in potency.  
 Tropes obviously fare well in terms of  precision. Can they account for 
individualistic generality, though? Tropes are, after all, particularised properties: they are 
either individuals (if  tropers) or individualised properties (if  modes) and hence they have a 
very precise individual identity. This does not mean, however, that we cannot make sense of  
general or indeterminate disposition ascriptions: we just need to offer a semantic, rather 
than metaphysical, solution. In particular, we just need to appeal to (exact) equivalence 
classes. I think that the best solution for the trope theorist is to give a semantic account to 
Generality (remember that Generality only requires that our power ascriptions are sufficiently 
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general), and formulate truth conditions for power ascriptions roughly along these lines: ‘x 
can F’ is true iff  there is some trope a that is the manifestation of  Px, and a belongs to the 
exact resemblance class of  the Fs, a ∊ [F]. Appealing to equivalence classes allow us to 
produce the required generality and indeterminacy in our disposition ascriptions without 
having to maintain that powers need to be directed only at qualitative entities—it is, after all, 
the standard strategy of  trope theorists (and in general nominalists) of  all stripes to make 
sense of  general talk of  properties (see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002 for details). The lesson here 
is that it is relatively easy to obtain generality from specificity, while going the other way 
around is much harder (this is also the lesson that Fine 1994 taught: going from fine-
grained to coarse-grained is easy; vice versa, not so much).  
 Therefore, we can conclude that tropes could be a viable ontological category for 
the manifestation of  powers.   
7.3 States of  affairs 
Can states of  affairs be mere logical existents, and hence manifestations of  powers? David 
Armstrong has offered two quite different ontologies of  states of  affairs. It will be useful to 
quickly rehearse the differences before considering whether they can be mere logical 
existents.   126
 Initially, Armstrong (1978a; 1978b) adopted a ‘Compositional’ or ‘Combinatorial’ 
view of  states of  affairs: these are particulars that result from the (non-mereological) 
composition of  a ‘thin’ particular (a bare individual) and an immanent universal. Bare 
individuals and immanent universals compose the state of  affair. States of  affairs so conceived 
are caught in a complex web of  dependency relations. On the one hand, since states of  
affairs are composed by bare individuals and immanent universals, they metaphysically 
depend upon their components: the state of  affairs [Fa] depends for its identity on the 
identity of  its components, F and a. The converse does not hold: according to Armstrong, 
 I am much indebted to Andrea Raimondi for helping me clarifying the details of  the two posi126 -
tions—I have pillaged his doctoral thesis, ‘Dispositionalism: A theory of  Properties’ (2018) and 
generally his mind for bibliographic references and clarifications on this point. 
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it is contingent which states of  affairs there are, and the same bare individuals and 
immanent universals could fail to produce a state of  affairs; indeed, the contingency of  the 
non-mereological tie between particulars and universals is what requires the existence of  the 
additional category of  states of  affairs in the first place: something more than the 
components is required to act as truthmaker for contingent singular claims (Armstrong 
2004). On the other hand, Armstrong is adamant that the components cannot exist on their 
own, outside states of  affairs. This results in a tension in dependency relations, which has 
been much discussed, so I will not add to the debate.  I assume that the tension is not 127
fatal to the position, and a suitably refined distinction of  dependency relations can be 
provided, in the spirit of  Bennett (2017). What I am interested in is whether states of  
affairs, thus conceived, can be merely logical existents. Read what follows as a conditional 
question: if  combinatorial states of  affairs are viable at all, can they be thought of  as non-
essentially non located?  
 Later in his life, Armstrong offered a rather different ontology of  states of  affairs 
(Armstrong 2004), according to which states of  affairs are the fundamental building block 
of  reality—they are not posterior or dependent in any way on their ‘components’. On the 
contrary, their components (bare particulars and immanent universals) ‘only exist at the 
limit of  abstraction’ (Armstrong 2009) of  states of  affairs. Universals and thin particulars 
are aspects of  states of  affairs or thick particulars (Heil 2015). In other words, according to 
this picture, states of  affairs are structured and complex, but their complexity is not 
grounded in the composition of  their parts: they are structured entities which are 
mereologically simple and fundamental (or at least ungrounded). It may be instructive to 
think of  them as standing to particulars as irreducible distributional properties (as described 
by Parsons 2000; 2004; Cameron 2015) stand to properties. Following Raimondi (2018), let 
 For instance, it is one of  the cases which prompted Bennett (2017) to posit a multiplicity of  127
building relations or Barnes (2018) to maintain that dependency is not asymmetric. Others, on the 
other hand, take this as a refutation of  Armstrong’s original view (I have seen for instance Mike 
Raven arguing that since grounding is univocal and asymmetric, combinatorial states of  affairs are 
metaphysically impossible). 
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me dub this the ‘Tractarian  conception of  states of  affairs’. Again, I will not be as much 128
concerned with the viability of  the view in general, but rather on whether states of  affairs 
thus conceived can fail to be located.  
 The only reason I can think of  for wanting to maintain that Tractarian states of  
affairs are essentially located is to distinguish them from facts. If  we understand facts along 
broadly Fregean lines, simply as true propositions (or Fregean Thoughts) and want to resist 
their association with states of  affairs, we may offer the following argument:  
1. Facts are just true propositions  
2. Propositions are Fregean Thoughts  
3. Fregean Thoughts are abstract  
4. Therefore facts are essentially non-located  
5. Facts are distinct from states of  affairs  
6. Therefore states of  affairs are essentially located  
The argument is obviously fallacious: assuming 5. involves only a negation outside the 
scope of  the essence operator: 
 (□Fact ¬(Located(Fact) & ¬□SoA (Located(SoA))  
while 6. involves the negation within its scope: 
 Armstrong’s terminology does not fit perfectly with Wittgenstein’s. Armstrong’s states of  affairs 128
are most naturally associated with Wittgenstein’s Tatsachen, which are the the fundamental building 
block of  the world: ‘the world is the totality of  facts’ (‘Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen’, 
TLP 1.1). Tatsachen are, in turn, understood as obtaining Sachverhalten (‘Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, 
ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten’ TLP 2), and these, finally, are defined as ‘combinations of  ob-
jects’ (‘Der Sachverhalt ist eine Verbindung von Gegenständen. (Sachen, Dingen.)’ TLP 2.01). Arm-
strongian states of  affairs are characterised by the fact that they are complex, but not by virtue of  
their parts or components, and that they are absolutely ungrounded and fundamental—it is not ob-
vious to me that this is the case with Wittgensteininan Sachverhalten and therefore, Tatsachen. This 
largely depends on how we interpret propositions 2.0122: ‘Things are independent in so far as they 
can occur in all possible situations, but this form of Independence is a form of  connexion with states 
of  affairs, a form of  dependence’ and 2.014: ‘The possibility of  its occurring in states of  affairs is 
the form of  an object’. 
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 (□Fact ¬(Located(Fact) & □SoA ¬(Located(SoA)) 
So, even if  we want to distinguish facts from states of  affairs, for whatever reason,  we 129
would not need to commit to the idea that states of  affairs are essentially located to do so. 
What about combinatorial states of  affairs?  
 I think there is no major hurdle in thinking that combinatorial states of  affairs are 
not essentially located, too. We have already granted that particulars can be merely logical 
existents—a fortiori, bare individuals can be.  Can immanent universals exist without being 130
located? I do not see why not. Remember, we have characterised immanent universals thus:  
 Aristotelian Universals: A universal F exists iff there is some particular x such that x 
instantiates F. 
Unless we take instantiation to be analysed in terms of  co-location, there is little reason to 
think that only concrete entities can instantiate immanent universals. So far I have treated 
instantistion as a formal ontological relation, much like characterisation in the case of  
modes (Lowe 2006, Hakkarainen ms).  Indeed, we can take instantiation to be the glue 131
that holds states of  affairs together: ‘States of  affairs hold their constituent together in a 
non-mereological form of  composition, a form of  composition that even allows the 
 One such reason might have to do with how fine-grained they are: how fine-grained states of  129
affairs are depends on how fine-grained natural properties are: it is completely an a posteriori affair. 
On the other hand, it seems that no such answer can be given to how fine-grained propositions (and 
hence facts) should be, and that it is up to us to decide when two facts are the same. Thanks to An-
nina Loets for suggesting this.
 Again: assuming that bare individuals are metaphysically possible. I am not thereby committing 130
to their possibility. 
 On alternative conceptions of  instantiation: Strawson (1959) treats it as a ‘non-relational tie’, and 131
Armstong (1997) as an internal relation. Nothing in the (admittedly, very sketchy) elucidation of  
what a ‘non-relational tie’ is suggests that it has to hold between concreta. And, obviously, internal 
relations can hold between non-located objects: surely the Platonist about numbers will maintain 
that the fact that 4 is divisible by 2 is due to an internal relation between the two! Of  course, treating 
instantiation as an internal relation presupposes that we modify AU and offer an independent char-
acterisation of  the existence conditions for immanent universals. If  this cannot be done, all the 
worse for Armstrong’s theory of  instantiation. 
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possibility of  having different states of  affairs with identical constituents’ (Armstrong 1997: 
118). There is no reason to think that such non-mereological form of  composition should 
only hold between concrete entities.   
 Of  course, David Armstrong was a staunch naturalist, and hence in A World of  
States of  Affairs he attempted to do reduce mathematical entities and set/classes to concrete 
states of  affairs—for instance, by treating numbers as instances of  unit-determining 
properties within complex states of  affairs or mereological sums (e.g. the second-order 
property 'swans currently on the lake would be instantiated seven times within a given 
region of  space’). But, of  course, a commitment to Naturalism is quite independent from 
the adoption of  an ontology of  states of  affairs or thick individuals. I cannot think of  a 
good argument to the effect that states of  affairs must be located in spacetime; on the 
contrary, I think there are good reasons for the friend of  states of  affairs to think that there 
could be non-located states of  affairs: again, it seems the only way to have a properly 
general one-category ontology, one which could make justice to truths about abstracta and 
concreta alike (without having to take on the Armstrongian—fairly unsuccessful—reductive 
project).  
 As far Precision and Generality are concerned, I think that states of  affairs are on 
par with tropes.  Both theories of  states of  affairs will concede that its constituents are 132
essential to it, but we can still grant linguistic individualistic-indeterminacy by the same 
semantic mechanisms used by tropes: a disposition ascription is true iff  there is at least one 
member of  a certain equivalence class such that it is the manifestation of  the power token 
in question. So, each token power P has only one state of  affairs as its manifestation, say 
[Fa]. Furthermore, there is an equivalence class [F] such that [Fa] belongs to [F] if  and only 
if  F is a component of  the state of  affairs, so that [F]: {[Fa], [Fb]... [Fn]}.  
 Although it should be noted that, if  we adopt a Tractarian view of  states of  affairs and the struc132 -
turalist view of  ontological categories as that defended by Westerhoff  (2005), according to which we 
‘try to get informations about the different components of  states of  affairs not by any direct in-
formation about them but by considering specific relations between them’ (2005: 8) we might lose 
some of  our precision, for it might be hard to distinguish the adicity of  the properties involved 
(Westerhoff  2005: 146-70). 
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 This means that, insofar as the chosen criteria are concerned, tropes and states of  
affairs are perfectly on par: they can both serve as manifestations of  powers equally well. 
The choice between tropes and states of  affairs (as well as the one between the particular 
version of  each theory) is to be settled by independent considerations.   
7.4 Universals and the Liberal Stance   
What about universals? In chapter 5, I have argued that universals were inadequate as 
manifestations of  powers for two reasons. The first was that they struggled to make room 
for de re truths about mere possibilia — pure and impure properties could not be obtained by 
abstraction from the particulars, if  these particulars were taken to lack existence. However, 
it would seem that a friend of  universals is free to accept my minimal metaphysics and 
therefore accept in her ontology mere logical existents, and then abstract the pure and 
impure properties from them, while still maintaining that powers can only be directed at 
Aristotelian  universals.  The point is perfectly right: my minimal metaphysics offers the 133 134
resources also to those who think that universals are the manifestations of  powers to 
account for that problematic set of  truths. Should we think, then, that also universals could 
be manifestations?  
 The point is not easy to adjudicate. The answer will largely depend upon how much 
weight we should give to the other argument against platonic universals that I have given in 
§5.3, concerning the relationship between universals and their instances, and Independence. 
Note, however, that the argument has to be re-fitted slightly if  targeted to someone who 
adopts both the minimal metaphysics and properly derived universals as manifestations: in 
chapter 5 I was considering the proposal to adopt universals as a way to disarm Too Much 
Possibility, by invoking the difference between their being instantiated or not. But, in the 
context of  the minimal metaphysics, that dialectical move is no longer required: Too Much 
Possibility has been disarmed independently of  an appeal to universals being uninstantiated. 
 Platonic universals do not make the cut, since they are abstract and hence essentially not-located. 133
 Many thanks to Barbara Vetter for pointing this out to me. 134
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This relieves the friend of  universals of  some explanatory burdens — while, at the same 
time, making their adoption less explanatory, since they are no longer indispensable for 
admitting powers. I have to confess that it is unclear to me how much weight the second 
argument carries, in this new dialectical context. It seems to me that many of  the strategies 
that I will adopt to make sense of  what it means for a mere logical existent to become 
manifested can now be adopted by the friends of  universals, too (e.g. the appeal to 
eternalism and processes to ground the truth of  dated sentences about the future that I 
sketched in 6.7 and will develop more fully in 8.3-5). Furthermore, the categorial framework 
of  the minimal metaphysics fits rather naturally with the view that instantiation is location 
(Cowling 2014), thus doing away with a mysterious fundamental instantiation relation that 
could be considered problematic. Finally, universals would certainly pass the criterion of  
Generality with flying colours.  
 On the other hand, thinking that powers are directed at impure universals abstracted 
from MLEs retains some problems (somewhat related to the points raised in §5.3). More 
fine-grained universals are presumably thought to stand in determinable/determinate 
relations with more coarse-grained universals: being scarlet is a determinate of  being red. 
So, presumably, more fine grained universals still, such as Jamie being scarlet, ought to be 
considered determinates of  being red — but this seems a bit odd: we think that 
determinables entail the disjunction of  all their determinates (being red entails being either 
scarlet or magenta, etc). But extending this further to the particular-level of  fineness of  
grain seem odd: being red would entail either Jamie being scarlet or Pedro being scarlet or 
Dory being scarlet… and so on for all possible individuals. That is to say, universals ought 
to encode all possible particulars. This seems to bake too much information in what it is to 
be red. On the other hand, if  the impure universal of  Jamie being scarlet were not a 
determinable of  being red, then how would they be related? This raises worries similar to 
those I have discussed in §5.3 about the relation between universals and their instances.   
 A thorough discussion of  this issue would lead us a but too far astray. I think we 
can extend the irenic spirit adopted above with regard to tropes vs states of  affairs also to 
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universals: it seems to me that the minimal metaphysics is, in general, compatible with the 
idea that universals are manifestations of  powers, but gives us no special reason to think 
that manifestations must be universals (contra the positions discussed in chapter 5) — the 
choice must be independently motivated.  The difficulties that beset the proposal of  135
having universals seem to be mostly in-house issues that concern universals only (e.g. the 
relationship between super-fine grained universals with more coarse-grained ones).  
 I think that the proponent of  the minimal metaphysics of  powers can take a fairly 
liberal stance here: all candidates seem to pass the three proposed criteria for being 
manifestations. Choosing between one or the other seem to be, more than anything, an 
independently motivated choice: as far as the candidates meet the three desiderata imposed 
(Generality, Precision, and fitting in the four-fold schema of  §6), they are equally good from 
the point of  view of  Dispositionalism. I take this neutrality to be a point for the minimal 
metaphysics.  
  
 E.g. Vetter (2015) is committed to universals as manifestations mainly because she cashes out the 135
notion of  locality that characterises her theory in terms of  taking a predicate operator (POT), rather than a 
sentence operator, as fundamental; her choice has relatively little to do to the role that universals play in solv-
ing Too Much Possibility. 
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Chapter 8. Radicalising the Theory   
The minimal metaphysics of  powers presented in §6 is built around Independence and 
Directedness. If  attractive, it should be the minimal common denominator of  any project 
involving powers, and in particular it should be the theory adopted by Dispositionalists who 
want to be able to communicate with other powers theorists. How are we to judge if  it is, 
indeed, attractive? We have already seen that it can solve some problems for both powers 
ontologies (Too Much Possibility) and Dispositionalism (de re truths about mere possibilia), 
among other things. It also presents ambitious Dispositionalism with some difficulties, as 
briefly discussed in §6.5-6. In order to argue for its overall appeal, I will zoom out from the 
task of  grounding Dispositionalism for a moment, and focus more on the Integration 
desideratum.  
 I do so with two aims in mind. The first is to further explore and clarify the picture 
that I have presented earlier, by drawing out some of  the consequences of  the theory, in 
particular with regard to its relation to issues in fundamentality and time. The second is to 
show how the minimal theory is amenable to being strengthened, if  need be, by some of  
the other common theses about powers that I have mentioned in the Introduction, and how 
this could be beneficial to Dispositionalism. Although these further theses are not of  
primary interest for Dispositionalism, a considerable part of  the appeal of  the minimal 
framework is that it is compatible and consistent with such stronger versions of  powers 
metaphysics, and thus the same ontology that can ground Dispositionalism can be 
employed in other debates.  
8.1. Production and Dependency Problems  
In arguing against Physical Intentionality and in favour of  the idea that all manifestations of  
powers do in fact exist, I have maintained that powers depend metaphysically on their 
manifestations, where by metaphysical dependence I mean something depending for their 
identity upon the identity of  something else. In the case of  powers the idea was that the 
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identity of  the power was (at least in part) determined by the identity of  their 
manifestations. 
 However, it is hard to deny that the direction of  the dependence seems to be the 
other way round: there is a strong intuition to the effect that it is the manifestations that 
should depend upon the powers, in some sense. After all, the powers bring about their 
manifestations. I suspect that it is this intuition that motivates and underpins the 
understanding of  manifesting as coming into being, which caused so much trouble in the 
previous chapters. This, in a sense, is what is at the root of  an additional thesis of  powers 
ontologies, namely Productivity. For instance, Mumford and Anjum explicitly state that   
Powers, we maintain, are productive of  their manifestations... [denying this] would do more harm to 
the metaphysics of  dispositions than good...Powers would have lost their potency and thus would 
no longer be any use in explaining how one thing brought about another (Mumford & Anjum 2011: 
8). 
Is the theory of  powers that I have presented so far incompatible with Productivity? That 
would be an unwelcome result, for it seems that Productivity plays an important role in 
one of  the currently most worked-out account of  causation by powers, and is in general a 
principle that seems to capture a widespread intuition. Declaring it incompatible would 
suggest that one and the same metaphysics of  powers could not ground both causation and 
modality, for instance,  and that the idea that manifestations depend upon their powers is 136
misguided. Fortunately, I do not think that Productivity is incompatible with my account 
of  powers and in general with the sort of  metaphysical dependence of  powers upon their 
manifestations that I have so far insisted on. In this section, I will argue that the minimal 
metaphysics allows us to say that powers are productive of  their manifestations, at least in a 
weak sense in which manifestations depend for their actualisation upon their powers. I am 
not sure whether this sense of  Productivity is the same as what Mumford and Anjum have 
 Although, naturally is far from obvious that causation requires production. 136
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in mind, or whether it is too weak—mainly because it is not wholly clear what they have in 
mind when they talk of  powers producing their manifestations. Even if  they have 
something stronger in mind, I think that the ‘Weak Productivity’ that I propose is a step in 
the right direction, and will just have to be supplemented by something else to match their 
desired thesis; unless this ‘something more’ involves entities coming into existence, I do not 
see any insurmountable hurdle.  
 So: is my minimal framework compatible with Productivity? Prima facie, my 
situation is uncomfortable: I have just argued that powers depend upon manifestations. 
Were I to subscribe to Productivity, it would follow that manifestations depend upon 
powers, too. This suggests that there is a criss-crossing, symmetric dependence between 
powers and manifestations. But normally we think that dependency relations are 
asymmetrical! In short, the following three theses seem to be inconsistent:  
1. Powers depend upon their manifestations. 
2. Manifestations depend upon their powers. 
3. Dependency is asymmetric. 
One way to solve the problem is simply to reject 3. and maintain that dependency relations 
can be symmetrical. The idea has been recently defended by Elizabeth Barnes (2018), citing 
as examples inter alia Armstrongian states of  affairs, bundles of  tropes that avoid the ‘bare 
mass’ problem, and structuralist ontologies in mathematics. However, I do not think that 
this is the best route to take here. I do not intend to offer an argument against Barnes’ 
thesis. Rather, I wish to highlight that rejecting 3. would not solve all uneasiness in the case 
of  powers. Take the ‘productive’ dependency of  manifestations upon powers: the intuition 
suggests that it holds because powers bring about their manifestations. But, if  the 
dependency involved were symmetrical, it would mean that it makes sense to say that 
powers depend upon their manifestations because manifestations bring about their powers. 
But this is absurd. Something similar can be said for the metaphysical dependency involved 
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in 1., although this could be plausible under certain conceptions of  the identity conditions 
of  powers—namely, those that maintain that powers are captured by counterfactual 
conditionals and hence their identity also includes the stimuli, as Bird (2007) does.   
 I think there is another, better solution at hand. In discussing the argument against 
physical intentionality, I have already made use of  different notions of  dependency: I 
argued that metaphysical (identity) dependence entailed rigid ontological dependence, at 
least if  this latter is taken in its modal/existential variety. I propose to solve the tension 
between the three theses by disambiguating ‘depends’ as it occurs in 1. and 2.: either two 
different notions of  dependence are involved (Paolini-Paoletti 2019) or two different relata 
are. This is consistent with the thesis that the dependence relation(s) involved are 
asymmetric. Thus, it is possible to adopt both my proposed framework and accept the 
productivity thesis so central to radical powers metaphysics.  
 In the previous chapters, I have characterised the metaphysical dependency involved 
in 1. as follows:   137
MD*: [ID(P)] depends upon [ID(M)]. 
That is, the relata of  the dependency relation are two facts: the fact that P has the thick 
identity it has, and the fact that M has the thick identity that it has. Clearly, when we speak 
of  the dependency involved in 2., it is something else we have in mind: we are interested in 
saying that powers bring about their manifestations, and therefore that it is the actualisation 
of  M that depends upon the power. According to the minimal metaphysics, we can 
understand actualisation as the acquisition of  spatiotemporal location on the part of  the 
manifestation. Following the model of  MD*, we can hypothesise that the dependence holds 
between two facts concerning location or concreteness: 
 I assume a predicativist account simply for ease of  exposition. Everything could be restated in 137
operationalist terms. 
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Location Dependence: [Located(M)] depends upon [Located(P)] or, alternatively, 
[Concrete(M)] depends upon [Concrete(P)].  
Location Dependence states that the fact that M is located depends upon the fact that P is 
located. Of  course, this is just a first stab at the dependency involved in Productivity. Real 
production might involve something more substantial—so that my account does not 
automatically entail the thesis. For instance, I find it plausible that on Mumford and 
Anjum’s (2011) understanding of  the principle, for genuine production to take place, an 
irreducible process must link power and manifestation, roughly as follows:  
Process Production: P productively brings about M iff  there is an uninterrupted process φ 
essential to P that has [Located(M)] or [Concrete(M)] as its natural endpoint. 
I will not devote much time here to investigate how, exactly, we are to cash out 
Productivity: my only goal is to show that the fact that Productivity involves a 
dependence relation which runs in the opposite direction than MD* does not entail that the 
two cannot be held consistently together. So, however Productivity is to be cashed out, the 
point for our current problem is this: it is immediately apparent that the relata of  the two 
dependency relations are not the same, or that the dependency relations criss-crossing each 
other are not the same. This is particularly apparent when we consider that M has the 
identity that it has even if  it is not located. We can then easily derivate their distinctness by 
Leibniz’s Law by considering ‘obtaining’ to be a (higher order) property of  facts:  
a. ◇ (O[ID(M)] ∧¬O[Located(M)]). 
b.  x=y → ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy). 
c.  [ID(M)] ≠ [Located(M)]. 
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Note that nothing has been said about the details of  the two dependency relations involved. 
The same relation, as far as the defence I have given so far goes, could figure in both 
statements, and yet be asymmetrical: the relata are simply different.  
 However, one might complain that this does not capture fully Productivity: we 
might want to say that the dependence obtains between powers and manifestations 
themselves, rather than between facts involving powers and manifestations. So, the relata 
would have to be the same two entities: P and M themselves. In that case, we can preserve 
the proposed solution by distinguishing between the two kinds of  dependencies involved 
(see Paolini-Paoletti 2019 for this latter approach) and say that powers depend1 upon 
manifestations, while manifestations depend2 upon powers. Presumably, we should at that 
point offer a proper elucidation of  the notions of  dependency involved: ‘metaphysical 
dependance’ and ‘productive dependence’. 
 I do not think that such a treatment would raise any significant difficulty, compared 
to the one that I have just sketched. So far, I have expressed metaphysical dependence as a 
binary plain dependence relation between (thick) identity facts, but it is often simply 
expressed by a more finely characterised dependency relation between entities:  
MD: x depends for its identity upon y. 
If  it is possible to offer more fine-grained dependency relations by adding a qualifying 
clause, then we can suggest a general model for dependence relations:  
General Dependence: x depends for F upon y. 
Prima facie, it seems perfectly innocuous to use this blueprint to engineer productive 
dependence in the same lightweight way captured by Location Dependence. Very simply:  
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Productive Dependence: x depends for its being spatiotemporal located/for its being 
concrete upon y. 
Note that the property used to characterise this relation of  productive dependence is the 
determinable ‘having a spatiotemporal location’, rather than any determinate location.  I 138
think this is enough to offer a first elucidation of  the dependence under scrutiny. In 
particular, I propose the following elucidation of  production:  
Weak Production: P produces M at t =df M depends for its location/concreteness upon P 
and M is actualised at t.  
I think that Weak Production allows us already to capture most of  the philosophically 
interesting aspects of  Productivity: it suffices to capture the intuition that manifestations 
depend upon their powers, without forcing us to deny that powers depend for their identity 
upon their manifestations, nor giving up on the idea that dependence is asymmetric. I am 
inclined to say that a theory that can accommodate the former can reasonably be said to 
have thereby accommodated the latter., but of  course it is up for debate whether a stronger 
characterisation is needed.  Perhaps the notion of  productivity that Mumford & Anjum or 139
Groff  have in mind is something more substantial than this, and the extra element is doing 
some essential work. In that case, however, the burden is on them to specify what is this 
‘harder thing to do’ (Williamson 2013): unless it involves creating new entities ex nihilo, I 
suspect that whatever the harder thing to do is, the minimal framework could accommodate 
it.  
 One might be tempted to the idea that productive dependence really concerns determinate prop138 -
erties, and these in turn ground their determinables (and hence, indirectly, the determinable depend-
ence). However, I think there are good arguments to resist the idea that determinables need be 
grounded or less fundamental than their determinates (see Wilson 2012), and hence I think there is 
no obvious reason to think that a formulation of  productive dependence based on determinables is 
not viable.
 Thanks to Stephen Mumford for pressing me on this. I will suggest a way to bridge the gap from 139
Weak Production to a stronger Productivity in §8.4. 
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 Weak Production is based on idea that there are many kinds of  dependence, and 
not all of  them have the same direction. Similar ideas have found some support recently, in 
the debate about grounding. Having a quick look at them might be useful to clarify my 
proposal. 
8.2 Fundamental Matters?  
Jessica Wilson (2014) and Karen Bennett (2017) have argued that we should not try to 
understand the notions of  dependence and priority in terms of  a unified concept, such as 
grounding: our ‘in virtue of ’ explanations are not themselves, nor track, a unique ‘big-G’ 
relation. Rather, we should recognise a family of  such relations that share some key 
features, but are significantly different in other respects—‘building relations’ (Bennett) or 
‘small-g’ relation (Wilson).    140
 Bennett offers two reasons for thinking that this is the case: The first is that a 
unified big-G relation is just too coarse-grained (see also Koslicki 2015). The second reason 
is that any suitably general big-G relation will get things wrong. In particular, it will either 
misrepresent reality, or lose its asymmetry.  Bennett’s argument against ‘Generalist 141
Monism’ runs as follows:   
The problem is that there is a case to be made that any highly abstract, very general relation that 
holds whenever a more specific building relation will fail to be asymmetric... Why think that the 
 Bear in mind that, while it is quite easy to count the two dependency relations I am interested in 140
here among Wilson’s small-g relations (although they do not actually appear in her list) it is not ob-
vious that what I am interested in fits seamlessly with Bennett’s building relations: I have stressed 
that metaphysical dependence is a ‘determinative’ rather than ‘constitutive’ relation (Dasgupta 2018, 
Kovacs forthcoming) and Bennett’s arguments are more straightforwardly concerned with the latter 
family.  
 Selim Berker (2018) has recently offered two interesting arguments to the effect that we must 141
believe in a unified Big-G grounding. One of  his arguments, however, relies on the fact that de-
pendency relations display an ‘asymmetry dovetail’, that is, never happen to criss-cross. I think that 
his point begs the question here. His argument from transitivity in favour of  big-G is much more 
interesting; unfortunately, I cannot discuss it with the thoroughness that it would deserve. I will just 
note that, if  we are persuaded by his argument from transitivity but not from his argument from 
asymmetric dovetailing, we are free to admit that big-G grounding is symmetric, after all, but all the 
small-g dependencies are not. This would still be consistent with what I am saying, although I do 
not find it very appealing. 
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general relation is not asymmetric? It fails to be asymmetric if  it is possible for two different specific 
building relations to hold in opposite directions between the same entities... thus if  the relevant kind 
of  case is possible – if  two things can mutually bear different building relations to each other – B1 
and B2 cannot be versions of  a more general building relation B (Bennett 2017: 26). 
Bennett invokes as examples Schaffer’s (2010) Priority Monism (where grounding and 
composition move in opposite directions) and cases of  downward determination. The 
relation between powers and their manifestation would be, then, another example. 
Interestingly, Bennett includes causation in the building relations; what I have dubbed 
‘productive dependence’ is precisely the kind of  building relation would be involved in 
causal goings-on, according to Mumford & Anjum, so the account would fit nicely in her 
overall framework. 
 Note, however, that not every kind of  ‘dependence’ I have talked about so far 
would turn out to be asymmetrical. I have argued that existential dependence follows from 
metaphysical dependence, and there is no reason to think that it will not also follow from 
productive dependence. In that case, it would mean that powers and manifestations are 
symmetrically existentially dependent. Recall the link between metaphysical dependence and 
existential dependence: 
Identity-Existence: If  x depends for its identity upon y, then necessarily, x exists only if  y 
exists.  
   
Similarly, we should expect the link between productive dependence to be as follows:  
Production-Existence: If  x depends for its being located upon y, then necessarily, x exists 
only if  y exists. 
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Thus, if  x metaphysically depends upon y, but y depends productively upon x, we obtain 
that necessarily, x exists if  and only if  y exists. But this is not a problem, given how I have 
cashed out existential dependence so far: on the contrary, this is exactly the kind of  result 
that we should expect, given my acceptance of  merely logical existents! There is no reason 
to think that the truth of  ‘Necessarily, if  x exists then y exists’ should preclude the truth of  
‘Necessarily, if  y exists then x exists’. Just think of  the case of  two necessary existents, e.g. 
numbers—the ontology of  Dispositionalism is necessitarian, after all. From this we should 
draw the conclusion that existential dependence, cashed out as it is in modal/existential 
terms, is properly speaking not a dependency relation. The point is an overly familiar one: in 
order to have the required asymmetry, we need to formulate the principle using operator 
introducing a hyperintensional context, such as ‘because’ or ‘in virtue of ’ and so on, and not 
simply a strict implication.   142
 One reason to resist the idea that we can save both the intuition that powers depend 
upon their manifestations and that manifestations depend upon their powers without giving 
up on the asymmetry of  dependence by simply distinguishing different relations has to do 
with the notion of  fundamentality.  Plausibly, we still want to concede  that the following 143
principle is true:  
Fundamental: If  x depends upon y, then y is more fundamental than x. 
 The reason for not treating rigid existential dependence as a proper dependency relation is then 142
due to its coarse-grainedness, rather than its being non-symmetric; asymmetry is not assumed as a 
necessary condition for being a dependence relation here—the point is not, therefore, undermined 
by the arguments of  Barnes (2012; 2018). Kovacs (forthcoming) thinks on similar grounds that ne-
cessitists, in order not to trivialise existential dependency, have to transform it in ‘concrete existential 
dependence’. There is no real difference between our two views: I dismiss the ‘modal/existential’ 
version of  existential dependence as not a genuine dependence relation in a faux-necessitarian 
framework; he modifies the modal/existential account in a necessitist framework to avoid its trivial-
ity. Tomato, Tomahto. 
 The principle is (often implicitly) commonly assumed, but not universally so: Barnes (2018:65-8) 143
for instance maintains that ‘dependence needs to be separated from talk of  grounding, priority, in 
virtue of, and so on. These relations are relations that aim to take us from the derivative to the fun-
damental... dependence is something distinct from theoretical gizmos–like grounding, priority, in 
virtue of– tailored specifically to take us from the less fundamental to the more fundamental. De-
pendence can do a lot of  interesting work in our theories, but it can’t do that’. In case dependence 
had nothing to do whatsoever with fundamentality, the problem does not even arise.
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There is no doubt that ‘more fundamental than’ is asymmetrical. The critic could construct 
a dilemma: either invoking the two distinct dependence relations was useless, for we still get 
the result that an asymmetric relation holds symmetrically, or one of  the two relations is not 
a ‘real’ dependence, and thus we can maintain that it does not support Fundamental. 
 The dilemma is a false one: we do not need to accept either horn. The idea to get 
out of  the dilemma is to follow Bennett, and maintain that ‘the more fundamental than relation 
– and relative fundamentality generally – is implicitly indexed to particular building 
relations’ (Bennett 2017: 162). Indeed, I am very sympathetic to the idea that ‘when I say 
that one thing is more fundamental than another, what I really mean is that it is more 
fundamental in virtue of  particular patterns of  particular building relations’ (Bennett 2017: 163) and 
that a more general notion of  relative fundamentality, if  available at all, should be 
constructed either by generalisation or by weighted sum,  that is, a sort of  vectorial 144
composition.  So, accepting that there is a complex network of  dependence relations 145
between the different categories does not preclude us to meaningfully ask questions about 
relative fundamentality, albeit the picture proposed might put in question the idea that there 
are absolutely fundamental entities (that is, that building relations are well-founded), for it 
would seem that everything that is either a power or the manifestation of  a power cannot 
be absolutely fundamental. If  both Pandispositionalism and Dispositionalism are true, that 
is, if  both all properties are dispositional and powers are the sole source of  metaphysical 
modality, it would follow that the absolute fundamental cannot have any properties—so, 
presumably, there is no absolute fundamental level. Pandispositionalism is incompatible 
with absolute fundamentality. Even if  we reject Pandispositionalism, it would still be the 
case that entities that are somehow connected to the network of  powers cannot be absolutely 
fundamental: if  there are absolute, ungrounded fundamentalia, and if  whatever goes on in the 
world does so through the activity of  powers, then it follows from the above considerations 
 x is more fundamental than y =df For all dependence relations R and all z, the weighted sum of  144
all the indexed more fundamentalR than relations between x and y, and between x and z and y, etc., fa-
vours x as overall more fundamental. 
 The idea should attract Neo-Aristotelians: ‘prior is said in many ways’, after all. See Arist. Metaph. 145
5 11. 
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that fundamental entities just don’t do anything: they are necessarily idlers. Although not 
inconsistent, this is admittedly a strange picture, and one that is rather distant from what 
foundationalists normally present. Powers ontologies (and therefore Dispositionalism) sit 
more comfortably and naturally with some form of  anti-foundationalism—be that of  the 
infinite descending sort (Bohn 2018) or the coherentist kind (Thompson 2018). Incidentally, 
this result partially vindicates the metaontological assumptions that I have made in fn. 32 
against positions (such as Cameron 2010b) according to which we ought to be ontologically 
committed only to the absolutely fundamental entities. Be that as it may, the result I am first 
and foremost interested in is that the minimal metaphysics presented here seems to be 
consistent with one of  the key theses of  radical powers ontologies, namely Productivity, at 
least if  it is acceptable to cash it out in terms of  Weak Production. 
8.3. Time for Powers 
Another thesis (e.g. Mayr 2011, Mumford & Anjum 2011, Groff  2013; ms) typically adopted 
by radical powers theorists is Dynamism: the idea that powers are dynamic and active. A 
world of  powers is not a passive mechanism that receives its activity from an external 
source, but is itself  the source of  change. I think it is important to show that we can add 
Dynamism to the minimal theory, because such a feature is often taken to be one of  the 
key advantages of  powers ontologies over the ‘passive’ world of  the Neo-Humeans 
(Williams 2019), and furthermore it is plausibly one way to get from Weak Production to 
the stronger Productivity that Mumford and Anjum have in mind. 
 I will address the compatibility of  Dynamism and the minimal theory of  powers 
by taking a somewhat long detour in the metaphysics of  time. There are three reasons for 
this: first, it would be hard to properly address the topics of  dynamism and change without 
specifying what kind of  metaphysics of  time is acting as a background. However, specifying 
such framework is not a trivial matter. Recently, Donatella Donati (2018) and Marius 
Backmann (2018) have argued that (radical) powers ontologies are not compatible with any 
of  the established metaphysics of  time. Were they right, it would be very hard to assess 
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whether the minimal theory could accommodate Dynamism, since we would lack a precise 
background framework for fleshing out discussions about change.  
 Furthermore, if  they were right powers ontologies in general and Dispositionalism 
would be in considerable trouble: it is hard to see how we could adopt a powers ontology if  
it failed to fit in with any theory of  time, even if  powers proved to offer a better theory of  
modality (or laws of  nature, causation, free will, etc.). So, it is paramount to show that 
powers ontologies are compatible with at least one metaphysics of  time.  
 Since an exhaustive treatment of  the compatibility of  powers with metaphysics of  
time would take us too far afield, I will limit myself  to arguing that powers ontologies are 
compatible with Eternalism, and can do so while accepting Dynamism; I will do so by 
showing how Donati’s arguments against the compatibility of  Eternalism and radical 
powers can be resisted.  
 I choose to focus on Eternalism not only because I find the view independently 
attractive, but also because there are certain key similarities between Eternalism and my 
minimal theory of  powers. This is the second reason for focussing on the metaphysics of  
time: if  Eternalism and the minimal metaphysics share important features, if  I manage to 
show that Eternalism is compatible with dynamic powers, I will thereby offer a reason to 
think that the minimal framework is.  
 Finally, this detour on the metaphysics of  time aims to further clarify the minimal 
theory by drawing out some of  its consequences, and to show how it offers a good ground 
for Dispositionalism. Vetter (2015: 292) suggested that the semantics of  Dispositionalism 
would benefit from the adoption of  an Eternalist framework when it comes to accounting 
for cross-temporal modal sentences, such as ‘I could be taller than Socrates’—showing that 
the minimal theory can reap those benefits is a point in its favour. But there is more: 
discussing the relation between the minimal theory and time will allow us to better clarify 
the treatment of  dated truths of  possibility, such as ‘Jamie can run a marathon on June the 
second, 2021’ and the debate concerning the direction of  powers given in §6.7. Let’s dive 
into it.  
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 We can characterise Eternalism as follows:  
a. The domain of  the most natural, unrestricted existential quantifier used to univocally 
express ontological commitment (Sider 2011, van Inwagen 2009) includes present, as 
well as past and future times and entities. Present, past, and future times and entities 
exist simpliciter.  146
b. There is no unique, objectively privileged time or temporally located entity. A 
description of  reality can be correct and complete without specifying what time is 
present.  147
c. Times and objects are ordered by the fixed, unchangeable relations being before than/being 
after than/being simultaneous with which can be specified without mentioning what time is 
present.  
d. Fundamental ideology is tenseless.  148
Donati characterises radical powers theories as follows:   
i. Powers are primitive. They cannot be analysed in terms of  counterfactuals, 
conditionals, etc.  
ii. Powers are productive. ‘Change consists in the production of  new causal powers, via the 
transformation of  old causal powers... although change is still taken to consist in 
variation of  properties over time, this change is the result of  causal production. This 
“production” results from the transformation of  old powers into new ones. Production 
is a real feature of  reality. And the “new causal powers” mentioned in the principle are 
manifestations of  the old ones’ (Donati 2018: 155). 
 Eternalism thus understood would trivially follow from the necessitist ontology here adopted. 146
Therefore, this thesis can be bolstered thus: All entities that exist in time (present, past and future) 
exist and are concrete. Thanks to Jamie Taylor for pointing this out.
 This is just the negation of  Cameron’s (2015) Privileged Present thesis. 147
 This does not mean that tensed language can be reduced without loss of  meaning! 148
 178
iii. Powers have modal consequences. ‘In particular, they generate a sui generis modality 
called “natural modality”. Natural modality is intermediate between metaphysical 
possibility and necessity. That is, there are sentences p such that p is metaphysically 
possible but not naturally possible (see Mumford & Anjum 2011; 2018)’ (Donati 2018).  
These three theses roughly correspond to the last principles that I have spelled out in the 
Introduction:   149
Strong Causality. Powers are causal powers.  
Productivity. Powers are productive: they bring about their manifestation by producing it.  
Dynamism. Powers are dynamic and active. A world of  powers is not a passive mechanism that 
receives its activity from an external source, but is itself  the source of  change. 
Tendency. Powers confer a tendential, sui generis kind of  modality, stronger than mere 
metaphysical or natural possibility and always and necessarily short of  natural and 
metaphysical necessity.  
In particular, Dynamism and Productivity play a central role in Donati’s arguments.  By 150
resisting her arguments, I will offer a reason to think that the minimal metaphysics can 
safely accommodate these two further theses. 
8.4 Eternalism, Productivity, & Dynamism 
I will consider three worries that Donati raises in relation to adopting a radical powers 
metaphysics together with Eternalism. By radical powers metaphysics I mean specifically 
 Note that Donati uses ‘natural modality’ in quite a different way than I do—her term seems to 149
be closer to what I have called Tendential modality. 
 She offers a final argument, centred around Tendency. Since I end up rejecting the principle in 150
the last chapter, I shall not discuss its consequences for the philosophy of  time. 
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theories that include Productivity and Dynamism. These worries are almost identical to 
those that can be raised concerning the radicalisation of  my minimal framework, so by 
dispelling them we should kill two birds with one stone.  
 Donati’s first argument is based on the idea that there cannot be production in an 
eternalist framework, because it is static. Since, in a sense, also my picture is a static one (for 
nothing new comes into existence), her argument, if  sound, would have the upshot that my 
framework is not compatible with production, contrary to what I have argued in the 
previous section. Her argument can be reconstructed as follows:  
1. Powers bring about (produce) their manifestations.  
2. To bring about a manifestation means to bring it into existence: the domain of  the 
most natural, unrestricted existential quantifier used to univocally express ontological 
commitment undergoes an expansion when a power is successfully exercised. After a 
power has acted successfully, there is something more and new.  
3. According to Eternalism, the domain of  the most natural, unrestricted existential 
quantifier used to univocally express ontological commitment is constant.  
4. Therefore, the domain of  the most natural, unrestricted existential quantifier used to 
univocally express ontological commitment is both constant and growing.  
5. ⊥  
The key move here is 2., that powers are productive iff  the change that they originate 
involves new powers coming into existence as a result. But nothing, strictly speaking, comes into 
existence according to the eternalist. Everything that will be already exists simpliciter, 
tenselessly.  
 It should be clear by now how I intend to resist the argument. Donati’s argument is 
based on the idea that a power manifesting consists in bringing its manifestation into 
existence from non-existence. I have argued in §6 that this is not how powers theorists 
should think of  actualisation, and that they should not think of  unmanifested 
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manifestations as non-existing entities. Being manifested should be thought of  as becoming 
concrete. Furthermore, this case should qualify as a case of  genuine production: in the 
previous section I have introduced the notion of  productive dependence and Weak 
Production for this purpose. No problem here.  
 However, there might be a catch, for there is a natural follow-up worry: What does 
it mean that something becomes concrete (namely, spatiotemporally located) at some time t in 
an eternalist framework? Similarly, what does it mean that something becomes actual in my 
picture? Surely it is tenselessly true that it was located there—it has always been located at t: 
so how can it become concrete? Let’s try to spell this out more clearly. According to my 
picture, a manifestation M becoming manifested means that it does acquire a 
spatiotemporal location. This suggests that it did not have a spatiotemporal location 
beforehand. But, if  Eternalism is true, temporal facts are all fixed and unchanging: the facts 
have always been there. So, in a sense, M has always been concrete, that is, it has always 
been manifested. Nothing is going on.   
 Note that this complaint somewhat mirrors a classic objection to the reductive 
Russellian account of  change that is normally adopted by Eternalists:  
RA: An object a changing from being F to being G =df  There is a time t such that a is F at t 
and there is a time t’ such that t<t’ and a is G at t’. 
The objection, to my knowledge first formulated by McTaggart, is that RA is not a good 
account of  change because there is no change according to RA. The (timeless, tenseless) facts are 
always the same, so nothing really changes. The objection runs as follows:  
If  my poker, for example, is hot on a particular Monday, and never before or since, the event of  the 
poker being hot does not change. But the poker changes, because there is a time when this event is 
happening to it, and a time when it is not happening to it.  
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But this makes no change in the qualities of  the poker. It is always a quality of  that poker that it is 
one which is hot on that particular Monday. And it is always a quality of  that poker that it is one 
which is not hot at any other time. Both these qualities are true of  it at any time—the time when it 
is hot and the time when it is cold. And therefore it seems to be erroneous to say that there is any 
change in the poker. The fact that it is hot at one point in a series and cold at other points cannot 
give change, if  neither of  these facts change. (McTaggart 1927, chapter XXXIII, sections 315-6).  
The situation is very similar to the one involved in my account: manifested manifestations 
have always been (timelessly, tenselessly) located somewhere in spacetime, and therefore 
there is no genuine actualisation—no change takes place. But if  no genuine change takes 
place, how can the picture be said to be dynamic?  
 The best answer to offer to both objections is, following Sider (2001), to distinguish 
between two perspectives that are available to the eternalist when it comes to discussing 
things or facts in time. One is the ‘atemporal perspective’ which ‘contemplate[s] the whole 
of  time’. This perspective can be formulated by using simple predicates, i.e. predicates that 
lack a temporal clause: ‘is red’, ‘is tall’, ‘exists’., etc. These are the sort of  predicates 
(quantifiers, relations, etc.) that we employ when we add the clause simpliciter: so, for 
instance, our most natural and fundamental existential quantifier, the one that is supposed 
to really carve up nature at its joints and tell us what there is simpliciter, takes the atemporal 
perspective (Sider 2011). It is according to this perspective that we can say that all facts 
remain unchanging: what facts there are, simpliciter, is constant both according to the 
eternalist and the minimal metaphysics. But this is not the perspective we use when 
discussing change: ‘when discussing objects in time, we typically do not take this atemporal 
perspective’ (Sider 2001: 56). In that passage, Sider is interested in defining what it means to 
adopt the temporal perspective with regard to parthood, and defines having a part at a time 
as follows:  
P@T: x is part of  y at t iff  x and y each exist at t, and x’s instantaneous temporal part at t is 
part of  y’s instantaneous temporal part at t.  
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I am not concerned with his definition of  parthood here  as much as with the clause of  151
‘at a time’ that gets added to the predicate ‘being a part of ’. To adopt the temporal 
perspective means precisely to add such clause to our predicates and take the corresponding 
properties to be temporalised. My contention is that it does not make sense to speak of  
change unless we take the temporal perspective.  
 If  McTaggart is saying that, according to Eternalism, facts never change from an 
atemporal perspective, he is absolutely correct; but this cannot be a problem for a theory of  
change (reductive or not), because a theory of  change cannot be given in the atemporal 
perspective anyway. This point generalises to every metaphysics of  time—even growing 
blockers can take the atemporal perspective (e.g. discussing hypertime or logical truths) but 
of  course they cannot make sense of  change while doing so.   
 Once this is clear, the worry can be dispelled: in order to make sense of  a 
manifestation becoming actualised, we need a two-step explanation. First, assume that there 
are some entities xx located at time t1 (that is, existing at t1) and some entities yy located 
(existing at) t2. Then introduce the notion of  being accompanied, so that x is accompanied 
by  y only if  x exists at t and y exists at t. We can now make sense of  the actualisation of  152
some M by saying that M was not accompanied by any entity that exists at t1, and that M is 
accompanied by some entity that exists at t2. More generally:  
Co-Location: M is actualised at t2 =df there is some x such that x is not accompanied by M 
at t1 and x is accompanied by M at t2.  
We can still make sense of  mere logical existents in this framework. Logical existents are 
those entities that exist simpliciter, but are not accompanied by anything at any time. These 
 Sider is interested in using P@T to give a 4-dimensionalist theory of  persistence and change—151
hence his interest in parenthood specifically. However, one can be an eternalist without subscribing 
to 4-dimensionalist theory of  persistence and change, and so disregard his notion of  temporal parts.
 I had originally chosen the expression ‘co-located'. Thanks to Jamie Taylor for pointing out the 152
potential confusions that would arise from doing so.
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are the entities that are never actually brought about—in this, they are similar to abstracta 
(the difference being that it is not essential for them to be). Yet, manifestations that are only 
momentarily unmanifested, but which will be (e.g. my death) are not accompanied by anything 
up to a point in time, and then are accompanied by something (e.g. my drinking the deadly 
poison).  
 It makes sense to say that something becomes actualised if, adopting a temporal 
perspective, we say that the world was unaccompanied by M up to t1, and then it is 
accompanied by M from t2 onwards. Tenselessly speaking, of  course, in an Eternalist 
framework all the powers have already been exercised (or not): the future is fixed. All the 
powers that (tensedly speaking) will bring about their manifestations have, tenselessly 
speaking, already done so, and the powers that will not (tensedly speaking) bring about their 
manifestations have already, tenselessly speaking, failed to do so. However, from a temporal 
perspective we can still make sense of  the idea that powers act and manifestations occur at 
some time. 
 Let’s move to Donati’s final objection against radical powers and Eternalism. The 
argument, stripped to its bare bones, can be summed up as follows:  
1. Eternalism entails a reductive account of  change along the lines of  RA: <Fa at t1, Ga at 
t2>.  
2. A reductive account of  change along the lines of  RA is incompatible with radical powers 
metaphysics. 
3. Therefore, Eternalism is incompatible with radical powers. 
Since what I have said above suggests that my framework entails a Russellian reductive 
account of  actualisation, the objection is all the more dangerous if  it is sound—it would 
show that my framework is incompatible with radical powers ontologies. Spelled out as 
above, it is not really clear why radical powers ought to be incompatible with RA. This can 
be fleshed out both in terms of  Production and of  Dynamism. Let’s look at these in turn.  
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8.4.1 Production 
The first objection runs along these lines: 
‘Powers produce their manifestations. You just showed me how a power is followed by its 
manifestation, but not that it brought it about. The Humean can do that much. A powers-based 
account of  change (or causation) requires more!’ 
This is absolutely correct. But the fact that I can describe what it means that M is actualised 
in terms of  a pair of  states of  affairs <M is not accompanied by any xx at t1, M is 
accompanied by some yy at t2> does not mean that that’s all there is to it. We also need to add 
the fact that M is productively dependent upon P, for one. We have established previously, 
via Weak Production, that this is sufficient for capturing the idea that powers are 
responsible for the obtaining of  the manifestations. The fact that we can describe an event 
by using just an ordered pair of  property-instantiations does not mean that we have fully 
described it and accounted for it. This point is absolutely central to my argument—mutatis 
mutandis, I will employ the same strategy to resist also the Dynamism-based objection. 
 The key point is that RA is ambiguous between a description of  the phenomenon and 
its explanation. We are tempted to think that the right-hand side of  the principle is what 
explains the left-hand side—that the left-hand side reduces to it: that RA is spelled out as 
'iff  and because’. But this would be a mistake. Eternalism entails RA only insofar as it is 
understood as a materially adequate description of  the phenomenon of  change (biconditional 
only): considering it a (reductive) explanation of  change is a further, quite independent, and 
much stronger thesis.   
 The point that I would like to convey is that we should distinguish between a 
modest, descriptive reading of  RA (iff), and an ambitious, reductive one (because). 
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Eternalism surely offers the resources to describe change in terms of  a sequence of  property-
instantiations, e.g. as an ordered pair of  states of  affairs such as <Fa at t, Ga at t’>, but that 
does only commit the eternalist to maintain that a certain biconditional holds:  
RAD : An object a changing from being F to being G iff  there is a time t such that a is F at t 
and there is a time t’ such that t < t’ and a is G at t’. 
This only tells us how we can represent change from an eternalist perspective. And surely, 
such representation of  change gets something right: even the most radical powers theorist 
would concede that the ordered pair <Fa at t, Ga at t’> captures something of  change. What 
the radical powers theorist denies is that such a picture is the full story about change: a fully 
satisfying description and explanation will have to involve powers, production, processes—
what have you. But it does not mean that the minimal scheme offered by RAD cannot be 
enriched or is incompatible with powers. What she must reject is this further thesis, which 
represents a reductive explanation of  change and which we should sharply distinguish from 
RAD: 
RAE: An object a changing from being F to being G iff  and (fully) in virtue of there is a time t 
such that a is F at t and there is a time t’ such that t < t’ and a is G at t’. 
It is only this latter, stronger principle which is incompatible with radical powers-based 
accounts of  change, because it asserts that there is nothing more to change than such variation 
of  properties. But this is quite the extra step: nothing in the doctrine of  Eternalism by itself  
forces us to go down this path.  
 Compare this with the situation of  the perdurantist:  
Lewis formulates perdurantism as the view that ‘‘something... persists by having different temporal 
parts, or stages, at different times’’ (1986: 202). Crucially, this formulation includes the ‘by’-locution, 
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which indicates an explanatory claim—to say that an object persists by having temporal parts is to 
say that facts about persistence are grounded in, or obtain in virtue of, facts about temporal parts. 
This conception of  perdurantism goes beyond the ontological account since ontological claims are 
not, by themselves, explanatory... it is one thing to say that persisting objects have temporal parts 
whenever they exist; it is another thing to say that objects persist because they have temporal parts. 
One can accept the first claim while rejecting the second, so the explanatory idea goes beyond the 
ontological (Wasserman 2016: 244-5). 
Eternalism is in trouble only if  it entails this second, stronger thesis: that there is nothing to 
change but a sequence of  property instantiations. Similarly, my framework is in trouble if  it 
entails that all there is to actualisation is such an ordered pair—without any room for 
production. But this is not the case: there is room for Weak Production. In order to offer 
an adequate description and account of  change or actualisation, it is not enough to say that 
a property is instantiated at a time and another at another time, or that an entity is not co-
located with anything at a time and is co-located with something at another time. We also 
have to say that there is a power directed towards it, and that it depends productively upon 
that power. This way, we can enrich RA by adding elements unique to the toolkit of  powers 
metaphysics.  
8.4.2 Dynamism  
The second way to flesh out Donati’s argument relies on Dynamism. I interpret the thesis 
as maintaining that causal goings-on and the action of  powers in general is inextricably 
related to the unfolding of  irreducible processes. The exercise of  a power is, or results in, a 
process starting to unfold. For instance, Mumford and Anjum state that ‘the cause will be 
depicted as merging into and becoming the effect through a natural process’ (2011: 107) 
and that  
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[W]e see causation as an unfolding process whereby a turns into b (as in Martin 2008: ch. 5). The 
combined powers of  the cause... become the effect... as part of  what it is to be those powers 
(Mumford & Anjum 2011: 119).  
The idea can be made more precise by appealing to the following principle. I have 
mentioned it earlier, under the heading MAP, as an example of  a more substantial way of  
cashing out Productivity: I want to advance the hermeneutical suggestion that we can 
obtain Mumford and Anjum's (2011) stronger Productivity by uniting Weak Production 
with Dynamism: 
DYN: P dynamically strongly produces M iff  there is an uninterrupted process φ-ing 
essential to P that has M as its natural endpoint. 
I will not devote much time rehearsing the various theories of  processes: I have presented 
them in enough detail in §3. For the purposes of  this argument, the only relevant feature is 
that processes are assumed to be irreducible to sequences (e.g. ordered pairs) of  events. We 
can now present a more substantial version of  Donati’s argument:  
1. Eternalism entails the Russellian reductive account of  change, RA. 
2. RA: An object a changing from being F to being G =df  <Fa at t, Ga at t’> such that t < 
t’.  
3. If  RA is true, change can be analysed as a sequence of  events or states of  affairs. 
4. Radical powers metaphysics is committed to the idea that change occurs in virtue of  
the unfolding of  a process.  
5. Processes cannot be reduced to a sequence of  events or ordered series of  states of  
affairs.  
6. Change can be analysed as a sequence of  events (3) and cannot be analysed as a 
sequence of  events (5).  
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7. ⊥ 
The same reasoning as above applies here. Eternalism only entails RAD, that is, it merely 
entails the simple biconditional—and not an explanation of  the phenomenon, such as RAE. 
Thus, Eternalism is perfectly consistent with the idea that there is more to be said about 
change than what RAD represents—and what can be added does not need to be reducible 
to a Humean-friendly ontology. The same, mutatis mutandis, is the case with my framework: 
just because I have resisted the objection that (according to my view) there is no 
actualisation because everything that will be located is already (tenselessly speaking) 
located,  it does not mean that Co-Location tells us the whole story about how 153
manifestations are brought about. It is an acceptable minimal description only.  
 Let me offer an example of  how one might enrich RA to get a more accurate 
picture of  change or causation from the point of  view of  the radical powers theorist. 
Mumford and Anjum argue that causation by powers is best represented not by neuron 
diagrams (as standard practice since Lewis 1973) but rather by vectors in quality spaces. The 
idea, in short, is that we take manifestations to be locations on a certain quality space—for 
ease of  exposition, limit the example to one-dimensional quality spaces, e.g. hot and cold.  154
We then represent the current state of  the object with regard to the quality space as a 
vertical line: this would be the current temperature of  the object. We then represent its 
powers in action as vectors moving in a direction: the powers to heat as vectors pointing in 
one direction, and the powers to cool as vectors pointing in the opposite direction.   
 Mumford and Anjum recognise that such a diagram only represents a moment: ‘The 
vectors depicted within a quality space are meant to indicate how things dispose in that 
particular situation. The vectors represent only the operating dispositions but the model 
 By appealing to a temporal description of  actualisation along the lines of  Co-Location, M is 153
actualised at t2 =df there is some xx such that xx are not co-located with M at t1 and xx are co-loc-
ated with M at t2.
 For some objections to the vector model, see Bird (2016) and McKitrick in McKitrick, Mar154 -
modoro, Mumford and Anjum (2013). 
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does not show, for instance, any actual change or movement within that quality 
space’ (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 26). Assuming that the quality space is one-dimensional 
and the two poles are, respectively, F and G, that we represent directedness by introducing a 
primitive operator ‘⇀’ such that ‘P⇀F’ is read as ‘P tends to F’, and finally that we can 
associate a real number to the intensity or degree of  a power, we can represent a situation in 
a vector space where there are two powers disposing, respectively, towards F and G as 
follows: nP⇀F, mP*⇀G. We can then represent a change in the vector space as an ordered 
pair of  such situations, consistently with RAD. For instance, we can represent an increase in 
the degree of  one of  the powers and a decrease in the other as <(nP⇀F, mP*⇀G), 
(n+1P⇀F, m-1P*⇀G)>. This gives us the evolution of  a situation with two conflicting 
powers where one power becomes stronger and the other weakens. To simplify, assume that 
there is just one power in action; say, increasing in intensity. We can then offer the following 
improved description of  change:  
RAD+: An object a changes from being disposed towards F to being more disposed towards 
F iff  <(nPa⇀F) at t, (n+1Pa⇀F) at t’>. 
 The radical power theorist will still think that this is not enough—there is more to 
change that this. As was suggested in DYN, what we need is for the two elements of  the 
ordered pair to be connected by a primitive process. But we can simply add this 
requirement to RAD+. As a first stab, we just need to add the clause that there is the 
relevant process between the two relevant instants.  Informally, we can just say that some 155
entity a undergoes change iff  a is disposed thus-and-so at some time t, has some different 
disposition at some later time t’, and there is a primitive process φ involving a which takes 
place between t and t’. More formally, we can depict what is going on as something like this:  
 Or that the productive dependence holds, if  we are satisfied with Weak Production.155
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RAD++: An object a changes from being disposed towards F to being more disposed 
towards F iff  <(nPa⇀F) at t, (n+1Pa⇀F) at t’> & there is (the right kind of) process φ such 
that there is φ-ing between t and t’. 
This description seems, prima facie, to be quite close to what radical powers theorists think is 
going on in cases of  causation (in this case, in case of  an increase in intensity in the 
tendency to F)—that is to say, it seems to sit well with DYN. Note that this representation 
of  change is perfectly consistent with RAD: it just contains more elements than those that 
would be available to any eternalist, for it requires the ontological toolkit which comes with 
radical powers. But this should come as no surprise: after all, Eternalism is not a theory of  
properties or causation, but merely of  time. We should expect that a better description can 
be afforded by an integrated theory of  time, powers, processes, etc. Assuming that 
something like RAD++ is a more adequate description of  change for the radical power 
theorist, she can then offer an account of  change in the following terms:  
RAE++: An object a changes from being disposed towards F to being more disposed 
towards F iff and fully in virtue of  <(nPa⇀F) at t, (n+1Pa⇀F) at t’> & there is (the right kind 
of) process φ such that there is φ-ing between t and t’. 
 Obviously, this is just a rough sketch. However, I think that it illustrates how powers 
metaphysics can be consistent with RAD without being trapped and limited to RAE. Only 
the former is entailed by Eternalism (and, mutatis mutandis, by my framework for the case of  
actualisation) and hence Donati’s objection against the consistency of  radical powers (and, 
more specifically, against powers theories that incorporate Productivity and Dynamism) is 
unsound. I have thus shown that both Eternalism, and my minimal metaphysics are 
compatible with these two ‘radical’ theses.  
 Can we conclude that these two clauses are also compatible with Dispositionalism? I 
do not see why they should not be. I have shown that both features are compatible with my 
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theory of  the status unmanifested manifestations—which is the kernel of  my preferred 
powers ontology for Dispositionalism. Thus, I claim that the proposed minimal 
metaphysics of  powers for Dispositionalism can be ‘radicalised’ by adding both 
Productivity and Dynamism, if  need be—at least, adopting an Eternalist theory of  time. 
This is good news, because it means that Dispositionalists can work with the same toolkit as 
other friends of  powers interested in pursuing other projects.  
8.5  Time’s Arrow in a Static World?  
There is, however, one last problem that might make it hard to square Eternalism with the 
minimal metaphysics. This is also relevant to the solution I have offered in §6.7 to the 
problem of  how to account for the debate over the temporal direction of  powers, so 
dealing with it will also allow me to flesh out that point in more detail.  According to my 
theory, unmanifested manifestations do not have a spatiotemporal location—hence, 
manifestations (before they are brought about) cannot have determinate temporal 
coordinates: manifestations are not dated. Jamie might have the power to run a marathon on 
June the second, 2021, but such power is not to be understood as follows (I am adopting 
here Vetter’s symbolism):  
(1) POT[run a marathon on June the second 2021](Jamie).  
This raises two closely intertwined questions: how can we account for the truth of  ‘Jamie 
can run a marathon on 2 June 2021’, and how are we to understand the debate about the 
future-oriented nature of  powers—namely, the debate on whether powers can only have 
future manifestations, or also past ones?  
 I have discussed my proposed solution to the latter question in §6.7; such a solution 
also allows us to provide a semantics for dated sentences of  possibility, so it is quite 
important for me to show that we can accommodate such solution in an Eternalist 
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framework. Here is a bit more detailed exposition on how I think we should deal with the 
debate over the directionality of  powers and dated possibility claims.  
 The central idea is that the disagreement about the forward-looking nature of  
powers can be reduced to a disagreement about the topology and direction of  time. From 
the fact that bringing about a manifestation takes some time and the fact that time only 
flows in one direction, we can explain why one might think that a potentiality’s 
manifestation cannot predate its possession, provided that we accept that the exercise of  a 
power involves the unfolding of  a process. That is to say, if  we accept Dynamism, and if  
time flows only in one direction, then we can explain that powers have only future 
manifestations. If, on the other hand, time flows both ways, is circular, or contains loops, 
then it makes sense to speak of  past manifestations of  present powers (and potentially, of  
backward causation). 
 This idea is also the key element for answering the former kind of  question, 
concerning the semantics of  dated sentences. If  we accept Dynamism, then sentences 
such as ‘Jamie can run a marathon on 2 June 2021’, ‘the sugar can dissolve at midday, but 
not at 9 am’ and so on are to be grounded in i) the direction of  time ii) the spatiotemporal 
location of  the powers, and iii) the nature of  the powers (and hence, of  the process). That 
is to say: given the temporal location of  the power for M, the fact that time flows in a 
certain direction and has a certain topology and metric,  and the nature of  the process 156
involved in bringing about M (specifically, how long it takes the process to unfold), then we 
can establish when a manifestation might or might not be actualised, without having to 
invoke dated states of  affairs.  
 For example: suppose it is now 11:59 am, and I have just dropped a cube of  sugar 
in my tea. Is the sentence ‘the sugar can be dissolved at 12:00’ true? Assuming that time 
flows in one direction, this will depend on the specific nature of  the powers involved—
namely, how long the process of  dissolution will take, which is grounded in the nature of  
 The metric need not be intrinsic to time—it can supervene on other facts. 156
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the sugar’s solubility and the water’s power to dissolve  (and obviously other factors, such 157
as atmospheric pressure). That allows us to give a truth-value to ‘the sugar can be dissolved 
at 12:00’ without having to attribute to the sugar a myriad of  time-specific powers—the 
power to dissolve at 12.00, the power to dissolve at 12.01, etc., which would overcrowd an 
already populous domain.  
 The problem is that both these solutions rest on the assumption that time flows, and 
has a direction. Without this assumption, we could not distinguish whether the sugar at 
11:59 can dissolve at 12:00 or at 11:58, nor be able to settle or give meaning to the debate 
about the direction of  powers. Unfortunately, Eternalism is standardly taken to entail the 
absence of  a flow of  time, let alone its having a particular direction.  For instance, Donati 158
(2018: 145) includes the lack of  directionality of  time in her characterisation of  Eternalism: 
‘Objects are ordered by fixed relations (B-relations) within a four dimensional manifold, and 
there is (plausibly) no passage’. Indeed, the idea that Eternalism excludes a genuine passage 
of  time and its directionality is widespread: ‘Defenders of  the block universe deny that 
there is an objective present, and usually also deny that there is any objective flow of  
time’ (Price 1996).  
 This is obviously troubling: if  Eternalism is incompatible with the flow of  time, and 
I invoked the flow and direction of  time to explain how undated powers can be the 
truthmakers for dated possibility claims and account for the debate about the direction of  
powers, then either I have to reject Eternalism or find another solution to these problems. 
 Since I find the solutions to these problems offered in §6.7 quite appealing, and I 
think that it is very important that a metaphysics for Dispositionalism be able to address 
them, the natural choice would be to abandon Eternalism (as suggested by Friebe 2018) and 
embrace a more ‘dynamical’ metaphysics of  time, e.g. Moving Spotlight. Fortunately, I do 
not think that the choice is forced upon us: the dilemma is a false one. One can be a full-
 Obviously, since these are not perfectly natural powers, it might be controversial whether these 157
are genuine powers. In keeping with the fairly liberal conception of  sparse properties adopted so far, 
I have no problem adopting these macro-phenomena for clarity of  exposition.
 Indeed, this is often taken to be one of  its merits, for it fits naturally with the kind of  time-sym158 -
metric laws that fundamental physics is concerned with. 
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fledged eternalist and yet accept that time has a direction and flows in one way. In slogan 
form: Eternalism does not mean that the universe is static and time does not have a 
direction.  
 I can think of  two strategies to deny that Eternalism entails a ‘static’ universe.  159
The first is to simply add a primitive direction of  time on top of  the eternalist four-
dimensional manifold, as it were. This idea has recently been defended by Tim Maudlin 
(2007).  He notes that the question of  the passage of  time is irrelevant to the ontic thesis 160
of  Eternalism:  
The belief  that time passes, in this sense, has no bearing on the question of  the ‘reality’ of  the past 
or of  the future. I believe that the past is real: there are facts about what happened in the past that 
are independent of  the present state of  the world and independent of  all knowledge or beliefs 
about the past. I similarly believe that there is (i.e. will be) a single unique future... Insofar as belief  in 
the reality of  the past and the future constitutes a belief  in a ‘block universe’, I believe in a block 
universe. But I also believe that time passes, and see no contradiction or tension between these 
views (Maudlin 2007: 109).  
I will not rehearse Maudlin’s arguments—I assume that his points are sound and his 
position is at least coherent. I think that powers theorists can adopt Maudlin’s theory, and 
treat the direction of  time simply as an additional primitive element of  their ontology, even 
if  they reject Maudlin’s account of  governing laws: the former does not entail the latter. 
Indeed, given the initial distribution of  powers and a primitive direction of  time, we can 
derive the evolution of  the universe (the pattern of  instantiation of  properties over the full 
 This slogan could be misleading. ‘The block metaphor sometimes leads to confusion, however. 159
In an attempt to highlight the contrast with the dynamic character of  the ‘moving present’ view of  
time, people sometimes say that the block universe is static. This is rather misleading, however, as it 
suggests that there is a time frame in which the four-dimensional block universe stays the same. 
There isn't of  course. Time is supposed to be included in the block, so it is just as wrong to call it 
static as it is to call it dynamic or changeable. It isn't any of  these things, because it isn't the right sort 
of  entity—it isn't an entity in time, in other words’ (Price 1996: 12). By it, I merely mean that talk of  
a privileged direction of  time is available to the eternalist. 
 See also Earman (1974) for this ‘Heresy’. 160
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four dimensional manifold) more economically than by positing i) the primitive governing 
laws, ii) the initial distribution, and iii) the primitive direction of  time, as Maudlin does.  
 An alternative way to subscribe to the existence of  time’s arrow within an eternalist 
framework is to reduce the direction of  time to some more fundamental phenomenon 
which does not include the directionality of  powers. The most obvious way to do so is to 
reduce time’s arrow to the increasing entropy’s gradient (Dowe 1992; Albert 2000; 2015, 
Loewer 2012). This requires two elements: on the one hand, the fact that the entropy 
gradient of  systems not in equilibrium tends to increase (in accordance to the second law 
of  thermodynamics or the statistical mechanical laws that ground it: see Albert 2000; 2015), 
and on the other hand, the ‘Past Hypothesis’; that is, the empirical hypothesis that the 
entropy gradient of  the universe right after the big bang was incredibly low.  161
 Notoriously, Loewer and Albert support a Neo-Humean metaphysics and a Best 
System Approach to laws of  nature (Loewer 1996; 2012, Albert 2000; 2015). However, a 
reductionist theory of  the direction of  time can be adopted by powers theorists just as well: 
the metaphysical commitments are not vital to the reductive strategy.  After all, all that the 162
friends of  powers wants to say is that the fundamental dynamical laws flow from the 
modally rigid properties of  the micro-entities—that their behaviour derives from the 
powers of  the particles that compose the relevant micro-states. This can be accommodated 
 The Past Hypothesis is necessary in order to avoid the Reversibility Paradox: The latter is neces161 -
sary to generate the asymmetry of  the direction of  time and avoid the Reversibility Paradox: ‘condi-
tionalizing on a low entropy macro state in the past (e.g. that the ice cube was twice as large an hour 
ago) constrains the probabilities of  trajectories so that entropy is likely lower between now and an 
hour past. The reason for conditionalizing on [the initial state of  the universe] is that nothing short 
of  placing the low entropy condition at the first instants of  the universe insures that the second law 
holds throughout the universe’s entire history’ (Loewer ms.). 
 For instance Albert (2016: 64), after having explained the epistemic asymmetry between past and 162
future in terms of  statistical mechanics and past hypotheses, writes: ‘everything we’ve been talking 
about...comes straight out of  the microscopic laws of  motion and the past hypothesis and the stat-
istical postulate. And all of  those have exactly the same mathematical form, and carry exactly the same 
implication about the trajectories of  material bodies, in anti-Humean conceptions of  the world’. Thanks 
to Alison Fernandes for pointing me out that much of  Albert and Loewer’s views can be separated 
from their Humean metaphysics. 
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without problems: the dynamical laws governing the micro-states are time-symmetric,  so 163
they can be grounded in powers that are not time-directed, and whose manifestations are 
not dated,  and so do not require anything that the minimal metaphysics could not 164
provide.  
 Both Maudlin and Albert’s theories of  the flow of  time are, then, compatible with 
the metaphysics of  powers I am proposing, and both are perfectly consistent with 
Eternalism: they can still subscribe to what I take to be the linchpin of  the metaphysical thesis 
of  Eternalism, namely that B-relations are more fundamental than A-properties. But this 
does not mean that we cannot, then, ground the arrow of  time in some facts about the four-
dimensional manifold. Once we have the (non-fundamental) arrow of  time, we can generate 
the directionality of  powers and the semantics of  dated possibility claims by adopting the 
strategy described above.  
 This would not entail that powers are no longer basic entities, because powers 
themselves have nothing to do with dated manifestations, and their identity does not depend 
upon their temporal orientation. The temporal orientation of  powers is an extrinsic matter, 
one which depends on something other than the powers themselves, namely the Past 
Hypothesis—the low entropy gradient of  the initial distribution.  
 Of  course, this means giving up on the idea that a denial of  time’s arrow is part and 
parcel of  any Eternalist metaphysics of  time. I think this is no sacrifice. Some directionality 
is already implicit in the way we characterise the B-relations among events in the manifold: 
 Therefore, we should not be too worried that such a reductive account of  time’s arrow would 163
prevent power theorists to ground the second law of  thermodynamic (or in general, entropy) upon 
some fundamental powers: we do not need to postulate a dated manifestation to make sense of  the 
increase of  entropy. Thanks to Matt Tugby for raising this issue. 
 Albert and Loewer are more ambitious than I need to be, and than the power theorist can be. 164
They suggest that the Mentaculus can not only explain time’s arrow, but offer a model of  causation: 
they propose to analyse causation probabilistically – suggesting that C causes E if  and only if just in 
case  the probability of  E conditionalised on C (plus some background facts) is higher than the 
probability of  E plus background facts alone. The Mentaculus thus offers a model to explain not 
only the asymmetry of  time and causation, but the evolution of  the universe. Obviously, power theor-
ists cannot accept a probabilistic reduction of  causation (see Mumford and Anjum 2011; 2018). 
Friends of  powers can adopt a reductive theory of  the direction of  time along the lines of  Albert 
and Loewer without subscribing to the more ambitious explanation of  the dynamic evolution of  the 
universe, which is grounded in an unacceptable reductive theory of  causation.
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we speak of  succession relations, which are directed: the battle of  Waterloo precedes the 
death of  Napoleon, which in turn precedes the October Revolution, and not vice versa. Of  
course, there is a topologically matching series of  events in the other direction:  
These sequences might be ‘matched’, in the sense that to every event in the one there corresponds 
an event in the other which has the same bodies in the same spatial arrangement. The topological 
structure of  the matched states would also be matched: if  state B is between states A and C in one 
sequence, then the corresponding state B* would be between A* and C* in the other (Maudlin 2007: 
108). 
But two topologically matching series are not the same series. One might think that 
introducing a direction to time breaks down the perfect isomorphism between the 
dimensions of  the spacetime manifold: time is not just another dimension, but regains a 
Newtonian special status, differing from space insofar as the latter is directionless, whereas 
time is not. While this is the case insofar as Maudlin’s primitivist theory is concerned, it is 
not if  we adopt the entropy-based reductive theory. Accepting that space does not have a 
primitive privileged orientation does not mean that there cannot be a supervening 
orientation. Matter (more generally, entities) is not distributed homogeneously in the 
universe, and it makes perfect sense to speak of  the centre of  the galaxy, say, as opposed to 
its periphery on the basis of  the concentration of  matter in these regions. These unequal 
distributions of  entities can be the base of  supervening asymmetries. There are spatial 
asymmetries, just not fundamental or primitive ones: 
Consider the up-down asymmetry. It plausibly reduces to the local gravitational gradient. Astronauts 
on the moon think down is the direction towards the centre of  the moon, not wherever it was when 
they left Earth (Callender 2016). 
The up-down spatial asymmetry is real and important (even if  we consider only the local 
gravitational gradient) and can usefully be employed in scientific explanations, as well as in 
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semantics, even if  it is not fundamental or primitive. The same goes for the temporal 
asymmetry. Both space and time do not have a primitive privileged orientation—but they might 
well have non-fundamental orderings, and this is all we need in order to account for the 
semantics of  dated possibility claims and the debate over the direction of  powers. 
 I think that this satisfies all the requirements of  the metaphysical thesis of  
Eternalism whilst allowing us to appeal to time’s arrow; if  we can do that, then the solution 
to the puzzle about the temporal direction of  powers in terms of  processes that I have 
sketched in §6.7 is available to us. 
8.6 Conclusions  
In this chapter, I have been preoccupied with showing that the minimal metaphysics of  
powers that I have presented in §6 is compatible with some of  the key theses dear to more 
radical powers theorists, such as Productivity and Dynamism. This is important, because it 
shows that Dispositionalism can tread on the same ontological ground that other 
metaphysicians are standing on when investigating other phenomena (causation is the most 
obvious candidate).  
 Investigating how we can radicalise powers has yielded a number to interesting 
results that contribute to clarify also the minimal theory itself. Discussing Production, I 
have introduced and characterised a notion of  productive dependence that goes from 
powers to their manifestations. If  this move is legitimate, it would mean that powers 
theorists should recognise a variety of  dependence relations and, as far as they intend to 
link relative fundamentality with dependence relations, they ought to conclude that in a 
powers ontology there is nothing that is absolutely fundamental—nothing is perfectly 
ungrounded or independent. That is to say, powers theorists should not be tempted by 
metaphysical foundationalism (Thompson 2018, Bohn 2018).   
 Examining how to implement Productivity and Dynamism to the minimal 
metaphysics in relation to the metaphysics of  time also allowed us to tackle a more general 
problem for all powers ontologies, namely whether powers are compatible with any of  the 
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existing theories of  time. I have argued, contra Donati, Backmann, and Friebe (see Giannini 
ms* for a more substantial treatment of  the issue), that the minimal metaphysics, even after 
the addition of  Productivity and Dynamism, is compatible with the adoption of  
Eternalism. If  there is time for radical powers, a fortiori there is time for minimal powers.  
 More cautiously: proving conclusively that two metaphysical theories are compatible 
is a hard task—indeed, it might be not unlike an attempt to verify a theory, be it empirical 
or not. As in any other area of  philosophy, new arguments can always crop up and 
undermine doctrines and connections thought to be on secure ground. Therefore, it would 
be rushed to conclude that I have proved for good that radical powers metaphysics is 
compatible with eternalism. However, I have shown that there is no sound argument to the 
contrary, yet. I think it is fair to shift the burden of  the proof  to the other camp, and 
conclude that we are warranted in thinking that there is time for powers.  
 Tackling the objections against the compatibility of  Eternalism, Productivity, and 
Dynamism also allowed us to get a better grip on how these two theses could be 
accommodated within the minimal theory, and allowed me to clarify the solution to the 
puzzle concerning the direction of  powers discussed in §6.7: now, I hope, it is clearer how a 
metaphysics of  powers can deliver a semantics for dated future modal claims without 
having to include fine-grained, dated unmanifested manifestations: all we need is time’s 
arrow and empirical knowledge of  the nature of  the processes involved in the exercise of  
the power—the debate concerning the direction of  powers can be reduced to a debate 
concerning the direction of  time.  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Chapter 9: Truthmaking Troubles    
In the last three chapters, I have presented my preferred metaphysics of  powers for 
Dispositionalism and showed that it can be radicalised. However, not all the consequences 
of  the theory are equally welcome. Some serious problems arise once we accept mere 
logical existents in our ontology. According to my theory, unmanifested manifestations of  
powers exist, simpliciter. This profligate ontology causes two difficulties when interacting 
with a simple version of  Truthmaking theory, according to which an entity makes the 
corresponding propositions or sentences true simply in virtue of  existing.  
 The first problem is that, if  one admits contrasting (or opposing) powers in one’s 
ontology, then we have to admit the existence of  contrasting manifestations. If  both exist 
simpliciter, how can we avoid that they make true two contradictory sentences or 
propositions? For example, assume that Marzia has the power to swim and also the power 
not to swim. Assume that the manifestation of  such powers are states of  affairs: [Marzia 
swims] and [Marzia does not swim]. Both states of  affairs exist: yet we cannot admit that 
‘Marzia swims & Marzia does not swim’ is true.  
 The second difficulty is this. According to Dispositionalism, every possible state of  
affairs is the manifestation (manifested or unmanifested) of  some actual power. I have 
argued that all the manifestations of  powers do, in fact, exist simpliciter. Again, if  we adopt 
Truthmaking theory, it would follow that everything that is possible is also the case: for 
every p, if  p is possibly true, then p is true. This is an extremely implausible modal principle: 
were Dispositionalism forced to accept it, it would probably be enough to undermine the 
appeal of  the theory. Worse than that: it would be inconsistent with Independence.    
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9.1 Conflicting Powers  
We can spell out the first problem more precisely as follows:  
1. Powers are directed towards their manifestations (either manifested or unmanifested). 
2. Manifestations exist (either manifested or unmanifested). 
3. Truthmaking Principle: sentences or propositions are true because their truthmakers 
exist. 
4. Manifestations are truthmakers for some sentences or propositions. 
5. There are pairs of  incompatible powers, i.e. two powers whose manifestations are 
truthmakers for a pair of  contradictory sentences or propositions. 
6. Therefore, there exist manifestations that make true contradictory sentences or 
propositions.  
7. Therefore, there are true contradictions. 
Premises 1. and 2. are central parts of  my account, so they are non-negotiable in this 
context. Premise 5. seems incontrovertible, too: some powers conflict with other powers in 
the world, such that their respective manifestations would be incompatible.  Finally, I have 165
formulated Dispositionalism in terms of  truthmaking: it seems hard to give up on that. 
 One might hypothesise that 5. is not that problematic. For instance, we could think 
that conflicting powers are to be modelled using a vectorial space (as in Mumford & Anjum 
2011), and what appears to be conflicting powers leading to mutually incompatible 
manifestations can always be mediated: that there is always a joint manifestation which is 
not itself  contradictory. For instance, suppose that there are two particles, Andy and Bertie. 
Andy and Bertie have a certain mass. The manifestation of  such power is a certain 
gravitational field, which in turn has the power to move the two particles towards each 
another. At the same time, they are both also positively charged, which results in some 
 This does not require the existence of  two-ways powers of  the kind invoked by Steward (2013) 165
i.e. multitrack powers that have both M and not-M among their manifestations (like the rational 
powers in Arist. Metaph. IX 1046b). Of  course, two-ways powers would incur in the same problem. 
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electromagnetic field that tends to repel one particle away from the other. Plausibly, one 
could think that there is also a joint power between Andy and Bertie’s mass and charge, 
which results, say, in the two particles retaining their initial positions: so, in a way, these two 
conflicting powers did not result in a contradiction (i.e. Andy and Bertie both moving 
towards and away from each other), but in the manifestation of  the resultant force. Even 
assuming that we can generalise Mumford and Anjum’s vectorial solution,  this would 166
clearly not dispel the problem, for the non-joint manifestations of  the powers would still exist: 
the manifestation of  their mass alone, and the manifestation of  their charge alone, still exist.  
 Another solution would be to hypothesise that the identity of  powers is to be 
understood as a complete and maximal set of  conditionals of  the sort ‘if  P is placed in this 
precise location of  this maximal network of  powers, then M would ensue. If  P is placed in 
this precise location of  this other maximal network of  powers, then M*…’. This is, I take it, 
roughly what Neil Williams  (2019) has in mind when he speaks of  the 'blueprint' of  
powers. But such a solution requires us to have a conditional or counterfactual 
understanding of  the nature of  powers, according to which stimuli play as much of  a role in 
the identity of  the power as their manifestations, whereas I have assumed so far Vetter's 
model, according to which stimuli (or mutual manifestation partners) do not  constitute the 
identity of  powers, so I will discard it.  
 I think there is a simpler solution to the problem, and it is to deny 6. More precisely, 
it is to deny that 6. entails that the principle of  non-contradiction is violated. The law of  
non-contradiction states that:  
 It is far from clear that we can do that legitimately. Alexander Bird argues that powers in multi-166
dimensional quality spaces are nothing like three-dimensional space, and hence that vectorial addi-
tions cannot work: ‘However, it is a mistake to think of  a multi-dimensional quality space as analog-
ous to 3-dimensional physical space. In principle, we can rotate objects such as a measuring rod in 3 
dimensions so that they are intrinsically unchanged, and thus can measure distance in any of  the 
dimensions. And so in 2- or more dimensional space, the various dimensions are measured in the 
same units. This allows us to set up a system of  co-ordinates to locate the position of  any object in 
space. The direction of  a given vector, r, can be understood in terms of  how much one has to rotate 
one basis vector, u (e.g. a unit vector along the x axis), so that u and r are parallel. But these features 
are not in general possessed by multi-dimensional quality spaces. The different dimensions (hot–
cold and dry–damp) are not measured in the same units. There is nothing akin to rotating a measur-
ing rod so that although unchanged it points in a different direction’ (Bird 2016: 29)
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It is impossible that the same thing can at the same time both belong and not belong to the same 
object and in the same respect, and all other specifications that might be made  (Arist. Metaph. IV 
1005b19–23).  
Given the resources of  possible worlds talk, the contradiction between alternative 
possibilities is avoided by relativising existence and truth to a world: x, the truthmaker for p, 
exists at some world w, and therefore it is true only at w that p. The fact that p is true at w 
and not true at w’ is not a contradiction, because contradictions have to involve ‘the same 
respect’. Hardcore actualists renounce the idea that the fundamental notion of  existence 
and truth are relativised to a world,  so they have to find another solution.  167
 The relevant clause that hardcore actualists have to appeal to here is ‘at the same 
time’—not completely unlike those preoccupied by the puzzle of  change. While diachronic 
changes do not produce contradictions because they have different temporal locations 
(Marzia is swimming at 3 and not swimming at 4), unmanifested manifestations, being mere 
logical existents, do not produce contradictions because they do not have a temporal 
location at all. So, even assuming that there are two incompatible states of  affairs, they 
couldn’t make it true that something is the case and not the case at the same time. They are 
simply indeterminate under that respect: they are not dated. Since the unmanifested 
manifestations are not located in space and time, they will not be able to make true a pair of  
dated propositions, needed to produce a contradiction, such as <Marzia swims at 3 on 
25/04/2019> and <Marzia does not swim at 3 on 25/04/2019>, but only <Marzia 
swims> and <Marzia does not swim>. That is not a contradiction—or it would make 
diachronic change contradictory, too. Only concrete entities have a location, and hence we 
only need to make sure that it is not the case that both mere logical existents can be 
 To be fair, this is a bit too rushed—we do not need to say that hardcore actualists are using a 167
different notion of  truth than their foes, be them possibilits or software actualists. Indeed, saying so 
would make the discussion much harder. We can just say that hardcore actualists cannot exploit the 
relativisation of  truth at a world to solve the problem of  conflicting truthmakers of  possibility 
claims, because there is only one world, so even if  the notion at hand is the same, it cannot do any 
meaningful work. 
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actualised at the same time. This, I think, partially alleviates the tension, but it does not fully 
dispel the uneasiness. 
 The deeper root is this. What about propositions about abstract entities? Does this 
mean that there cannot be contradictory pairs of  propositions about them? That would be 
an unwelcome result—clearly, <2+2=4> and <¬(2+2=4)> are contradictory, even if  their 
truthmakers do not have a spatiotemporal location. Possible world theorists have an easy 
time here: they only need to assert that 2+2=4 holds at all worlds, and any proposition that 
2+2=5 must hold at some world, and hence the contradiction can be properly formulated 
because it concerns the same respect (namely, the world w where they both hold). Keeping 
with the analogy with time, Dispositionalists should say that 2+2=4 holds at all times. 
Perhaps it is not too unreasonable to argue that necessary truths hold at all times, and so we 
can explain the contradiction involved in the mathematical example even if  numbers are 
abstract.  
 The question is: why this should not carry over to mere logical existents, and thus 
invalidate the initial reply? How are we to account for the difference between truths about 
abstracta and truths about mere logical existents? I think that the difference between the 
theory of  truthmaking that I have to adopt to deal with truths about abstract entities and 
the one for truths about concrete ones goes deeper than the issues of  contradictions, and is 
revealed in its magnitude by the second puzzle. Let’s take a look at it first; hopefully, the 
solution to it will also make clear how I intend to account for the difference between the 
contradictions involving abstract entities and the lack of  contradictions involving mere 
logical existents.  
9.2  Megarian Actualism  
The simplest formulation of  Truthmaking Principle runs as follows:  
TM: A → ∃x □(∃y x=y → A) 
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Roughly, it states that for every true proposition, there is an entity which necessitates its 
truth. Many have disputed that necessitation is too coarse-grained to make sense of  
truthmaking (everything whatsoever would be a truthmaker for all necessary truths, for 
instance); there are more credible alternatives on the market,  but since they do not help in 168
solving the problem I am about to introduce, we can run with the naïve, more familiar 
formulation for the time being.  
 The problem for my theory is that, if  we take that what exists simpliciter determines 
what is true simpliciter, then from the fact that everything that possibly exists does in fact exist 
(Ontological Maximalism), it follows that everything that is possibly true is, in fact, true. So, 
for instance, Williamson notes that the Truthmaking Principle and Necessitism sit very 
uncomfortably together:  
The inconsistency can be made plain in terms of  Kripkean model theory with variable domains 
where all worlds are mutually accessible. TM requires the formula A to be true at a world only if  its 
domain contains an individual o such that A is true at every world whose domain contains o. Thus 
the domain of  every world contains o only if  A is true at every world. Hence if  all instances of  TM 
are true in a model with a constant domain, every formula of  the language is either true at every 
world or false at every world (on a fixed assignment). The combination of  TM and necessitism is 
incompatible with contingency... the truthmaker principle drags us from the non-contingency of  
being to the non-contingency of  truth (Williamson 2013: 393).  
The situation is not very different for the Dispositionalist, provided that we are 
ontologically committed to the existence of  unmanifested manifestations, and that we 
accept that possibility claims are grounded in powers. We seem to be committed to the 
disastrous: 
BAD: ◇p → p 
 For instance, invoking relevant entailment (e.g. Restall 2000), projection (Smith 1999. See 168
Schnieder 2006), and more recently, some hyperintensional notions such as grounding (Correia & 
Schnieder 2012; See Fine 2015). 
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This would obviously be very troubling for Dispositionalism. Even if  we avoid overt 
contradictions by appealing to the temporal indeterminacy of  mere logical existents, we still 
derive a very unpalatable principle. This is still unacceptable, for not only is the principle 
independently implausible, but it would also entail Megaric Actualism. This is because 
Dispositonalism, if  it aims at grounding alethic modality, is committed to axiom T (Vetter 
2015; Kimpton-Nye forthcoming): 
T: □p → p  
which is formally equivalent to the principle ‘ad esse ab posse’:  
T: p → ◇p 
From T and BAD it follows that something is possible if  and only if  it is the case:  
Megaric Actualism: ◇p p 
But Megaric Actualism is incompatible with the minimal metaphysics of  powers, because it 
entails the negation of  Independence, which is one of  the core principles of  the minimal 
theory.  We need to tweak or reject Truthmaking Principle. 
 There is a very obvious strategy to avoid BAD: we need to add a further clause to 
the truthmaker principle. What is true cannot be a matter of  existence simpliciter. It should 
be a qualified way of  existence that makes truths true. In short, we need to reformulate 
TM  according to the schema:  169
 As I have said at the beginning of  the section, in what follows I will employ and modify a truth169 -
making principle cashed out in terms of  necessitation simply because it is the most common and 
familiar—this does not mean that I am suggesting that it is the right formulation of  the principle.
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TM*: A → ∃x □((∃y x=y ∧ Fx) → A) 
for some condition F. The proposal raises two concerns:  
A) What property should we appeal to?  
B) Is this a legitimate move, or does it miss some key point of  truthmaking? 
Given the categorial framework I have presented, a plausible candidate to answer question 
A) is suggested by the very formulation of  the basic principle of  Dispositionalism, DPoss: 
DPoss: ‘possibly p’ is true iff  and because there is some potentiality whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘p’ true.  
The principle contains the clause ‘if  manifested’. ‘Possibly p’ is made true, according to 
DPoss, by the power tending to what would be the truthmaker of  p—an entity which we are 
already committed to ontologically. Presumably, however, this same entity does not make 
true that p, simpliciter. The intuitive metaphysical reason to formulate DPoss as it is is that, if  
the unmanifested manifestation could make ‘p’ true, it would thereby also make ‘possibly p’ 
true, as long as we are committed to ab esse ad posse. This would make powers completely 
redundant. They would not be the truthmakers of  possibility claims anymore: rather, it 
would be their manifestations, simply in virtue of  existing.  170
 According to the theory proposed here, to become manifested just is to become 
concrete, that is, spatiotemporally located. So, the first proposal is to modify truthmaking as 
follows:  
TM SpaceTime: A → ∃x □((∃y x=y ∧ Located(x)) → A) 
 Thanks to Lorenzo Azzano for pressing me on this. 170
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Since unmanifested manifestations are not, by definition, located, they would not make any 
proposition true, therefore avoiding validating BAD.  
 The proposal is not without its shortcomings and costs. In particular, by imposing 
the condition that truthmakers have to be located in spacetime to make the corresponding 
relevant propositions true, it makes it hard to see how there could be truthmakers about 
abstracta. Abstract entities are not located in spacetime—which means that they cannot be 
the kind of  entities that make propositions true. Yet, surely there are truths about abstract 
entities: that five is the successor of  four, that two is prime, that there are sets, etc. are all 
true. But if  the abstract entities that these sentences are ostensibly about are not their 
truthmakers, then what could make them true? Do we have to abandon the idea that every 
truth is made true by a truthmaker?  
 I would rather avoid rejecting Truthmaking Maximalism. Although I agree with 
Cameron (2019) that Truthmaking theory is not a theory of  truth—that it, it does not aim 
to tell us what the property of  being true is, nor what it is to be true—I find it hard to see 
what could possibly be the appeal of  truthmaking if  we give up up on Maximalism: how 
can we ‘catch a cheater’, for instance (Merricks 2006), if  the theory can have exceptions? 
Of  course, this is a far cry from a conclusive or convincing argument in favour of  
Truthmaking Maximalism.  I will just stipulate that ceteris paribus a Maximalist form of  171
Truthmaking is better than a non-Maximalist one. If  this assumption is not shared by the 
 A more interesting argument has recently been offered in the form of  a dilemma by Jago (2012; 171
2013), which fits perfectly our case. In short, his dilemma is built around the case in which there are 
truths which supposedly do not require truthmakers that are nevertheless necessitated by truths that 
do. The case of  my theory of  powers fits perfectly in this category, so if  Jago’s argument is success-
ful, we have a good reason to think that it applies to the case under consideration. 
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reader,  they are free to just avoid the problem currently at hand by rejecting Maximalism 172
and simply stipulate that MLEs are not truthmakers.  
9.3 Truthmaking Reconditioned  
Is there any option which does not involve rejecting Truthmaker Maximalism? Admitting 
that these sentences lack truth-value would be disastrous. Does TM-ST force us to provide 
concrete truthmakers for truths about abstracta? Even assuming that the project is feasible 
(which is dubious), its success would raise serious concerns about the status and role of  
abstract entities: if  they cannot even serve as truthmakers for claims concerning their 
existence, what theoretical role do they play? Are they not completely explanatorily idle?  
 I think that the solution offered, that is, to invoke the additional clause of  
spatiotemporal location, can be fixed and allows us to retain some version of  truthmaking. 
Its main shortcoming is that it makes it hard to see how there could be truths about 
abstract entities, if  these could not act as their truthmakers. It presents us with a dilemma 
with very unlovely horns: either there are no truths concerning the abstracta, or they are 
made true by concrete entities.  A similar argument could be construed with regard to 173
certain sentences about merely logical existents, such as ‘There are mere logical existents’; 
since these are not, by definition, spatiotemporally located, they could not be the ST-
truthmakers of  the claim. My (admittedly, sketchy and speculative) proposal goes as follows.   
 In order to formulate my theory of  being in potency, I admitted a primitive essence 
operator, □x. □x (p) was informally read as ‘p is true in virtue of  the nature/essence of  x’. So 
far, I have treated the operator as simply a device which selects a special subset of  truths. 
This assumed that p was already true, and that the Finean operator simply was needed to 
 They would have good reasons to think that Maximalism should be abandoned: Truthmaking’s 172
woes to deal with negative existential sentences, as well as universally quantified sentences in an in-
finite domain (where a substitutional account of  quantification won’t do) are well known. See Arm-
strong (1997); (2004), Molnar (2000), Beall (2000), Dodd (2017), Mumford (2007), Parsons (2006), 
Schaffer (2010), Simons (2005); (2007). Another particularly thorny case is the truthmaker version 
of  the Liar paradox: ‘This sentence does not have any truthmaker’. For discussion of  this case see 
Milne (2006); (2013); Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006); De Sa & Zardini (2006).  
 It should be clear here that the solution to this problem is going to solve also the first puzzle 173
presented above. 
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demarcate the special sentences from the rest. But one could also think that the essential 
operator has a more robust role: it makes the sentence true. We should not think of  the 
Finean essence operator as a compound of  some general notion of  ‘true in virtue of ’ and a 
general notion of  ‘the nature of ’—the operator is primitive (Fine 1995b, Romero 2019). If  
this is so, then not all sentences or propositions owe their truth to TM-ST: some are true in 
virtue of  essences.  
 Assuming that the truthmaking principle is not formulated in terms of  essences 
(contra Lowe 2006), we could maintain that there is a plurality of  devices and relations that 
bestow truth—and that the truthmaking principle (understood as the link between plain or 
qualified existence and truth) is just one among them. That is, I suggest that we could be 
pluralists as to why a proposition is true: it could be true because its (ST-)truthmaker exists, or 
because it is made true by the essence of  something.  
 Recently, Adam Griffith defended a pluralist theory of  truthmaking which might 
line up nicely with my proposal. He notes that:  
what distinguishes truthmaking pluralism from standard approaches to truthmaking is that it rejects 
an assumption made by most parties in the debate over truthmakers. It is the assumption that there 
is exactly one truthmaking relation and that it is a non-plural, non-determinable, and non-multiple-
realizable relation that holds between each truth (that needs a truthmaker) and its truthmaker 
(Griffith 2015: 1160). 
Rejecting ‘truthmaking monism’ and adopting, instead, Griffith’s domain-based 
truthmaking pluralism seems to take us in the right direction:  
Truthmaking Pluralism: For each different domain of  propositions D1, …, Dn apt for 
truthmaking, there is a different relation R1, …, Rn that serves as the truthmaking relation 
TR for the truths in D1, …, Dn. Relations R1, …, Rn are characterized or defined by the 
principles of  truthmaking TM1,…,TMn, respectively. 
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Of  course, I only distinguish two domains: those concerning spatiotemporally located 
entities, and those concerning non-located entities. Since truthmaking is not a theory of  
truth (Cameron 2019), that is, it does not purport to analyse truth nor explain what truth 
consists in, truthmaking pluralism does not entail alethic pluralism (the entailment seems to 
hold in the opposite direction, though).  
 We can, then, offer a first attempt of  our pluralist theory of  truthmaking:  
TM∨: A → (∃x □((∃y x=y ∧ Located(x)) → A)) ∨ ∃x □x A  174
Importantly, there is no spatio-temporal location constraint imposed on the second 
disjunct: some truths might hold in virtue of  the essences of  abstracta. If  it could be shown 
that all truths about abstract objects are true in virtue of  the essence of  abstract objects, 
TM∨ might be able to account for every truth. This, in turn, would allow us to maintain 
that there are no ungrounded truths floating free of  being. That is, while it seems 
implausible that TM-SpaceTime could do the work required to a maximalist  truthmaking 175
theory, TM∨ might be up to the task. It is worth to note that invoking essences would not 
compromise the task of  ‘catching ontological cheaters’ (Merricks 2006), for we are 
committed to the existence of  the arguments of  the essence operator (see Fine 1994; 1995, 
Teitel forthcoming).  
 Despite the fact that truthmaking pluralism does not commit us to alethic pluralism, 
some might feel uneasy about TM∨. Surely the link between Truth and Being cannot be 
gerrymandered and so inelegant! Some of  these worries will be due to the long-standing 
and deep-rooted prejudices against disjunctions, and as such they can be easily dismissed. 
 It is important that we do not read the disjunction as exclusive, or we would thereby deny that 174
concrete entities can have essences—which is a substantial thesis that we better keep out of  our 
principle of  pluralist truthmaking.  
 As Griffith (2015) notes, truthmaking pluralism does not entail a commitment to truthmaking 175
Maximalism.
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Others might be more warranted. While a thorough exploration of  these themes would take 
us too far astray, let me say a couple of  things that hopefully will help mitigate the 
queasiness.  
 Griffith distinguishes between strong and moderate varieties of  pluralism: 
  
Strong truthmaking pluralism says that there is more than one truthmaking relation and denies that 
the various truthmaking relations are unified in any substantial way... For the strong truthmaking 
pluralist, truthmaking would be disjunctive... According to moderate truthmaking pluralism, there is 
more than one truthmaking relation, but these various truthmaking relations are unified in a 
substantial way (Griffith 2015: 1161).  
He maintains that in order to be ‘unified in a substantial way’ it is enough that all the 
truthmaking relations play the same theoretical role in our metaphysical theorising, which 
can be captured by the following list of  principles:  
a) Truthmaking is the relation of  being true in virtue of. 
b) Truthmaking connects representation (i.e., truth-bearers) to reality. 
c) Truthmaking entails ontological priority: truthmaking grounds what is less fundamental 
(true propositions) in what is more fundamental (what exists).  
d) Truthmaking is not a purely modal relation (as necessitation or supervenience are). 
e) Truthmaking is an explanatory relation, i.e., an entity that stands in the truthmaking 
relation to a proposition explains the truth of  that proposition. 
f) Truthmaking is a relation of  non-causal ontological dependence. 
   
All of  the above apply also to our case: despite the name, TM∨ is more unified than a mere 
disjunction. A thorough discussion of  truthmaking would require a thesis-long independent 
treatment; however, the key point that I hope to get across is that there are ways to 
accommodate the theory I have developed in the last few chapters with (some version of) 
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the truthmaking principle: we can admit incompatible tropes into our ontology without 
thereby verifying BAD.   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9.4 Preserve the Letter at the Expense of  the Spirit?  
This leaves us with the last question, namely B: Is the strategy that I have sketched a 
legitimate move, or does it miss some key point of  truthmaking? This point was raised by 
Williamson (2013). Necessitism is, quite evidently, incompatible with the conjunction of  
TM and the denial of  the schema A →□A: truthmaking leads from the non-contingency of  
being to the non-contingency of  truth. He considers an amendment to TM analogous to 
the one that I have proposed:  
Someone might try to reconcile TM with necessitism by interpreting the explicit quantifiers in TM 
as restricted, say to concrete things... On the restricted principle, each proposition strictly implies the 
concreteness of  something whose concreteness strictly implies that proposition (Williamson 2013: 
401).  
Against the proposal, Williamson writes that  
[s]uch a reinterpretation preserves the letter of  TM at the expense of  the spirit. For on the 
truthmaking view at issue, if  an object o is a truthmaker for the proposition that this tile is square, 
then o itself––not its possession of  a property unnecessary for its being, such as concreteness––is 
sufficient for this tile to be square. For if  the required sufficient condition is just for a given object 
to possess a given property that may be unnecessary for its being, we need look no further than the 
tile itself  and its possession of  the property of  squareness. Thus the proposed reinterpretation of  
TM not only misses the spirit of  truthmaker principle but undermines its motivation (Williamson 
2013: 401).  
I will offer just two quick observations to the effect that his point is not very cogent. The 
first, at the price of  sounding pedantic, is that we do not need to modify TM as invoking 
existence and the possession of  a further property, as I did with TM-SpaceTime. We could 
also adopt a restricted quantifier. That is, we can introduce a restricted existential quantifier 
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∃L such that it applies to all and only spatiotemporally located entities, and thus reformulate 
TM as  
TM-SpaceTime*: A → ∃x □((∃L y x=y → A) 
But, more to the point, I think that Williamson’s argument has the feeling of  a slippery-
slope fallacy. It is one thing to admit that one specific property (concreteness, or 
spatiotemporal location) does the heavy-lifting in truthmaking; it is quite another thing to 
say that if  we admit anything but existence, we can completely trivialise truthmaking by 
allowing any property to complement existence (such as the squareness of  the tile, the 
whiteness of  the tile, and so on). Compare the case with McDaniel’s (2017) metaontology 
of   ‘fragmented being’, according to which there are multiple primitive restricted quantifiers 
in Ontologese, and the unrestricted one is just a disjunction of  them. Just because there are 
fundamental restricted quantifiers, we should not be allowed to think that any restricted 
quantifier whatsoever is fundamental. Analogously, we need not think that any property 
whatsoever could restrict truthmaking, but spatiotemporal location (or concreteness) could.  
 Why should we think that this is the case? A blunt and brazen answer would be: 
because spatiotemporal location is the key factor in the schema that I maintain provides the 
best framework for powers ontologies, while being square or white, as Williamson’s tile, is 
not. In other words, being spatio-temporally located is joint-carving or structural (Sider 
2011), according to my theory. This is not as question-begging as it might first seem. Note 
that even in the original formulation of  truthmaking it is not existence simpliciter that is 
involved—rather, it is existence at a world: it is true at w that p if  and only if  p’s truthmaker 
exists at w. Of  course, proponents of  truthmaking and possible-world talk will be quick in 
pointing out that existence at a world (just like truth at a world) is the more fundamental 
notion.   
 But why should we think that? The only reason I can see is that it allows us to enjoy 
the bountiful fruits of  possible-world semantics. It is in virtue of  possible worlds semantics 
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and its theoretical merits that philosophers have felt warranted in adopting truth-at-a-world 
and existence-at-a-world as fundamental notions. So why shouldn’t the friend of  powers 
avail herself  of  a similar move, with regard to the fourfold schema and spatiotemporal 
location? This is nothing more than a tu quoque, mind you. But I suspect it is a somewhat 
persuasive fallacy, in this dialectical context.   
 Here’s a less eristic way to make the same point. I want to say that the schema I 
have provided in §6 is the best conceptual framework for a metaphysics of  powers. i) If  this 
is correct, and ii) if powers really are the building block of  the world or at least they are 
among its fundamental materials, and iii) if  we think that there are no true contradictions, 
then the four-fold schema has to capture the structure of  the world, or at least part of  it.  176
If  the minimal metaphysics is the correct one, spatiotemporal location and essence have to 
be joint-carving, in Sider’s (2011) sense of  the word. I am tempted to say that the schema I 
have offered represents the minimal ontological categories that a powers ontology requires 
(at least in the sense of  the most general categorisation required to make sense of  the 
world) and that spatiotemporal location and flexibility are the two basic factors for a 
factored ontology (in the sense of  Simons 2012; 2018) suited for the needs of  powers, but 
properly defending this claim would sidetrack the main discussion excessively,  so I will 177
not commit to that claim. I will simply contend, for the purposes of  this discussion, that 
there are good reasons to think that spatiotemporal location allows us to draw a very special 
and privileged demarcation of  entities, in a way that not every predicate can. If  this is so, 
then the adoption of  something like TM-ST is not ad hoc as it might first seem. Similarly, if  
the Neo-Aristotelian paradigm in which Dispositionalism is broadly speaking situated is 
true, essences are very special, and therefore the essence operator should have a privileged 
 I want to say that the four-fold schema represents the minimal required framework for a meta176 -
physics of  powers, not that it is exhaustive. Plausibly, there will be other factors that have to be ad-
ded in order to map the structure of  the world. 
 It would require offering some account of  what, exactly, is an ontological category, and defend177 -
ing the controversial claim that entities do not necessarily belong to one. See Westerhoff  (2005) for 
an argument to the effect that categories are not necessary or essential (but note that his conception 
of  ontological categories might be too lightweight and pragmatic for my purposes, and so I most 
likely could not accept his argument for the contingency of  categories). 
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role in our fundamental ideology: so, perhaps, adopting TM∨ is not so unreasonable or 
gratuitous.   
9.5 Conclusions  
The interaction of  my minimal theory of  powers with truthmaking is not straightforward: 
there are problematic consequences that threaten the viability of  the theory; first of  all, 
claiming that manifestations exist simpliciter can cause troubles when we recognise that there 
are pairs of  conflicting powers, whose manifestations would be the truthmakers for pairs of  
contradictory truths. Secondly, if  we admit that all unmanifested manifestations exist 
simpliciter, and they are truthmakers, then a Dispositionalism grounded on the minimal 
metaphysics risks to entail that whatever is possible is also the case—a form of  Megarian 
Actualism which would contradict one of  the principles of  minimal metaphysics. However, 
these consequences can be resisted. We can tweak Truthmaking in a way that is consistent 
with the metaphysics of  powers by recognising that there are multiple truth-making 
relations that obey different principles: in particular, by recognising that in a quasi-
necessitist ontology such as the one envisioned by my minimal metaphysics, existential 
truthmaking cannot be concerned with existence simpliciter, but rather with concrete 
existence, and that essence is more than just a function selecting subsets of  truths, but it is a 
distinct truthmaking principle: the reading of  the essence operator given by Fine, ‘p is true in 
virtue of  the nature of  x’, should be taken seriously and the emphasis should be on ‘is true 
in virtue of ’ as much as ‘the nature of ’.  
 This tweak of  truthmaking that I have suggested sits quite naturally with the overall 
Neo-Aristotelian framework that the theory is embedded in: the key elements of  the Neo-
Aristotelian conceptual scheme (namely, the four-fold schema of  minimal metaphysics and 
essences) are those that do most of  the heavy-lifting. Developing a worked out theory of  
truthmaking goes well beyond the scope of  this dissertation: they will have to be the topic 
of  future work. However, I think that the suggestions presented in this section offer a 
promising way out of  the two difficulties mentioned above.  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Chapter 10. Independentist Troubles for Dispositionalism?  
In the previous chapters, the tension between two core tenets of  powers ontologies were at 
centre-stage: on the one hand, Directedness, the thesis that powers are for something; on 
the other hand, Independence, the view that powers can exist unmanifested. I hope that 
the tension has been dispelled by recognising the existence of  unmanifested manifestation, 
and the clarification of  their ontological status as non-essentially non-located entities—
mere logical existents.  
 However, the tension with Directedness is not the only trouble caused by 
Independence for the project of  Dispositionalism. There is the additional worry that 
Independence will interfere with the grounding of  necessities. Indeed, some philosophers 
(most notably Mumford & Anjum 2011; 2018) think that ‘cases of  necessity are never cases 
of  dispositionality’ (Mumford & Anjum 2011: 177) because the modality conferred by 
powers is sui generis and always short of  necessity. This is precisely due to the ineliminable 
possibility, supposedly granted by Independence, that powers are prevented from bringing 
about their manifestations. In short, they argue that Independence just is, or entails 
Tendency. Tendency would hamper the ambitions of  even a modest form of  
Dispositionalism: if  the minimal metaphysics of  powers that I have presented so far 
entailed Tendency, it would not be a good metaphysics of  powers for Dispositionalism.  
 So, if  we want to develop a metaphysics of  powers suitable for Dispositionalism, we 
better take a closer look at Independence, and find a way to grant the core principle 
without thereby compromising our ability to ground necessary truths; that is, we need to 
show that we can uphold Independence, which is part and parcel of  the minimal 
metaphysics of  powers, without having to buy Tendency, too.   
 The plan for this chapter will be as follows: I will first distinguish between two 
formulations of  Independence and pick the most apt for framing the problem (§10.1). I 
will then show that Tendency follows from Independence if  we accept that the (suitably 
formulated) principle is constitutive of  powers qua powers (§10.2-3). This presents the 
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dispositionalist with two tasks: first, she must provide an argument to the effect that 
Independence is not constitutive to powers qua powers, and secondly she must provide an 
alternative theory about the source of  Independence, in a way that preserves the 
principle’s key role in the metaphysics of  powers but does not hamstring the ambitions of  
Dispositionalism from the get go.  
 I will take on the latter task first, and present two models to explain the link 
between powers and Independence: Simple Degree Theory (§10.4-5) and Two-Tiered 
Degree Theory (10.6), and I will argue that the latter is to be preferred. Thus, whether 
Independence entails Tendency depends on what we take to be the source of  the former: 
the nature of  powers, or the fact that they come in degrees. Finally, I will turn to the first 
task: should we accept or reject the thesis that Independence is constitutive of  powers qua 
powers? I will conclude (§10.7-8) that, on the basis of  arguments from theoretical virtues, it 
is preferable to think that Independence is grounded in the degree of  powers.  
10.1 ‘Declare Independence’ 
I have often expressed Independence simply by the slogan: ‘powers can exist without 
bringing about their manifestation’ and, after settling for the Actualisation Route, 
‘manifestations can exist unmanifested’. To see how this idea might interfere with 
Dispositionalism’s project of  grounding necessities, we need to characterise the principle a 
bit more carefully. There are two ways to cash out the principle more precisely: one in non-
modal terms, and one in modal terms. Assuming that we understand what it is for a 
manifestation to be actualised according to the theory presented in the previous chapters, 
we can spell them out as follows:  
IND-A: For some power P such that P is directed at M, P is spatiotemporally located and 
M is not spatiotemporally located.  
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IND◇: For some power P such that P is directed at M, it is possible that P is spatiotemporally 
located and M is not spatiotemporally located.  
  
 So far, I have largely employed IND-A. However, it is not the most commonly 
adopted among friends of  powers  and there might be reasons for preferring the modal 178
version. The main one is this: some philosophers think that Independence is constitutive of  
what it is to be a power. For instance, Mumford writes that ‘the possibility of  unmanifested 
existence seems essential to being a dispositional property even though we can make sense 
of  a disposition that is continuously manifested’ (2006: 481. See also Giannini & Mumford 
forthcoming). If  this is the case, then it should concern every power whatsoever. IND-A 
merely states that some powers happen not to be manifested, so it would appear to have an 
insufficient scope: we should reformulate it using the universal quantifier. But extending 
IND-A to all powers would be absurd: it would entail that every power in fact fails to 
manifest. This would simply force the world to a halt. Since, evidently, this is not the case, a 
universally quantified IND-A is just false. This seems an exceedingly uncharitable argument 
to conclude that Independence is not a constitutive principle for powers, however: it’s too 
easy and too quick an argument for excluding that Independence is not part of  what it is to 
be a power. On the other hand, generalising IND◇ does not entail anything like the world 
freezing over—it would simply allow the possibility of  it happening, which, if  we believe in 
the legitimacy of  Shoemaker’s (1969) famous thought-experiment, should be conceded.  
 Secondly, some philosophers are attracted to Independence by an intuition about 
counterfactual states of  affairs, rather than the mere empirical idea that some powers do not 
act. What they have in mind is that even though a given power P has been successfully 
exercised, it might nevertheless have failed to do so. For instance, Mumford & Anjum (2011:53, my 
emphasis) think that ‘when a causal process is interfered with or prevented in the token 
case, concerning individual events, it may prevent causation from ever occurring. But, even if  
 For instance: ‘Powers can exist in the absence or in the presence of  their manifestations’ (Molnar 178
2003: 82; my emphasis). 
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it did not, it could have done’. Obviously, IND-A is not enough to make justice to this intuition: 
the fact that some powers actually fail to manifest does not seem to justify, on its own, that 
those which did successfully bring about their manifestations could have failed, too.  It is 179
hard to account for such intuitions, if  all we can say about Independence is that in some 
cases powers actually have failed to bring about their manifestations.   
 Why have I adopted IND-A so far, then? Apart from mere reasons of  convenience 
(we could spell out Too Much Possibility more perspicuously, having one modal operator 
less to worry about) the main reason behind my choice was due to the following worry. The 
modalised principle of  Independence is prima facie hard to square with the very project of  
Dispositionalism. According to Dispositionalism, the modal facts expressed by sentential 
operators such as ‘◇’ and the corresponding possibility talk in natural languages are 
grounded in the local properties, namely, powers. Powers ground global modality; but at the 
same time one of  the key principles that supposedly characterises what it is to be a power is 
formulated in modal terms. How can this work? It would seem that if  we try to paraphrase 
the possibility in IND◇ in terms of  powers, we end up in a regress similar to the one 
discussed in §6.4 with reference to the Williamsonian characterisation of  mere logical 
existents as contingently non-located entities, with the effect that in order to understand what 
it is a power we need to invoke a further power, ad infinitum. 
 I suggest that the analogy is not perfect, and the regress raising in connection to 
IND◇ might not be vicious. Perhaps, it is even to be expected.  The goal of  §6.4 was to 180
clarify what it is for a manifestation to be unmanifested—what is the mysterious property 
of  being in potency. This is a question we expected to make some progress with: what it is 
to be in potency was genuinely an obscure notion that we assumed we could get a better 
 Of  course, we can justify the counterfactual claim by supplementing IND-A with some other 179
principle — perhaps one invoking the fact that shared kind-membership entails shared modal prop-
erties (this point was inspired by a paper by Tom Schoonen). Still, the intuition matches much more 
naturally with IND◇. 
 Simons (2018) observes, in connection with Lowe’s four-categories, that one of  the most reveal180 -
ing symptoms of  the fact that we are dealing with bedrock phenomena is that it is almost impossible 
to avoid starting regresses. 
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grasp on. On the other hand, I have stated already in the Introduction that I take powers to 
be primitive and un-analysable. But if  we concede that Independence is supposed to be a 
constitutive part of  what it is to be a power, is it really surprising that it cannot be spelled 
out without involving powers? Aren’t we setting the bar too high, demanding that a 
(supposedly) key component of  what it is to be a power be elucidated without invoking 
powers? Compare the case with that of  essence. We can obviously ask for the essence of  
various entities, and demand an informative answer, but if  we are to investigate the essence 
of  essence itself  (or the essence of  the essence-operator)  we should not be surprised if  181
the answer cannot be formulated without including the notion of  essence itself.  But that 182
just indicates that the term is a primitive! Similarly, it could be argued that IND◇ will 
contain a modal operator to be reduced to powers because powers are primitively modal, 
and Independence constitutes their nature. So, if we think that Independence is 
constitutive of  what it is to be a power or anyway very closely intertwined with their 
natures, then we should not be too scared of  the regress: we should not try to analyse the 
notion anyway.  
 Does this mean that IND◇ is to be adopted by those who think that the principle is 
constitutive of  being a power, and IND-A by those who deny this, so that not only we find 
ourselves at a dialectical stand-off, but the two parties are talking past each others? I think 
that the standoff  can be avoided, and that the two parties can meaningfully disagree 
without talking past each other: IND◇ can be adopted even by those who do not think that 
it is constitutive of  what it is to be a power. To see why this is the case, simply consider that 
Dispositionalism supposedly grounds a logic as strong as T (Vetter 2015), if  not S4 (Yates 
2015) or even S5 (Kimpton-Nye 2019). Given T, we can derive IND◇ from IND-A very 
trivially: actuality entails possibility. So, given that there are unexercised powers and 
 I assume that the question is legitimate—not that a good answer can be given. See Hale (2013) 181
for the idea that operators have essences, and Wallner (forthcoming) for a prolonged discussion on 
the regress that ensues. Many thanks to Michi Wallner for discussions on this point. 
 I assume here, as I did throughout the dissertation, that essence cannot be analysed in modalist 182
terms. See Torza (2015) for a rigorous generalised argument against modalism. 
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unmanifested manifestations, it follows that it is possible for some powers to be 
unexercised. Therefore, in what follows, I will adopt the modalised version of  
Independence, and assume that it does not result in a vicious regress for Dispositionalism. 
The question concerns, then, the scope of  IND◇: those who think that Independence is 
constitutive of  powers will insist that it holds universally, whereas those who think that 
Independence is not part of  what it is to be a power will have the option of  denying this.  183
10.2 The Independence Problem for Dispositionalism 
Why should we be interested in whether Independence holds constitutively of  all powers 
or not? The reason is quite simple: those who think that IND◇ is a constitutive aspect of  
powers have to claim that Independence entails Tendency. More relevant to the point of  
this dissertation, if  Tendency holds, then powers are not in a position to ground any 
necessity, and hence the whole dispositionalist project is at risk. That is to say, I will suggest 
that the following hold: 
Independence to Tendency: If  Independence is constitutive of  what it is to be a power, 
then Tendency holds of  all powers.    
Tendency to Contingency: If  Tendency holds, then powers cannot ground necessary 
truths.  
In this section, I will try to spell out their reasons to think that these two theses holds. We 
can make their starting point more precise by formulating the view of  Independence 
advocated by those who think the principle is constitutive as follows:  
 Of  course, the disagreement is deeper and persists even if  both parties agree that Independence 183
holds necessarily of  all powers: questions about constitutive principles are hyperintensional. How-
ever, I will argue that the disagreement is plausibly reflected even just at the extensional level.  
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INDE: It is true in virtue of  the nature of  powers that, for every power P, it is possible that 
P obtains and its manifestation, M, does not (is not manifested).   
Given the way I have elucidated what it is to obtain or being manifested, we can 
reformulate the principle thus:  
INDE*: It is true in virtue of  the nature of  powers that, for every power P it is possible 
that P is spatiotemporally located and its manifestation M is not spatiotemporally located.  
The most fervent proponents of  INDE are Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum. In their 
latest book, they endorse the idea that:  
when there is a tendency towards E, without anything necessitating that it is so, E can be produced. 
It also means that there can be a tendency towards E, and yet E is nevertheless not produced, even 
though nothing was stopping it… The deeply tendential view that we offer suggests, in comparison, 
that the conditions can be non-trivially right for a certain effect, but that the effect still does not 
occur. This would not be because, as with the external principle of  tendency, there is some external 
additive interferer that prevents the cause from realising its effect. With the internal principle, there 
is nothing that prevents the effect from occurring, but still, it need not occur, just because the modal 
nature of  the cause is internally tendential (Mumford & Anjum 2018). 
They think that accepting that powers are essentially independent means that they are 
essentially tendential, that is, that they confer a sui generis kind of  modal force which is 
always short of  necessity. This is an endorsement of  Independence to Tendency. Powers 
cannot necessitate their manifestations directly, by pointing at them very strongly, as it were. 
But this is not all: there is a further, surprising consequence. According to Mumford and 
Anjum, not only powers cannot ground necessities on their own by pointing at them very 
strongly, but they are utterly incompatible with any kind of  necessity: ‘the possibility of  
prevention leaves no room for any kind of  necessity in causal production’ (Mumford & 
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Anjum 2011: 53). In a simplified slogan: where there are powers there is no necessity, and 
where there is necessity there are no powers. This is a surprising upshot, and it might well 
seem to be too quick and dramatic. That is to say, Tendency entails contingency. How do 
they justify these two theses?  
 Let’s start by considering Independence to Tendency. From INDE we can 
trivially derive the following: 
Universal IND◇: For every power P such that P is directed to M, it is possible that P is 
spatiotemporally located and M is not spatiotemporally located.  
Universal IND◇ denies the existence of  surefire  powers: that is, powers that cannot fail to 184
bring about their manifestations. Rejecting surefire powers, in turn, trivially prevents us 
from understanding necessary statements as those made true by the manifestations surefire 
powers. That is to say, Universal IND◇ is inconsistent with the ‘Naïve Dispositionalist 
Necessity’ thesis, which can be spelled out thus:  
Naive Dispositionalist Necessity: ‘Necessarily p’ is true iff  there is some power P such 
that its manifestation M would make p true and P necessitates that M is spatiotemporally 
located.  
We can read Mumford and Anjum’s arguments against Causal Necessitism (Mumford & 
Anjum 2011: §3) as an attack against Naïve Dispositionalist Necessity: ‘any causal process 
can be prevented or interfered with in some way as to affect the outcome’ (Mumford & 
Anjum 2011: 53). But how are we supposed to get from the denial of  Naive Dispositionalist 
Necessity to the more surprising Tendency, and from there to universal contingency? 
 By this I mean powers that could bypass or be unaffected by any opposing power. I am not sure 184
who used this expression first, but hopefully it is common enough not to need additional clarifica-
tions. See for instance Jaag (2014) and Williams (2019).
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Surely, even if  there is no causal necessitation, the effects (manifestations) might be 
necessary for other reasons. For instance, we can intelligibly reject Causal Necessitism and 
nevertheless hold that everything happens by necessity because logical Fatalism is true. Or 
maybe, even though every power to shatter the vase can be prevented, there is a vase-hating 
omnipotent deity that makes it the case that every vase is shattered miraculously, 
independently of  anybody’s causal contributions. And so on.  
 And yet, on more careful consideration, we can see that the stronger  thesis holds: 185
if  we adopt INDE, we have to conclude that powers are incompatible with necessity 
simpliciter.  According to INDE, it is essential to each power P that its manifestation M—186
the truthmaker for p— might fail to obtain. Assuming that p expresses a fact about concreta 
and hence cannot be true unless one of  its truthmakers obtains, it follows that if  there is a 
power for p, then necessarily it is possible that not-p. Formalising ‘P is directed towards M’ as 
P⇀M and ‘makes exactly true’  with ⊩ we obtain the following argument.  Note that I 187 188
take Exact Negation to be valid in case p is a singular statement that can only be made true 
by a very specific state of  affairs, and not something like 'something is red’.  
1 □P (P⇀M) Directedness 
2 □P (P⇀M) → ◇ (Located(P) & ¬Located(M))) INDE 
 Mumford & Anjum themselves sometimes seem to suggest that they reject only Naive Disposi185 -
tionalist Necessity, writing that ‘causation is consistent with there being necessitation in the world. 
But the claim is that causation does not itself  provide necessitation’ (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 
64). 
 Marmodoro (2016) has argued that powers, even of  the independent kind, can unproblematically 186
ground conditional necessity (although note that she takes powers to be more closely connected to 
counterfactuals than what I have done in this thesis). 
 Fine (2014; 2017; 2017b; 2017c) utilises his notion of  exact truthmaking only with semantic pur187 -
poses, as a way to provide the meaning of  sentences; he does not employ it in metaphysical or onto-
logical theses, such as in the Truthmaking Principle that I have been using in this thesis. However, 
this is due more to his animadversion against the ontological use of  truthmaking than with the 
formal apparatus itself  (‘truthmaking is fine as a guide to metaphysics as long as we junk the relata 
on the left, the things whose existence makes true, the relata on the right, the things made true, and 
the relation of  making true’. Fine 2017: 556). I take it that it is perfectly OK to adopt the technical 
apparatus of  exact truthmaking and using it for ontological/metaphysical purposes. 
 Mumford and Anjum (2011:117) spell out the argument less precisely, but perhaps more per188 -
spicuously:  i) If  DFa, then ¬□ Fa ii) By contraposition, If  □ Fa, then ¬DFa.
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Informally, the argument states that if  a power tends to the truthmaker of  p, then p cannot 
be necessary, because the very same power that tends to the exact truthmaker of  p entails 
(by INDE) that necessarily, P can fail to bring the exact truthmaker of  p about, thus making 
it possible that not-p is the case. If  something is possible because there is a power for it, 
then, necessarily, also its negation has to be possible. According to Dispositionalism, all 
possibilities are grounded in powers; therefore, everything that can possibly be the case is 
also possibly not the case: universal contingency.   
 If  Independence is essential to powers (and thus INDE is true), then there cannot 
be anything that fills the gap between powers and necessity. As long as something is the 
manifestation of  a power, then it will be contingent. Powers are incompatible with necessity. 
Where there are powers, there is no necessity, and vice versa. This seems bad news for 
Dispositionalism.    
 There are two possible reactions on the part of  the dispositionalist.  The first is 189
simply to deny INDE. Independence is not an essential feature of  powers qua powers: if  it 
holds of  a subset of  powers, then it must do so in virtue of  something special that 
characterises its members. The strategy argues that Independence is an important thesis, 
but it does not constitutes what it is to be a power, and therefore it does not necessarily 
hold of  all powers. This seems the most obvious solution, but it is not as straightforward as 
it might seem at first. First of  all, we need to first disarm the arguments in favour of  INDE, 
3 □P (P⇀M) → ◇ (¬Located(M)) &-elimination
4 (Located(M) ⊩ p) Exact Truthmaking 
5 (Located(M) ⊩ p) → (¬Located(M) ⊩ ¬p) Exact Truthmaking 
Negation
6 □P (P⇀M| Located M⊩ p) → ◇ ¬ p 1, 2, 3, 5. 
7 □x (p) → □(p) Essence to Necessity
8 □ (P⇀M| Located M⊩ p) → □ (◇¬p)) 6, 7. 
 I think that Vetter (2015) either does not fully appreciate the fact that these two strategies are 189
distinct, or is a bit on the fence about which one to commit to—there are hints in favour of  both 
strategies throughout her book.  
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and then offer (non-question begging) arguments against it. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, we need to do so without overreaching: that is, we must preserve the idea that 
Independence, even if  not constitutive of  powers qua powers, is nevertheless a very 
important principle about them (or a significant subset of  them). Independence played a 
central role in shaping the way we think about powers, and arguably played a key role in 
resisting the conditional analysis, for instance. We cannot simply reject it; rather, we need to 
restrict it in a principled manner which allows us to ground all the necessities we need 
without compromising our intuitions. In short, we need to deny INDE and Universal 
IND◇ without rejecting IND◇, nor downplaying its importance for many powers.  
 The second strategy consists in accepting INDE, but rejecting the argument offered 
above or, more precisely, it involves working around it. The idea is that we can show that 
necessities hold despite powers being essentially independent and tendential. In short, 
finding a way to sidestep Tendency and Mumford and Anjum’s argument, rather than 
resisting it. The idea would be that even conceding that powers are incompatible with 
necessities, Dispositionalism can still manage to ground all necessary truths in some indirect 
way. Since this latter strategy follows the path of  least resistance, it would be the most 
elegant and painless solution. I will consider this latter strategy in the next section, where I 
will argue that it is ultimately unsuccessful.  
10.3 Sidestepping, Formal Inadequacy, and INDE's revenge 
The core insight of  the sidestepping strategy is that, from a formal point of  view, we do not 
need to have any power directed at a necessarily actualised manifestation in order to obtain 
necessities: we don’t need to have a power directed to the truthmaker of  p in order to 
ground ‘necessarily, p’. The key is to consider the duality of  the modal operators: 
‘necessarily’ is equivalent to ‘not possibly not’.  
DUAL: □p   ¬◇¬p  
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Given this fact, we can then think  the grounding of  necessities can be perfectly orthogonal 
to Independence. All we need is to accept the following principle, which I have used 
throughout the thesis to characterise Dispositionalism:  
DNec: ‘necessarily p’ is true iff  and because there is no potentiality whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘not-p’ true. 
Even if  all powers are preventable, in accordance to Universal IND◇ and INDE, we could 
still have necessities in the world, simply by virtue of  not having any power involved with 
the truthmaker of  either p or its negation. If  there are no powers that would make true that 
not-p, then p is necessarily true: we don’t need to have any power directly involved in p’s 
truth (by tending towards p’s truthmaker). In this vein Vetter states that:  
[DNec] links necessities to potentiality indirectly, via possibility. Intuitively, necessities mark the 
limits of  the potentialities that objects have. More precisely, it is necessary that p just in case nothing 
has, had, or will have a potentiality to be such that not-p (Vetter 2015: 203).  
Unfortunately, DNec (and therefore sidestepping) is riddled with difficulties, as it stands. I 
will mention two (but they boil down to one and the same, really). First, it has the 
embarrassing consequence of  allowing that there are possibilities that are not grounded in 
powers, thus undermining the other core thesis of  Dispositionalism, namely:  
DPoss: ‘possibly p’ is true iff  there is some power whose manifestation, if  manifested, 
would make ‘p’ true.  
 230
To see how this is the case, we just need to consider axiom (D) □p →◇p. Vetter maintains 
that the logic of  potentiality grounds a modal logic as strong as T, which she takes to be the 
minimal model for alethic modality. We can obtain (D) from (T) very straightforwardly:  
1) □p →p        (T) 
2) p → ◇p      (T) 
3) □p →◇p    (1,2) 
This allows us to derive that something is possible even if  there are no powers whose 
manifestation would make it true, simply in virtue of  the fact that there is no power to the 
contrary, thus violating DPoss: if  p is necessarily true holds because no power is directed at 
the truthmaker for either p or not p, then by (D) it follows that p is also possible — and yet 
no power points to it, ex hypothesis. This would mean that we have to weaken DPoss to a 
simple conditional: 
Weak DPoss: ‘possibly p’ is true if  there is some power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘p’ true.  
  
I take it to be an undesirable result, although I do not think it is fatal. 
 The second problem that the sidestepping strategy encounters is more serious, and 
has been pointed out by David Yates (2015): we can derive contradictions from DNec. I 
have already briefly discussed his argument in §6, but it is worth coming back to it. Yates 
starts by assuming that i) the propositions of  mathematics are necessary and ii) that no 
powers are directed at the truthmakers of  mathematical propositions nor at the truthmakers 
for their negations. Thus, Yates concludes that there is no power whose manifestation 
would make ¬(2+2=4) true. Given DNec, we can then conclude that necessarily, 2+2=4. 
This is exactly how sidestepping was supposed to work, after all. Unfortunately, from the 
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same line of  reasoning it also follows that there is no power such that 2+2=4. Hence, by 
parity of  reasoning, we can derive that necessarily, ¬(2+2=4). Given T, we can then derive 
the contradiction ¬(2+2=4) & (2+2=4). 
 The argument obviously generalises to every use of  DNec to sidestep the 
incompatibility of  Tendency and necessity. Thus, according to Yates, a dispositionalist 
theory of  modality which includes DNec is formally inadequate. He suggests to invoke a 
weakened, disjunctive version of  it which allows something other than powers to ground 
necessities.  
 Vetter’s reply (Vetter 2018) is simply to reject Yates’ assumption that potentialities 
cannot be directed to mathematical (as well as logical) truths. Potentialities are not to be 
identified with causal powers, and they are abundant: there is a plenitude of  them. So, 
mathematical truths are not cases in which there is no power either way. She then argues 
that such plenitude is not ad hoc and can be justified.  But even if  we grant that there is a 190
plenitude of  non-causal potentialities, we must abandon the sidestepping strategy. DNec 
was invoked in an attempt to ground necessities while granting not only that there are no surefire 
powers (and hence Naive Dispositionalist Necessity is not viable), but also that preventable 
powers for p are incompatible with p’s necessity — that is, that tendential powers could co-
exist with necessities. The whole point of  sidestepping was to grant that some truths might 
be necessary even if  there is no power whatsoever directed at their truthmaker. But once we 
adopt a plenitude of  powers, this strategy collapses: for every truth p, there is a power 
directed at its truthmaker. If  INDE holds of  that power, then it will rule out that p is 
necessary, because the very fact that a power points to its truthmaker entails that it also may 
fail to bring that truthmaker about.  
 In short, sidestepping faces a dilemma: either it is consistent with INDE but entails 
that Dispositionalism is formally inadequate, or saves Dispositionalism but is inconsistent 
with INDE. The dispositionalist must therefore adopt the first strategy, and reject INDE. 
 I will return to some of  her arguments in the next section. 190
 232
As we have seen, however, we cannot simply reject IND◇ completely, for it is still a core 
principle for all friends of  powers.  
 That is to say, Dispositionalists have two goals, if  they aim to reject INDE, ground 
necessities, and at the same time grant that a more circumscribed version of  Independence 
is an important principle for powers:  
I) Show that Independence is not constitutive of  powers, and thus that Tendency does 
not essentially hold of  all powers.  
II) Restrict the scope of  Independence in a principled manner, so that it does all the work 
it is supposed to do and nothing more that would compromise Dispositionalism.  
I will start by attempting to formulate a theory that meets the second desideratum, and only 
then take a closer look at the dialectic between the defender of  INDE and her foil. 
10.4 Simple Degree Theory  
The most articulate attempt to meet the second desideratum is due to Vetter (2015; 2018). I 
cannot help but feel that Vetter’s treatment of  the issue is pulled in slightly different 
directions and that she is somewhat ambiguous between different solutions. So, I will 
present first an oversimplified toy-version of  her theory in this section, and then offer an 
improved version of  that in the next. I suspect that the improved version that I will end up 
presenting is what she really had in mind to begin with, but since it is not wholly clear, it 
makes sense to present it as a separate proposal.    
 Vetter’s starting point is ‘the simple observation that dispositions come in degrees. 
A champagne glass is more fragile than a tumbler, some people are more irascible, sociable, 
or loquacious than others, and a rubber band is more elastic than a cotton cloth’ (Vetter 
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2018: 7). Indeed, she suggests that the degree of  a power is among its identity conditions: a 
token power P is the entity that it is in part because it has the degree it has.   191
 Vetter’s idea is that Independence is grounded in the degree of  powers, rather than 
in their essence simply qua powers. Powers can fail to manifest not because they are powers, 
but because they are powers of  a certain degree. So, Independence is essential only to some 
powers, and holds not in virtue of  their being powers simpliciter, but in virtue of  being 
powers of  a certain degree. In particular, she thinks that there is such a thing as the 
maximal degree of  a power, and suggests that the scope of  IND◇ should be restricted to 
powers with non-maximal degree only. For convenience, I will refer to powers with a 
maximal degree as maximal powers and all the others as non-maximal powers. In short:  
Simple Degree: Independence is grounded in a power’s degree, and holds only for non-
maximal powers. 
Prima facie, the account meets the second goal: it offers a principled explanation of  the 
restriction of  Independence’s scope to some powers only. I think that the proposal of  
grounding Independence upon the degrees of  powers is very promising. Before turning to 
considering whether it is preferable to INDE, however, we need to flesh out the proposal a 
bit more. 
 There are two main reasons for thinking that powers come in degrees. The first 
(Wasserman & Manley 2007, Vetter 2011a; 2015; 2018) is that we make frequent use of  
comparative statements about the dispositional properties of  objects and the relative 
strength of  causal powers. This is to say that there is evidence that our disposition ascriptions 
 A central feature of  her account is that potentialities are the contextually-insensitive metaphysical 191
background for disposition-ascriptions. The power to break and ‘fragile’ behave like height and ‘tall’. 
In order to have comparative dispositional ascriptions (x is more fragile than y) there need to be a 
context-independent ordering: context then determines the cut-off  points for the predicate. So 
token powers are akin to determinates, and the type power to a determinable. It is essential to each 
determinate that it has the value that it has. The point is more evident if  we think of  determinates 
as points on a quality space: the identity of  a token point is given by its position on the relevant 
space. 
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are gradable: sentences such as ‘x is more fragile than y’, ‘the gravitational attraction 
between x and y is stronger than the attraction between x and z’, are common and 
indispensable, both in our theorising and our everyday interaction with the world. If  we are 
realist about powers, we think that dispositional ascriptions are grounded in them, and so it 
is most natural to think that such comparative statements are true in virtue of  powers being 
themselves ordered in the relevant way. Attributing a degree of  relative strength to powers 
also allows us to better understand complex causal interactions: it makes it possible, for 
instance, to treat powers as vectors  and think of  their interactions in terms of  192
composition of  vectors, as proposed by Mumford & Anjum (2011: §2). For instance, we 
can explain why electron x would move away from electron y despite the presence of  
gravitational attraction between the two massy objects simply by representing the two 
forces as two diverging vectors, and establishing that the resultant force causes them to 
repel each other because the gravitational attraction between x and y is weaker than the 
electromagnetic repulsion between them. 
 The second reason to think that powers come in degrees is that it allows us to offer 
a simple threshold theory of  the context-sensitivity of  disposition ascription. Disposition 
ascriptions such as ‘x is fragile’ are notoriously context-sensitive: we would not predicate ‘is 
fragile’ of  a plank of  wood in a china shop, but would probably do so if  we were trying to 
build a tank.  Orthodoxy has it that context-dependence is a linguistic matter, not a 193
metaphysical one: we can have context-sensitive terms or judgements, but not context-
sensitive properties; this means, firstly, that we ought to be careful before assuming that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between our everyday dispositional terms (such as 
fragility) and bona fide dispositional properties, and secondly that it is our semantic theory 
 Note that I am not saying that the vector model proposed by Mumford & Anjum is the only or 192
best way to understand every interaction between powers: I am happy to remain neutral on this 
point for the time being. For objections against the universal applicability of  the vectorial composi-
tion model, see Bird (2016). I am merely pointing out that it is a useful model at least in certain 
cases, and it presupposes that powers come in degrees. 
 We can make sense of  this if  we think that we ordinarily use disposition ascriptions to predicate 193
‘easy possibilities’ (Williamson 2000, Peacocke 1999, Sosa 2002). The context-sensitivity of  our dis-
position ascriptions is also, I suspect, one of  the main reasons why the philosophical community has 
been so obsessed with the idea that there is a very intimate link between powers and counterfactuals. 
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that should account for the phenomenon. Semantics deals with context-sensitivity by 
focusing on the shift of  truth-values, but in order for the shift to be possible, Vetter 
maintains that ‘we need to provide a metaphysical background, a context-insensitive 
metaphysics from which, by the right semantic mechanisms, the semantic values of  the 
context-sensitive expressions get selected’ (Vetter 2015: 80).  
 Of  course, the semantic mechanisms might vary a great deal; however, dispositions 
seem to be amenable to a very basic and intuitive treatment. The idea, very roughly 
sketched, goes like this: start with an ordered series as your background. By ordered series 
here I mean simply a collection of  entities among which an asymmetric and transitive 
relation R holds (say, major than, proper part of, or left of). Then, maintain that the 
context-sensitive predicate F can truly be predicated of  an object x if  and only if  x is 
located beside a certain arbitrary threshold t in the series. At this point, one can simply 
maintain that the location of  the threshold is determined by context and varies with the 
context of  utterance or evaluation, or that only a portion of  the ordering is to be taken into 
consideration in a given context by means of  restricted quantification.    
 Take, for instance, the predicate ‘fast’. The ordered series in the background is that 
of  the speed of  a body, measured, say, in miles per hour. Impose an arbitrary threshold for 
‘fast’: say, it has to be above the middle point of  the series. Then, depending on the 
conversational background, select the privileged portion of  the series that you are going to 
consider. Depending on the relative position of  the subject and the threshold, one can now 
say whether x is fast or not in that particular context. This treatment of  context sensitivity 
requires there to be a context-insensitive ordered series—the metaphysical background. 
Compare the case of  ‘is tall’ and height. The most natural thought here is that it is the 
degrees of  a power that allow us to order them appropriately: there is a rigid, invariant 
ordering relation between them, due to their degree.  
 I find both reasons to think that powers come in degrees to be convincing. 
However, some questions about this account linger. The first concerns the ability of  Simple 
Degree to ground a restricted version of  Independence:   
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Finiteness How can we warrant that there is something such as a maximal power? Why 
cannot we think that degrees come in an infinite series?  
Note that nothing in either of  the two reasons presented to accept the existence of  degrees 
of  powers suggests that we need to think that there is such a thing as a maximal degree. 
After all, there is no such thing as a maximal height, nor anything that suggests that there is 
a ‘longest vector’. That is to say, no argument to the effect that powers are graded entails 
that there must be a maximal degree: is there a ‘maximal force’ in physics?  If  we think 194
that the degree of  a power is just a primitive fact about that power, which we can represent 
by associating the power with a real number n, then there is no reason to think that there is 
such a thing as an upper bound.  
 This is not an objection per se to the Simple Degree, but rather an explanatory 
challenge: the dispositionalist who wants to ground Independence upon the degree of  
powers, rather than their nature, and in turn ground necessary truth upon maximal powers, 
has to offer a reason to think that the degrees of  a powers have an upper bound.  
 Vetter (2015: 89; see also 2018) offers an argument  to the effect that there are 195
maximal potentialities — that there is an upper bound to the degree of  powers. She first 
introduces the two following principles: 
a) Comparative regularities, such as y’s being F more often than x despite both being in 
roughly the same circumstances, provide good though defeasible evidence for 
comparative disposition ascriptions such as: y is more disposed to F than x is. 
b) If  x is disposed to F and y is more disposed to F than x is, then y is disposed to F.  
 Of  course, we do think that some vectors representing certain physical forces happen to be 194
capped at certain values (namely, the speed of  light). But there is no reason to think that force, in 
general must be similarly capped, and obviously nothing in the mathematical apparatus used to rep-
resent that suggest anything like it. 
 I discuss another one, based on her semantics for gradable disposition ascriptions, in the next 195
section. 
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Vetter then invites us to think about the limiting case of  a pattern of  behaviour: 
The limiting case of  colour is monochromaticity... Similarly, the limiting case of  a pattern of  
behaviour... is uniformity of  behaviour: being F all the times... a) and b) together push us towards 
accepting permanently exercised dispositions and according them a degree that is rather high, and 
higher than most non-permanently exercised dispositions... Might we just stop here ad take permanent 
exercise to be the maximal degree of  a disposition? Not quite. For permanence does not get to the 
modal character of  dispositions: a disposition might be permanently exercised for contingent 
reasons. Rather, we need to extend the argument for permanently exercised dispositions to a 
stronger case: the case of  a disposition that has to be permanently exercised (Vetter 2015: 89-90).   
Prima facie both principles seem reasonable. However, the argument is not rock-solid. A first 
problem for Vetter’s analogy is represented by one-off  powers, like mortality. Assume that 
the manifestation of  mortality is dying. In a sense, it is a maximal power: necessarily, every 
mortal entity dies. If  we think that one can only die once, it does not make sense to say that 
x is more mortal than y iff  x dies in more situations than y. Should we think that mortality is 
a maximal power, then? But surely, in that case it is false to say that x permanently exercises 
her power to die: there are a lot of  situation in which x has the maximal power to die, and 
yet she is not dying (leaving aside stoic-esque ideas to the effect that one is constantly 
dying). Assume that, on the other hand, dying is not a one-off  power: one can die (and be 
resurrected, presumably) a number of  times. Would a person x who could die infinitely 
many times (and be resurrected each time), once for every possible situation, count as more 
mortal than somebody, y, who only dies once, and stays dead? That seems counterintuitive: it 
seems to me that, on the contrary, x is in a sense immortal (compare: cases of  
reincarnation). And yet x exercises her power to die in many more situations than y does. 
So, Vetter’s line of  reasoning does not translate perfectly to every case.  
 A more serious problem with the argument is that this does not establishe that in 
fact there are such powers, nor that there could be. Just because I can imagine a necessarily 
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permanently manifested potentiality, it does not mean that it is possible that it exists, unless 
we adopt some form of  rationalistic epistemology of  modality, to the effect that 
conceivability (imaginability, etc) entails possibility (Chalmers 1996; 2002; 2010, Yablo 1993; 
2002). Aside from the well-known problems that beset the theory in general (van Inwagen 
1998, Vaidya 2017, Vaidya & Wallner 2019), there remains the fact that Dispositionalism 
does not sit very well with a rationalistic epistemology of  modality (Williams 2019: 118); it 
is much more natural to pair it with a thoroughly empiricist, a posteriori theory (somewhere 
along the lines of  Nanay 2010; 2011, Mumford & Anjum 2011, Strohminger 2015, Vetter 
2018). 
 Dispositionalism maintains that the modal space is determined by what powers 
happen to be instantiated: the initial distributions of  powers dictates what is possible. It is 
not easy to see why a conceivability theory would work against this backdrop (as opposed 
to, say, Lewisian Plenitude). Furthermore, more has to be said about the kind of  mental 
operation  that I am carrying on when raising the degree of  a potentiality, i.e. taking the 196
pattern of  behaviour to its limit case: what kind of  conceivability are we talking about? For 
instance, I can imagine that I am an inch taller than I actually am, and obviously repeat the 
operation ad infinitum. But obviously at some (possibly indeterminate) point, I will imagine 
something impossible: we can safely say that it is metaphysically impossible for a man to be 
infinitely tall. It is surely true that were I 200 miles tall I would be taller than if  I had been 
only 199 miles tall, but this does not mean that either scenario is possible. I do not want to 
dispute that, normally, necessarily permanently manifesting dispositions would have a 
higher degree than occasionally manifesting dispositions. What I want to dispute is the fact 
that there are or there could be such potentialities. So, I think that the question remains: why 
we should think that there is an upper bound to the degree of  a power? Again, this is not 
an argument against Simple Degree per se — it just points out that it raises a question that is 
hard to answer.  
 A number of  philosophers (Lowe 2008; 2012, Hale 2013, and especially Vaidya & Wallner 2018 ) 196
even insist that conceivability needs to be constrained by our knowledge of  essences in order to give 
us any information concerning possibility. This would invalidate Vetter’s argument, making it ques-
tion-begging. 
 239
10.5 Simple Degree and Necessity  
Simple Degree concerns the grounding of  Independence. According to the theory,  powers 
have intrinsic and primitive degrees, there is an upper bound of  degrees (maximal powers) 
and Independence does not hold for maximal powers. However, the reason why we 
wanted to restrict IND◇ in the first place was that we wanted to allow for certain powers to 
be grounds for necessary truths. The arguments presented in §§10.2-3 showed that an 
independent power is incompatible with the necessity of  the propositions its manifestations 
are truthmakers for. From this, it follows that, if  necessary truths are to be grounded by 
powers, they need to be grounded upon non-independent powers. According to Simple 
Degree, these are the maximal powers. Thus, adopting Simple Degree entails the following:  
Necessity to Maximal: If  p is necessary, then it is made true by the manifestation of  a 
maximal power.  
This leaves open, however, whether being made true by the manifestation of  a maximal 
power is also a sufficient condition for being necessarily true. That is, Simple Degree alone 
is silent on whether being necessary can be defined or is at least co-extensional with being 
made true by the manifestation of  a maximal power; in other words, it is neutral on whether 
the following holds:   
Necessity Equals Maximal : It is necessary for x to φ iff  (and because) x has a maximal 
potentiality P to φ. 
There are some reasons to suspect that Necessity Equals Maximal is not in good 
standing. In short, the problem with it is that, if  we take having maximal degree to be an 
intrinsic feature of  powers, then the fact that P⇀M⊩p is maximal leaves open, on the face 
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of  it, the possibility for there being another power P* ⇀M*⊩¬p. Were this further power to 
exist, then clearly it would be possible for ¬p to obtain, and hence p could not be necessary: 
therefore, the existence of  a maximal power would not be a sufficient condition for p being 
necessary. The problem is that it seems natural to think that the degrees of  powers, as 
described so far, are intrinsic features of  a power: whether a power has degree 0.5 or 0.6 
should be only about how it is, regardless of  the circumstances. But, in that case, it is not 
wholly clear how having a high degree is connected with the existence, and the degree, of  
another distinct power (i.e. the opposite power). By saying that a power’s degree is 
intrinsic,  I want to stress the fact that powers are local matters of  fact—they concern a 197
certain portion of  reality. So, it might well be that if  x is maximally disposed to p, then it is 
absolutely not disposed to not-p. But this should not, intuitively, concern whether some other 
entity has a power to a certain degree: it seems reasonable to maintain that the fact that x 
has power P to degree n is independent from that fact that y has power P* to degree m.   
 It is important to stress that this difficulty faced by Necessity Equals Maximal 
are not an indictment of  Simple Degree: Simple Degree is a theory about Independence, 
and does not entail Necessity Equals Maximal — so, if  the latter turned out to be 
problematic, it would not mean that Simple Degree is compromised. The proponent of  
Simple Degree simply has to offer a different, less simplistic account of  the link between 
being a maximal power and grounding necessary truths. The most natural amendment to 
Necessity Equals Maximal that avoids the problem is the following:  
 Naturally, it is very hard to offer a satisfactory elucidation of  the notion of  intrinsicness in an 197
Anti-Humean framework—and, especially, in a powers ontology. All of  the most common accounts 
are hard to transfer to powers ontology, for they were tailored for a Humean mosaic (see for in-
stance Francescotti 1999, Lewis 1986b, Marshall forthcoming). This is most clearly the case when it 
comes to the famous account offered by Lewis and Langton (1998), according to which a property 
F is intrinsic iff  it meets the following four criteria: i) Possibly, there exists a lonely F, ii) Possibly, 
there exists a lonely non-F, iii) Possibly, there exists an accompanied (i.e. not lonely) F, iv) Possibly, 
there exists an accompanied non-F. The Lewis-Langton account cannot work because, on the non-
Humean picture, no property can be lonely: there are necessary connections among distinct entities.
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Necessity Equals Maximal + No Opposing Powers: It is necessary for x to φ iff  and 
because x has a maximal potentiality P to φ & there is no other entity y that has a power P* 
to be such that x does not φ.  
Granted the existence of  plenitudinous powers, this principle seems perfectly able to avoid 
the objection briefly sketched above and offer a perfectly adequate theory of  necessity. 
However, one is left with the feeling that the second clause has been inserted by hand, as it 
were, to avoid the putative shortcomings of  Necessity Equals Maximal. Ideally, a theory 
that connects being a maximal power and the categorical absence of  opposing powers more 
intimately would seem more elegant and parsimonious. Can we do that by adopting Simple 
Degree?  
 Vetter (2015) at times seems to suggest that we can — indeed, she seems to suggest 
that being a maximal power according to Simple Degree entails that there are no opposing 
powers, and thus that Necessity Equals Maximal entails Necessity Equals Maximal + No 
Opposing Powers. She seems committed to the following theses:  
I) An entity’s degree of  power to φ is inversely proportional to its power to not-φ. So, if  x 
has the power to φ at maximal degree, then it has a power to not-φ to the minimal 
degree, which is 0. Having the a power to ψ to degree 0 amounts to not having the 
power at all  
II) If  x does not have a power to φ, then nothing else has a power to be such that x is φ.  
The first principle is rooted in the way in which Vetter cashes out degrees of  powers in 
possible worlds semantics. Vetter (2015: §3; Vetter 2018) cashes out the ordering source of  
Kratzerian semantics for gradable predicates as the modal force of  the property, that is, the 
kind of  quantifier that ranges over the relevant modal base (the relevant domain of  possible 
worlds). Keeping the modal base fixed, ordering powers according to their degree is 
equivalent to ordering the scope of  the associated quantifier. The minimal degree of  a 
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power will then correspond to the existential quantifier: something is minimally breakable if  
there is at least one world at which it breaks, while the maximal degree corresponds to the 
universal quantifier—something is maximally breakable if  it is broken at every world (more 
precisely: at every situation). Thus, the degree of  a contextually invariant series of  gradable 
predicates would be understood as the ratio of  possible worlds  at which that power is 198
manifested: x is more fragile than y if  x is broken at more worlds than y is—thus, x’s 
fragility has higher degree than y’s fragility if  it manifests more often. We could understand, 
then, the contextual sensitivity of  dispositional terms as a function that associates our vague 
dispositional predicate (‘fragile’) with a precisified modal strength.  
 Vetter is a realist about powers and a hardcore actualist, and thus cannot take this 
possible-world theoretic model as anything but a heuristic tool. However, she notes that 
potentialities and their degrees ‘should share certain structural features with the 
semantics’ (Vetter 2015: 85). I find it plausible that she (perhaps implicitly) associates the 
degrees of  real potentialities with the intension of  the contextually invariant predicates—
those with a precisified modal force: so, in short, with the set of  worlds or circumstances in 
which the power is manifested.  
 This would explain why she both thinks that i) there is a maximal degree of  powers 
and ii) why x’s power to φ is inversely proportional to its power to not-φ, and thus why 
entities having a maximal power to φ lack any opposing power to not-φ. Since a power’s 
having maximal degree is equated with it being actualised at every situation, at every 
possible world, maximal potentialities line up very nicely with the Leibnizian biconditional: 
p is necessary iff  p at every possible world.  And if  something is the case at every 199
situation, then of  course there is no opposing power, because the anti-extension is just 
empty (unless we are in a paraconsistent logic where extension & anti-extension can 
 As Vetter correctly notes, since there are repeatable dispositions, we should include cases or situ198 -
ations, rather than maximal worlds, in our domain. 
 Even more interestingly, adopting cases or situations instead of  possible worlds makes the pro199 -
posal very close to an influential interpretation of  Aristotle’s theory of  necessity, proposed by 
Hintikka (1985), according to which necessary events are sempiternal and continuous: it is necessary 
that p only if  for every time t, p at t. 
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overlap). But note that, of  course, in the possible world-theoretic model, the degree of  a 
power is definitely not an intrinsic feature of  a localised matter of  fact: it has to do with 
how all the possible worlds are.  
 However, it is not clear to me whether Vetter’s association of  the degree of  a power 
with modal strength is correct. I have both a general worry about the overall approach, and 
a more specific and technical issue with it. The general worry is how much of  the structure 
of  reality a hardcore actualist should read off  possible world semantics — surely, if  the 
dispositionalist is to admit that possible worlds are a useful heuristic tool (and it would be 
absurd for them to deny it), then representations of  modality via possible worlds talk must 
map onto some significant aspect of  the primitive phenomenon. However, it is hard to 
know where to draw the line: how much can we read off  from this representation? Surely 
not everything, since, according to the dispositionalist, there are no possible worlds, 
accessibility relations, and the like! Before these general issues are explored more in detail, I 
would suggest caution in reading off  a principle such as I) from the behaviour of  
quantifiers in PW talk. 
 This general worry can find its expression in a more specific difficulty. Simple 
Degree, as I have presented it, treats powers as quantities: this means, among other things, 
that it should be possible to calculate the ratio between two powers, e.g. determine whether a 
power is twice as strong as another, etc: ‘if  a and b are any magnitudes of  the same quantity, 
then a:b = r, (where r is a real number)’ (Michell 1999: 59). This is a stronger feature than 
just requiring powers to arranged on a weak linear order, which, strictly speaking, is all we 
would need to meet the requirement of  accounting for comparative judgements of  
dispositions. To illustrate the difference, consider this example: the Scoville scale arranges 
the spiciness of  chillies in a linear order. This allow us to say that a Carolina Reaper is 
spicier than a Orange Habanero. However, the scale does not allow us to say that the 
former is twice or three times spicier than the latter. Spiciness is not a quantity, on a non-
permissive understanding of  what it is to be a quantity (Wolff  2020). Note that treating 
degrees of  powers as quantities, as opposed to merely weakly ordered properties, is crucial 
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if  we are to represent interactions of  powers with vectors, as suggested by Mumford & 
Anjum 2011): the fact that Simple Degree allows to easily do that is a strong point in its 
favour.  
 Now the trouble with Vetter’s possible-world semantics for degrees of  powers is 
this: if  a power’s degree were equivalent to the number of  possible worlds (or better, 
situations) at which its manifestations obtain, then we could establish the ratio between two 
powers by dividing one’s set of  manifested-situations with another, as follows: Pa : P*b =  S 
: S*, where S = {w | M obtains at w}. The problem is that, for every two powers P and P*, 
there are infinitely many worlds where P manifests, and infinitely many worlds where P* 
manifests — so, no ratio can be established for any power, and no power can therefore be 
associated with a degree (the point is touched upon by both Vetter 2015 and Manley & 
Wasserman 2008, but not resolved). This difficulty suggests that associating degrees of  
powers with worlds where the power is manifested might not be that smooth or natural, 
and we should at least be careful in associating possible worlds talk with powers. If  this is 
the case, then also the reasons that Vetter presents to argue for I) are weakened.  
 As for point II), that if  x does not have a power to φ, then nothing else has a power 
to be such that x is φ, I think that Vetter’s justification would run as follows: assuming I), we 
know that if  x has a maximal power to φ then it does not have a power to not φ. Now, we 
need to show that nothing else has the power to be such that x is not-φ. We can do that by 
assuming that the power P* to be such that not-φ x is an extrinsic power for anything that is 
not x itself. Now, extrinsic potentialities are grounded upon joint potentialities (Vetter 2015: 
§4). But nothing can have a joint potentiality with x to the effect that not-Fx, for x has no 
potentiality whatsoever to be such that it is not F. Therefore, there cannot be any extrinsic 
potentiality to that effect either. Thus, No Opposing Powers follows from Maximal.   
 This argument is elegant and compelling. However, it might be open to certain 
counterexamples — or, at least, it might entail unwelcome consequences. The key passage is 
that if  x has no potentiality to φ, then it cannot have any joint potentiality to φ. The 
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principle seems intuitively attractive; however, it is far from self-evident, and indeed it might 
generate some troubles if  accepted in an unqualified form. If  we interpret it as stating that 
for every x and y, x and y have the joint potentiality to φ if  and only if  both x and y, 
individually, have the potentiality to φ, then the principle seems to be false: I do not have 
the potentiality to sing a duet of  Last Nite, but Alex and I do. If  signing a duet of  Last Nite 
with Alex can be analysed in terms of  me signing certain portions of  a song, and Alex 
signing other portions, then the issue is not substantial. If, however, there are irreducibly 
plural properties — that is, properties that cannot be analysed in individuals bits, then the 
view is in trouble (compare with Oliver and Smiley 2013 arguments for irreducibly 
collective predicates).  
 More charitably, we can take the defender of  II) to assume something like this:  
Contribute: For every x and y, x and y have a joint potentiality to φ if  and only if  x and y 
individually considered have the potentiality to contribute to φ.  
  
However, also this weaker principle is not without problems, and I am not sure that Vetter 
herself  could accept it: she admits extrinsic potentialities to self-identities of  mathematical 
truths, where in no way one of  the participants is contributing anything to the obtaining of  
the manifestation. Similarly, it would rule out cases of  collective powers that are not 
reducible to distributive powers.  Furthermore, we need to be careful in offering a 200
characterisation of  ‘contribution’ that allows for strong emergent manifestations. A plausible way 
to think of  emergent manifestations of  joint powers is that no contributor, taken 
individually, has the power to bring about the emergent phenomenon, which obviously 
cannot be reduced to the sum of  contributions by the entities that brought it about. Emergence 
 See Oliver & Smiley (2013) for examples of  collective properties that are not reducible to dis200 -
tributive properties. Similar points with regard to collective grounds not reduced to distributive 
grounds can be found in Dasgupta (2014) and Litland (2016). For instance, Dasgupta argues that 
haecceitistic facts are wholly grounded by qualitative facts, collectively, but that no subset of  qualit-
ative facts grounds a subset of  haecceitistic facts, nor we can say that some subset of  qualitative 
facts partially grounds the haecceitistic facts (similarly for distances in a relationalist view of  space-
time). 
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is an intricate matter, and I do not intend to dwell on this point much; however, it seems an 
unhappy consequence if  we were to deny the possibility of  strong emergence on the basis 
of  our theory of  modality.  
 These arguments have limited ambitions and are far from being knock-down: it 
might still be the case that No Other Powers follows from Maximal. Secondly, and more 
importantly, even if  No Other Powers is not entailed by Simple Degree’s Maximal, it 
might still be perfectly OK to add it by hand in the account of  necessities — for all I have 
said, Necessity Equals Maximal + No Opposing Powers might still be a perfectly good 
account of  necessity stemming from a Simple Degree account of  Independence.  
 However, when we add the feeling that No Opposing Powers has been added 
somehow forcibly to the explanatory challenge expressed by Finiteness, I think that one 
would be justified in seeking an alternative account of  how degrees of  powers ground both 
Independence and necessity. That is to say, I think that although Simple Degree is a good 
theory of  restricted Independence, and Necessity Equals Maximal + No Opposing 
Powers is a good Dispositionalist theory of  necessity, there might be a more elegant and 
satisfactory view in the vicinity. In the next section, I present my attempt at formulating 
such a view.  
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10.6 Two-Tiered Degree 
I think that the Simple Degree account is on the right track, and only needs minor tweaks. 
Here’s a simple proposal to improve it.  
 Assign a primitive degree n to each and every power, independently from anything 
else, so as to preserve the idea that degrees are a local and intrinsic matter. So far, this is just 
as Simple Degree. The key difference is that we will not directly ground Independence, nor 
necessity, in the degree of  powers; rather, we establish a global framework, which includes 
all the intrinsically graded powers. We then group together all the powers that have the same 
manifestation, and all the powers that have the opposite manifestation on the other side. By 
this I mean that we group on one side all the powers whose M is such as to make true that 
p, and on the other side all the powers whose M* is such to make true that not-p; we ignore 
those that are neutral with regard to the truth of  p.   201
 We then perform a simple addition (think of  it as a scalar addition) within the two 
groups, thus obtaining the total degree towards M and not-M. Call these values α and β, 
respectively. We can then establish the following principle:  
(TT) IND◇ holds iff  and because α - β ≠ α. 
This is to say that whether Independence holds of  a certain power is not a local matter that 
only concerns that very power. Rather, it is determined by the global composition of  
powers of  the same relevant kind. It means that we have no longer any use for the notion 
of  a maximal power in establishing Independence. We do not need to postulate that there 
is an upper-bound to the numeric value associated with each power: we can simply assign a 
numeric value to each power, and then check whether there is an opposition. If  there is no 
 This obviously presupposes that we can make good sense of  truthmakers for negative truths—201
which is far from clear. However, the assumption seems to be baked in the overall semantics of  
Dispositionalism which I have adopted without much discussion, so I will not raise the point here. 
It is obviously a very contentious, and potentially very problematic point for Dispositionalism. 
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opposition,  Independence fails. If, on the other hand, there is some opposing power, 202
that is, if  the resulting value is different from α, then Independence holds. Since the 
former case is extremely more likely (as the universe is a rather big place!) the fact that 
Independence holds for the majority of  powers is easily explained. There needs not be a 
greatest degree for there to be failures of  Independence and necessary truths—so, we can 
avoid offering an explanation of  the disanalogy between the degree of  a power and height, 
for the simple fact that there is no disanalogy. This means that we need not worry about how 
much structure we can read off  our possible worlds talk, and understand degrees of  powers 
as proportions of  possible worlds. Framing the discussion in these terms has the advantage 
of  explaining how a local matter of  fact, viz. a power’s degree, can entail anything about the 
existence of  separate and independent powers. Independence, as well as necessity, is a 
global affair. According to Two-Tiered, Independence and necessity are directly grounded 
in the global composition of  primitive, intrinsic degrees of  powers.  
 Two Tiered allows us also to to explain naturally and, I think, more elegantly than 
Necessity Equals Maximal + No Opposing Powers the relationship between failures 
of  Independence and necessity. The bridging principle can be formulated as follows:  
(TTNec) It is the case that necessarily p iff  α - β = α.  
The powers that satisfy TTNec naturally violate TT, and thus are not independent. Thus, 
the link between violations of  Independence and necessity does not need any additional 
further principle: No Opposing Powers is backed into what it means to be non-
independent.  
 A benefit of  this model is that it allows us to capture some of  the temptations and 
perceived desirable features of  the approaches previously discussed. For instance, we can 
 As will become clear soon, if  we allow for a series of  degrees without an upper bound, we do 202
need to pose some restrictions on how we sum those powers, for we want to avoid paradoxes of  
infinities. But limiting the ‘range’ of  the vectorial composition of  powers might be an easier task: we 
can perhaps avail ourselves of  the limits posed on causal action posed by special & general relativity. 
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capture the temptation of  adopting the sidestepping strategy as a limit case of  this account. 
All we need is to admit that □p iff  α - β = α even if  α=0. I think that we should accept a 
more restrictive theory, according to which ‘Necessarily p’ is true only if  α>0: there is 
something profoundly counterintuitive in the idea that p can be necessary if  there is no 
power either for it or against it, and indeed, if  we allow α=0, then it becomes easy to see 
how we can generate the contradictions that we mentioned in the section above: α - β = α is 
true if  α=0 iff  β=0, and therefore α - β = α   β - α = β. But it is still helpful to be able to 
express the sidestepping strategy in a perspicuous and rigorous way.  
 Note that there are two ways in which α - β can be equal to α. One is if  α ≠ 0 and β 
= 0, that is to say, if  there is no power such that it can bring about an M* that makes not-p 
true. The other way in which the result might follow is if  both have infinite value (of  the 
same cardinality). This raises a difficulty. In case α is infinite and β is finite or is an infinite 
of  the same or smaller cardinality than α (if  α= ω1 and β= ω1, α - β = α, and similarly if  α= 
ω2 and β= ω1, etc), the result of  the subtraction would be equal to α.  
 Thus, if  there is a power of  infinite degree, and the sum of  every power is only of  
finite degree, then nothing can stop the former power from manifesting. This lines up 
nicely with a certain pre-theoretical idea of  necessity that we have: necessity as an irresistible 
force, that we develop by projecting experienced cases of  overpowering (e.g. the pull of  a 
strong wind) and simply imagine its magnitude to be augmented infinitely, but obviously 
creates problems to the theory. Furthermore, if  we concede that both α and β were 
infinities of  the same cardinality, the usual paradoxes of  infinity would infect our theory of  
modality: α - β = α would make □p true, but at the same time β - α = β would make □¬p 
true, resulting in Yates’ formal adequacy objection.    
 This suggests that anybody involved in the Dispositionalist project has a clear-cut 
task ahead: she must prove that sums of  powers cannot result in infinite magnitudes. I take 
this to have interesting programmatic consequences for future research within the 
dispositionalist camp. Unfortunately, since my focus in the present dissertation is to provide 
a metaphysical foundation to Dispositionalism, rather than carrying out the project directly, 
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and that doing so would take up too much space, I will not undertake the task here. I will 
just note that the most obvious route to deny the existence of  infinite sums of  powers, 
namely considerations from the causal nature of  powers interaction plus the limited scope 
of  causation imposed by Special Relativity due to the finite extent of  the light cone, will not 
do the trick; although it might be plausible to think that we can compose vectorially only 
powers that are within one’s light-cone, this restriction would re-introduce to Two-Tiered 
the intrinsicness problems of  Simple Degree: we would have no assurance that there be no 
opposing powers outside the light cone. But if  necessity is monotonic, then we cannot 
allow for this possibility; it cannot be a local affair,  however large that locality is. It must be 
global.   
 I want to bring attention to a last positive aspect of  the Two Tiered account. It 
allows us to draw a distinction between two different versions of  Independence. Call these 
‘Extrinsic’ and ‘Intrinsic Independence’, respectively.  
Intrinsic Independence: all powers have a finite degree, and no sum/composition of  
powers has infinite value, either.  
Extrinsic Independence: not only is Intrinsic Independence true and hence there are 
no powers of  infinite degree, but also the world is such that for every power towards M 
there is at least one power towards not-M.  
The former principle would nicely capture the idea that every power, intrinsically 
considered, does not pass the antecedent strengthening test, and therefore does not 
guarantee its manifestation to occur: it is not all-overpowering. I think that this version of  
Independence captures quite nicely Mumford and Anjum’s intuitions—and in general the 
idea that all powers are, theoretically and in themselves, defeatable. I think that Extrinsic 
Independence alone is sufficient to justify the pull that many feel toward INDE: there is a 
sense in which Independence is constitutive of  what it is to be a power, if  we assume that 
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no individual or sum of  powers have an infinite degree: in a sense ‘when a causal process is 
interfered with…it may prevent causation from ever occurring. But, even if  it did not, it 
could have done’ (Mumford & Anjum 2011:53).  
 This latter thesis, on the other hand, seems to be on shakier grounds. It concerns 
the global distribution of  powers. This would be the thesis required by Mumford and 
Anjum to argue that dispositionality is constitutively tendential, in the sense that if  a 
proposition is made true by an entity that is the manifestation of  a power, then it is 
necessarily contingent. First of  all, it appears to be an empirical fact presented as an a priori 
truth. Secondly, no argument along the lines of  Antecedent Strengthening can be made in 
its favour: for it states that it is the case that for every POT[M] there is some POT[not-M], 
and not that this is merely possible.  
 I take Vetter, as well as any other dispositionalist who wants to ground necessity, to 
be denying Extrinsic Independence, when she admits necessities in the world, while 
Mumford and Anjum’s argument (including the antecedent strengthening test) are primarily 
concerned about denying the possibility of  Intrinsic Independence. Nothing about 
powers in themselves should make us feel inclined towards Extrinsic Independence or its 
negation: it is up to the non-Humean mosaic, as it were—the initial global distribution of  
properties. So, it is an a posteriori fact: epistemically contingent, and epistemically possible. I 
see no reason why we should accept Extrinsic Independence a priori. Of  course, this does 
not amount to refuting the idea that Independence is essential to powers qua powers yet—
arguments against it are yet to come, and Mumford and Anjum might be committed to the 
essentiality thesis independently. However, I think that the distinction allows us to capture 
the intuition behind Mumford and Anjum’s heavyweight Independence principle without 
having to incur in its pernicious consequences for Dispositionalism: we could admit that 
Intrinsic Independence holds of  all powers, but Extrinsic Independence holds only of  
some — those for which it fails can ground necessities. In one sense, we can say that 
Independence holds of  all powers, but this does not threaten Dispositionalism. Whether 
the other, stronger sense of  Independence holds, and of  which powers, is also an 
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empirical question. This should be a very good piece of  news for the epistemology of  
modality of  Dispositionalism: as we discover the universe around us, we find out whether 
certain propositions are necessary or not — more specifically, it makes it relatively easy to 
discover that propositions believed to be necessary turned out to be contingent, which 
seems to reflect nicely the scientific practice.  
 To recap: I propose that the best anti-essentialist proposal is that Independence is 
not grounded in the essence of  powers qua powers, but rather depends on the relationship 
between the global sums of  opposite powers. This can be captured by the following 
unlovely mouthful:  
TT-IND: For all powers whose manifestation would verify p, if  i) the vectorial sum of  
degrees of  powers for p is a finite value α>0 , ii) if  the vectorial sum of  degrees of  opposite 
powers for non-p is a finite value β>0, then it is possible that P is spatiotemporally located 
and M is not spatiotemporally located.  
I think that this is a plausible theory of  for a principled restriction of  the scope of  
Independence, compatible with the dispositionalist project of  grounding necessities, as 
well as possibilities, upon powers—that is, it is a plausible alternative to INDE. But having 
an alternative theory with more desirable results does not mean that it is the right one. 
Nothing of  what I have said so far entails that Independence is not to be thought as being 
grounded by the essence of  powers. We need to take a look at the dialectic between the two 
positions before being reassured that powers are not incompatible with necessity. 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10.7. Is Independence Essential to Powers?  
To recap, we have now two competing theories of  Independence. On the one hand, we 
have INDE, according to which Independence holds of  absolutely all powers because it 
holds in virtue of  the essence of  what it is to be a power. 
INDE: It is true in virtue of  the nature of  powers that, for every power P, it is possible that 
P is spatiotemporally located and its manifestation M is not spatiotemporally located.  
Accepting INDE entails that powers cannot, qua powers,  be grounds for the truth of  203
necessary claims—that Dispositionalism is doomed from the get-go, as far as necessity is 
involved. The modality involved with powers is sui generis and always short of  necessity.  
 On the other hand, we have Two-Tiered, according to which Independence does 
not hold unrestrictedly and in virtue of  the essence of  being a power; rather, it is grounded 
in the global composition of  gradable powers: a power of  finite degree can fail to bring 
about its manifestation only if  there is an opposing power. If  there happens to be no opposing 
power, then any power of  finite degree will necessarily bring about its manifestation.  
 The core of  the disagreement concerning Dispositionalism’s possibility of  
grounding necessities, then, lies in the source of  Independence: does it hold (when it does) 
in virtue of  the nature of  being a power, or on the total composition of  degrees of  powers? 
It is finally time to tackle this point head-on. I will start examining the main argument that 
can be offered in support of  INDE: Antecedent Strengthening.  
 The argument comes in a variety of  flavours: versions of  it have been formulated 
by Schrenk (2010) and Mumford & Anjum (2011). All versions share a common idea: 
contrasting the monotonicity of  necessity with the non-monotonicity of  powers (in some 
 It is important to add this claim, for obviously, in a sense, some necessary truths will be groun203 -
ded in powers even according to Mumford & Anjum. In particular, since essence entails necessity, 
IND◇ will turn out to be necessary. And it is obviously in virtue of  the nature of  the powers that such 
necessity holds. However, this is an essentialist ground, not a dispositionalist one: powers are merely 
the argument of  the essence operator, which does all the modal heavy-lifting. (Giannini & Mumford 
forthcoming). 
 254
sense). I will formulate a toy-version of  the Antecedent Strengthening that occurs, mutatis 
mutandis, at the core of  every variation of  the argument, and attack such toy version. If  my 
refutation of  this toy-AS is correct, then all arguments in which it is embedded will 
crumble, so I will not try to spell them out one by one.  We can formulate the Antecedent 204
Strengthening argument as follows:  
1. Necessity passes the antecedent strengthening test 
2. Therefore, necessity is monotonic 
3. Powers do not pass the antecedent strengthening test 
4. Therefore, powers are not monotonic   
5. Therefore, powers cannot ground any monotonic sentence or proposition 
6. Therefore, powers cannot ground necessities  
The antecedent strengthening test states that: if  A necessitates B, then A, φ for any φ, 
necessitates B. If  we understand necessitation as strict conditional, we can put this more 
formally:  
AST: □(A→B) → □(A, φ →B)  
Thus, Mumford and Anjum write:  
 Mumford and Anjum embed something akin to this version of  the Antecedent Strengthening 204
Argument in a more complex argument:  
1. Powers are causal powers: they are essentially involved in causal goings-on. 
2. Causal processes are essentially preventable. 
3. Therefore, powers are essentially preventable. 
4. If  causal processes are essentially preventable, Independence is essential to powers. 
5. Independence is essential to powers. 
The ASA is employed to prove premiss 2., and runs roughly like this:  
I. If  A necessitates B, then A,C necessitate B. 
II. Not (If  A causes B, then A,C cause B). 
III. Therefore causation≠ necessitation. 
What I say in the main text against ASA will work with this variant too, once we formulate the ‘total 
cause’ (Mill 1843) with the unrestricted existential quantifier. 
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suppose [water is H2O]. Then there will be various true conditionals for different values of  φ: if  this 
is water and Madonna is a man, then it is H2O; if  this is water and Barack Obama is President, then 
it is H2O... what we thus have is an antecedent strengthening test of  necessity. We put the claim into 
conditional form, if  we can, and then strengthen the antecedent of  that conditional to see if  it 
remains true under various conditions. If  the conditional is robust under antecedent strengthening – 
that is, if  it remains true for all strengthenings of  its antecedent – then it passes the test and is 
necessary. If  it fails for some strengthenings, we do not have a case of  necessity (Mumford & 
Anjum 2011:57). 
The first part of  the argument seems clear enough: necessary truths are monotonic. But 
what does it mean to say that powers are not monotonic? If  we adopted Naive 
Dispositional Necessity, it would mean that there are no surefire powers: that no power, on 
its own, can guarantee that its manifestation will occur, and therefore that the sentence 
made true by its manifestation will be necessarily true. So far, so good: Two Tiered is 
similarly committed to this point, as long as powers of  infinite degree are banned. But those 
who deny INDE are not committed to Naive Dispositional Necessity. According to Two 
Tiered, necessary truths are grounded in the fact that there is a (finite) power for their 
truthmaker, and that there is no opposing powers.  
 Presumably, then, the Antecedent Strengthening argument can be adapted to Two 
Tiered by thinking that, despite it being the case that actually there are no opposing powers 
(and thus that α < 0 & α - β= α ), the domain of  what exists could have been bigger, and 
contain the opposing power. So, it is not the case that, if  □(A→B) → □(A, φ →B) holds 
when A is the complete description of  the actual universe and B is ‘□p’, because φ might 
describe an extension of  the actual universe which contains an opposing power which 
falsifies α - β= α. The idea behind the argument is that just because, as it happens, there are 
no powers to non-p, it does not mean that there couldn’t be; but if  p is necessary, we need 
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to show that there could not be anything undermining it. So, powers cannot really ground 
necessities.  
 But this line of  reasoning begs the question. In the formulation targeted at Two 
Tiered, the antecedent, A, is a complete description of  the actual world (at least as far as it’s 
relevant for the truth of  p). As such, it will involve a universal quantifier. We have to think 
that the quantifier as absolutely unrestricted, or Two Tiered cannot guarantee the failure of  
Independence. So, it ranges over absolutely all there is. When we say that p is necessary 
because there is no opposing power, we obviously have to mean that there is no opposing 
power in the broadest scope available. Since, according to the minimal metaphysics, 
unmanifested manifestations do exist, they are part of  the domain upon which the 
quantifier ranges. But, in keeping with DPoss, we can assume that at least possibilities are 
dictated by the actual powers, and therefore by all the manifestations. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, we cannot add anything else to run the antecedent strengthening test: there is 
nothing extra that we can add to our antecedent, because it already incorporated absolutely 
everything there is. So, any further truth φ that we add will not be relevant to the truth of  p or 
its negation.  
  To this, Mumford and Anjum will reply that it is nevertheless possible that there is 
something more, and that is enough to get the argument going: ‘all that is required is that it 
is possible that the effect be prevented by an additive interferer’ (Mumford & Anjum 2011: 
63).  
 I do not think that this is a good reply. First of  all, note that in order to grant the 
possibility of  that extra entity to exist, we have already had to abandon the Dispositonalist 
framework and DPoss. The possibility that the additive interferer exists is not grounded in 
any of  the actual powers, because otherwise the domain over which our unrestricted 
quantifier ranged would have already included it, which would thereby make it false that p 
was necessary to begin with. So, it is not clear whether it is legitimate to appeal to the 
possibility of  that additive interferer from the Dispositionalist standpoint: it begs the 
question against the bit of  the theory that was not under scrutiny (namely DPoss). It 
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already assumes that actual powers do not ground all the possibilities. Compare the case with 
the necessity of  the laws of  nature entailed by dispositional essentialism: we cannot say that 
laws of  nature could be any different, had different entities existed, if  what is possible and 
necessary is dictated by the essences of  what there actually is (Ellis 2001, Bird 2007, and 
Fine 2005).  
 But assume per impossible that we add an extra power (to the effect that not-p), so as 
to falsify the consequent, and that this is not an illegitimate, question-begging move. In that 
case, the antecedent of  our conditional is a contradiction: ‘unrestrictedly there is no power 
such that not-p & there is a power such that not-p’. Assuming that we are operating in 
classical logic, ex falso quodlibet: for every proposition B, if  A & not-A, then B. But this 
includes the proposition that necessarily p. That is to say,  the conditional is vacuously true. 
 Obviously, the proponent of  the antecedent strengthening argument will protest 
that the conditional has to be non-vacuously true. But in that case, since the antecedent is 
contradictory (the antecedent already stated that unrestrictedly there are no opposing 
powers and therefore the extra interferer was added per impossibile), we would have to adopt 
a non-classical logic to account for non-vacuously true counterpossibles. But this begs the 
question against Dispositionalism again: it is not clear that Dispositionalism, or in general 
anybody supporting an ontology of  powers, should admit non-vacuously true 
counterpossibles at all (Vetter 2016). In order for the argument to go through, we need that 
extra premiss.  
 Therefore, at best, the Antecedent Strengthening argument is incomplete. At worst, 
it relies on a premiss that we cannot concede: so far, we have treated powers as only 
supporting intensional contexts, so that I have operated assuming that if  I have a power to 
φ and φ ≡ ψ, it seems hard to deny that I thereby have a power to ψ. A metaphysics of  
powers of  this kind will have a hard time grounding the sort of  hyperintensional logic 
required to make sense of  non-trivially true counterpossibles, which is most likely to be 
modelled using impossible worlds (inter alios, Jago 2014, Berto & Jago 2019). 
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 So, either we vacuously get the right result, or we have to substantially change the 
metaphysics  of  powers we have been operating with. But if  the way we have to make sense 
of  hyperintensional context (which would allow to account for non-vacuous 
counterpossibles) requires powers with impossible manifestations, then this is enough to 
undermine Dispositionalism without any need for the Antecedent Strengthening argument: 
DPoss would trivially fail if  there are ‘dispositions impossible’, to borrow the pun of  
Jenkins & Nolan (2012). But not only would such a metaphysics of  powers undermine 
Dispositionalism: it would most likely undermine also a number of  other projects that 
powers theorists are interested in, including the foundation of  causation, for it would entail 
that there are powers to do the impossible—that is, a strong violation of  the laws of  nature, 
in the sense of  Lewis (1981) and Beebee (2003)—probably, not a result that Mumford and 
Anjum are looking forward.   
 Either way, it would seem that Antecedent Strengthening argument fails. And, of  
course, if  there is no argument to the effect that powers cannot ground necessity, a fortiori 
there is no basis for the inference to the best explanation to the effect that Independence 
is essential to powers, nor any argument that embeds it will be sound. We have no reason to 
think that Independence is essential to powers qua powers.  
10.8 Avoiding the Standoff  
I have argued that the Antecedent Strengthening argument is flawed, or at least question-
begging, and thus it does not show that Independence holds in virtue of  the nature of  
powers qua powers. But this does not mean that INDE is false, and that Independence is 
grounded in the degrees of  powers, as depicted by Two Tiered. I know of  two arguments 
that try to show that Independence ought to be understood in terms of  degrees of  powers, 
both due to Vetter (2015; 2018). However, both arguments are built around the idea that 
there are maximal powers (I discussed them both in the previous sections: one is §10. 4 and 
one in 10.5). But I have argued that we do not need anything like maximal powers for 
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grounding Independence in degrees, and indeed that we have better alternatives. Why, 
then, should we believe in one rather than the other theory of  degrees?  
 I think that our best shot for deciding what theory of  Independence to adopt, and 
for ultimately choosing Two Tiered, is that a theory which grounds Independence in the 
degree of  powers rather than in their nature simpliciter is more theoretically virtuous than a 
theory accepting INDE and Tendency.  
  Much of  what I am about to say crucially depends on whether the theoretical 
virtues of  a theory are truth-conducive: whether the fact that a theory has certain merits 
(e.g. it is simple, elegant, explanatorily potent, etc.) warrants belief  in its truth. It is quite a 
common,  although not uncontroversial (see in particular Bueno & Shalkowski 205
forthcoming), methodology for theory choice in contemporary metaphysics. I do not intend 
to embark on a methodological debate here. I will just note that the idea that theoretical 
virtues are truth-conducive (or at least that they play the lion’s share when it comes to 
theory choice in metaphysics) is shared by the two factions I am here concerned with; for 
instance, Mumford and Anjum explicitly state that ‘often the best argument for acceptance 
of  a theory is its explanatory utility and power. Accordingly, we will proceed to show how 
the dispositional modality can explain a range of  phenomena in philosophy’ (Mumford & 
Anjum 2018: 23). The principle of  theory choice has recently been made quite perspicuous 
by Williamson (2007; 2016) and can be summed up, roughly, as by the following ‘argument 
from utility’:  206
1. Theory T is more virtuous than theory T* iff  were T true, it would explain the 
phenomena better than T*, were T* true. 
2. If  T is more virtuous than T*, we should believe that T is true rather than T*. 
 The paradigmatic case is David Lewis: ‘It is my view that the price is right, if  less spectacularly so 205
than in the mathematical parallel. The benefits are worth their ontological cost. Modal realism is 
fruitful; that gives us good reason to believe that it is true’ (Lewis 1986:4). 
 Confront: ‘We should think it true, because it would do a better job of  explaining things were it 206
true’ (Williamson 2016: 266).
 260
I want to claim that theories based upon the idea that the source of  Independence is the 
composition of  the degrees of  powers, rather than their essence, are better off  vis-à-vis their 
theoretical virtues; if  we accept arguments from utility, then this provides us with 
(defeasible) reasons to accept something like Two-Tiered rather than any theory based on 
INDE which accept Tendency, such as that defended by Mumford and Anjum.  
 Why think that Two-Tiered (and, in general, other theories rejecting INDE) are 
theoretically superior to INDE? It is always hard to determine which theory is better off  
(that is, it is always very hard to evaluate claims like the counterfactual in 1.), but I think it 
can score some points without being too controversial. First of  all, it allows to give 
Dispositionalism a chance—it allows us to formulate a theory of  modality based on actual 
powers. This is obviously question-begging; the whole point of  Mumford and Anjum is 
that we should not be pursuing Dispositionalism, because Independence is essential to powers. 
But note that the circularity is admittedly part of  the theory choice strategy based on 
Argument from Utility: the counterfactual that if  a theory were true it would explain the 
phenomena is used to justify the fact that a theory is in fact true. Begging the question is 
ingrained in the methodology, for better or worse.  Both those who accept Tendency and 207
those who reject it admit the existence of  powers in their ontology, and both are 
confronted with the task of  grounding modality. A theory which rejects Tendency and 
therefore gives (at least modest) Dispositionalism a chance is more likely to make powers do 
more of  the theoretical heavy-lifting: it will allow powers to ground modality, among other 
things, while a theory adopting Tendency will have to find something else to act as the 
source of  modality: thus powers would do less explanatory work, and presumably 
 This precisely the point that Bueno and Shelkowski (forthcoming) attack when criticising argu207 -
ments from theoretical utility. They ‘question both the extent to which scientific practice itself  relies 
on such theoretical virtue arguments (beyond providing pragmatic reasons for acceptance of  the 
relevant theories) and whether these virtues legitimately provide grounds for commitment to the 
existence of  the ontology that is thereby postulated’ (Bueno & Schalkowski forthcoming). In partic-
ular, they claim that the counterfactual premiss of  the argument ‘is an expression of  hope, rather 
than an articulation of  a plausible basis for thinking a theory true. That it would do a better job is 
thought to justify that it does a better job. That it does a better job is thought to justify embracing it 
as true. A conclusion that a theory is true, however, cannot be warranted on the basis of  a premise 
regarding its potential to do or to be something or other’ (ibid.). 
 261
something else entirely would have to be admitted in one’s ontology (not necessarily so: 
perhaps the same ontology plus another hardcore actualist theory of  modality, like 
Essentialism, would be enough). The point is not very strong, but it’s something.     
 Secondly, Dispositionalism allows us to ‘save the phenomena’ of  our pre-theoretical 
intuitions better than INDE. That is to say, Two Tiered, by distinguishing between 
Intrinsic Independence and Extrinsic Independence and accepting the former, allows 
us to both preserve the intuition that all powers are, in some sense, liable to being 
overpowered or contrasted, which lies at the heart of  the Antecedent Strengthening 
argument, as well as the rejection of  Causal Necessitarianism, without having to sacrifice 
our pre-theoretical intuitions that some propositions are necessary, even if  we think that the 
world is a powerful place (indeed, even if  we think that all properties are powers). Ceteris paribus, 
we should keep the more conservative theory with regards to our overall network of  beliefs. Of  
course, we could also offer an error theory to the effect that we are systematically mistaken 
in thinking that there is such a thing as natural (or causal) necessity, but as a rule of  thumb, 
ceteris paribus error theories are a cost: they are the last resource, to be adopted only if  we 
have a knock-down argument that rules out those beliefs, or we cannot find a way to offer a 
theory which grounds them. We sometimes speak as if  there is natural necessity. No 
knockdown argument has been offered against this claim, therefore a theory which allow 
the truth of  our beliefs is preferable to one which posits that we are systematically wrong. 
Again, this claim is very defeasible and can be disputed.  
 Finally, an epistemic point. Adopting Two Tiered allows us to modify some of  our 
judgements and beliefs concerning what is necessary: it invites a fallibilist epistemology of  
modality, at least as far as necessity is concerned. Whether □p is true or not will depend by 
what properties are out there in the world: we might start by observing that some power P 
is invariably followed by its manifestation M and hypothesise that there are no opposing 
powers and therefore the sentences made true by M are necessary — only to detect, in our 
empirical investigations, that there are opposing powers, somewhere. This allows us to 
revise our knowledge of  what is necessary based on our empirical findings — something 
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that seems to fit better with our scientific practices and the history of  science than the idea 
that we can know what is necessary once and for all a priori: namely, none. Note also that 
Two Tiered is more permissive — it does not rule out that, in fact, Extrinsic 
Independence is true and therefore so is Universal IND◇: after all, we might find out that, 
as it happens, it is really the case that for every power there exists an opposing one. But it 
also allows that this is not the case, and there are genuine natural necessities. This neutrality 
is to be preferred, ceteris paribus, I think: neutrality as to the particular modal truths should 
be a virtue of  a theory of  the foundation of  modality.   
 Admittedly, these considerations are far from being overwhelming: after all, it would 
seem that the flexibility of  the minimal metaphysics of  powers bites us back here, allowing 
us to accommodate a thesis such as Tendency which conflicts with the original aim for 
which the minimal metaphysics was developed, namely to ground Dispositionalism. 
However, these arguments from theoretical utility do contribute to creating some space for 
rational theory choice when it comes to INDE and Tendency: there are pros and cons to 
be weighted. If  the methodology has any merit, then there is hope of  making some 
progress. Indeed, if  the circularity at the root of  arguments from theoretical virtues is 
acceptable, Dispositionalism itself  would be the best reason to think that INDE is false. If  
we buy into the idea that theoretical virtues are truth-conducive, we have thereby some 
defeasible reason to reject INDE and give Dispositionalism a chance.  
 Suggesting that the question concerning the source of  Independence in the 
context of  the minimal metaphysics should be settled by looking at the theoretical virtues 
of  the two proposals, the main one concerns the ability to support Dispositionalism, a 
curious dialectical inversion has taken place: for the majority of  the thesis, I have developed 
a metaphysical base that should ground, but also constrain and shape the Dispositionalist 
theory of  modality. Here, on the other hand, it is the viability and independent merits of  
Dispositionalism that end up shaping the metaphysics underneath: the more attractive and 
valuable Dispositionalism as a theory of  the foundations of  modality is, the more reasons 
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we have to adopt the metaphysical picture that supports it, and thus think that 
Independence is grounded in the degrees of  powers.  
 This sort of  dialectic upturning is not surprising, considering the two desiderata that 
I have set out for the minimal metaphysics of  powers at the beginning of  the dissertation: 
on the one hand, to give Dispostionalism a shot; on the other hand, to be in a position to 
interact meaningfully with other brands of  powers ontologies and their applications. The 
compatibility and overlap with these other theories is obviously shaped and constrained by 
their merits: how much out of  our way we should go in order to preserve the necessary 
overlap needed to maintain a unitary framework among powers-based theories depends on 
what riches the various theories offer. Thus, in absence of  straightforward entailments or 
links, the way in which we should expand the minimal metaphysics of  powers will be 
dictated by what enterprises and applications are worth pursuing and their success.   
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Concluding  Remarks   
The goal of  this dissertation was to develop a metaphysics of  powers that satisfies two 
desiderata: on the one hand, it had to provide a good basis for Dispositionalism; on the other 
hand, it had to be suitable to support other applications of  powers to metaphysical 
problems, or be relevantly similar to metaphysics of  powers that are being used to pursue 
these other projects, in order to create a unified, common framework for Anti-Humeans of  
all stripes.  
 I have started by presenting two core principles that minimally characterise any 
theory that purports to be a theory of  powers: that powers are directed towards their 
manifestation (Directedness) and that some powers might fail to bring their manifestation 
about (Independence). These two are, prima facie, in tension: the metaphysics of  powers is 
threatened by an argument to the effect that its core principles are inconsistent. Trying to 
dispel this argument allowed us to gain a better understanding of  the implications and 
commitments of  powers ontologies. I have argued that Directedness, and in particular the 
idea that powers depend for their identity upon their manifestations, commits us to the 
existence of  unmanifested manifestation. This means that even if  the directedness relation 
is akin to Physical Intentionality, if  we adopt a powers ontology we will be committed to a 
whole lot of  entities: in fact, if  we accept Dispositionalism, we are committed to all the 
possible entities. It turns out that Dispositionalism has a very generous ontology, despite 
being a hardcore actualist theory.  
 This leaves us with the task of  figuring out what these entities are: in particular, it is 
unclear how unmanifested manifestations should be understood. After considering a 
number of  alternatives in chapters 2-5, either aimed at dissolving the tension (Marmodoro’s 
theory, processes ontologies) or providing an answer to it (non-actual entities, 
uninstantiated universals), I have concluded in chapter 6 that the best way to characterise 
the difference between manifested and unmanifested manifestations is in terms of  
spatiotemporal location and its essentiality. Taking these as factors, I have introduced the 
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following fourfold scheme which, I suggest, should be taken as the minimal framework for 
powers ontologies in general:  
The scheme is at the core of  my proposed minimal metaphysics of  powers, and allows us 
to elucidate what it means for a power to bring its manifestation about (that it, what it 
means to become manifested): simply to acquire a spatiotemporal location. On this basis, it 
becomes possible to be fairly liberal when it comes to the ontological categories that 
manifestations of  powers can belong to (§7): anything that is not essentially located in space 
and time can play that role, including particulars (akin to Williamson’s Mere Logical 
Existents), tropes, or states of  affairs. This has important consequences for 
Dispositionalism: first of  all, it allows the theory to account for de re truths about merely 
possible individuals: the rich ontological resources of  the minimal metaphysics thus help 
Dispositionalism to overcome the expressive shortcomings pointed out by Jessica Leech 
(2017).  
 Furthermore, the minimal metaphysics proved to be very apt at accommodating a 
number of  further theses that characterise more ‘radical’ theories of  powers. In particular, 
in chapter 8 I showed how the minimal metaphysics can without any difficulty be 
strengthened by the addition of  Productivity and Dynamism. Radicalising powers also 
yielded a number of  elucidations about the minimal theory itself  (§8). Attempting to 
incorporate Productivity, I have introduced and characterised a notion of  dependence 
from power to manifestation, distinct from the metaphysical dependence from 
Essentially Spatiotemporally located 
Concrete X ✓
Abstract ✓ X
Logical Existence X X
Spacetime points ✓ ✓
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manifestation to power. Powers are caught in a complex network of  dependency relations. 
Among other things, this means that they do not fit nicely with linearly hierarchical pictures 
of  the world: if  dependences track fundamentality, in a powers ontology there is nothing 
that is absolutely fundamental—nothing is perfectly ungrounded or independent.   
 Examining how to implement Productivity and Dynamism to the minimal 
metaphysics in relation to time also allowed us to tackle a problem for all powers ontologies, 
namely whether powers are compatible with any of  the existing theories of  time— idea that 
has recently been put in doubt (Donati 2018; Backmann 2018). In §8 I argued that the 
minimal theory is compatible with Eternalism. This is good news for Dispositionalism, 
insofar as it makes it easier to provide a semantics for cross-temporal modal truths, dated 
possibility claims, and account for the debate over the direction of  powers, 
 If  anything, the minimal metaphysics of  powers has proven to be even too flexible: 
even if  it does not entail Tendency—the thesis that powers embody a sui generis kind of  
modality always short of  necessity—in chapter 10 it emerged that it is compatible with it. 
This shows that the powers metaphysics here developed is not tailored specifically and 
uniquely for Dispositionalism, and it can act as the minimal common ground for all friends 
of  powers—chapters 8 and 10 showed that the way to best develop and enrich the minimal 
framework is very much up for grabs, and will depend also on the requirements and success 
of  its applications to philosophical problems.  
 Not all consequences of  the minimal metaphysics are favourable for 
Dispositionalism, however. Adopting Two-Tiered makes it considerably hard to generate a 
theory of  modality that cleanly preserves the duality of  the modal operators. It should be 
quite easy to see why this is the case: according to Two-Tiered, in order to ground □p it is 
not enough to make sure that there is no power whose manifestation would verify ¬p: we 
also need to make sure that there is a power whose manifestation would verify p — we need 
to rule out cases in which both α and β are equal to zero, as showed by Yates’s (2015) 
argument. This point echoes Yates’ proposal for ‘weak dispositionalism’, to a certain degree: 
the time theory of  modality offered by Dispositionalism will involve conjunctions or 
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disjunctions — DNec, as it is, is not enough. Dispositionalists will need something along 
the lines of   
DNec+: ‘Necessarily p’ is true iff  and because i) there is no power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘not-p’ true and ii) there is a power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘p’ true.  
But this is not all: there are more conjunctions and disjunctions on the horizons in 
Dispositionalism’s complete theory of  modality, if  we have to adopt something along the 
lines of  DNec+: it is far from clear that powers can ground all necessary truths there are. 
As I have argued in §6.5 and §8, the minimal metaphysics that I developed makes it hard to 
see how there could be powers directed at abstract entities, because to become manifested is 
cashed out in terms of  acquiring a spatiotemporal location, in the Minimal metaphysics that 
I develop, which clearly is not fitting for abstracta. This means that, unless the 
dispositionalist manages to show that all truths can be grounded upon concrete entities, she 
will have to limit the scope of  her theory to natural modality only.   
 A second troubling consequence for Dispositionalism is that non-modal essences 
play a central role in my understanding of  powers. If  we accept that essence entails 
necessary truths, we have to conclude that some modal truths are generated by essences—
in other words, that Dispositionalism is irremediably intertwined with a prima facie rival 
theory of  the source of  modality, Essentialism.  
 These two consequences are closely related. However, while each one is problematic 
on its own, taken together they might indicate a possible way forward. There are, I think, 
encouraging signs for a fruitful interaction between powers and essences. In §9 I exploited 
the fact that a primitive essence operator is part and parcel of  the ideology of  the minimal 
metaphysics for suggesting a solution to some troubling consequences that stem from the 
conjunction of  the inflated ontology of  powers metaphysics, Dispositionalism, and 
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Truthmaking. In order to avoid that Dispositionalism collapses into Megaric Actualism (the 
thesis that everything that is possibly true is also true), I argued that we have to restrict the 
scope of  the truthmaking principle to spatiotemporally located entities only, which in turn 
raises the question of  the truth value of  sentences concerning abstract objects. I have 
suggested that we should adopt a form of  truthmaking pluralism which takes the essence 
operator to be a kind of  truth-maker operator, so that truths (be they modal or not) about 
abstract objects can hold in virtue of  the essences of  abstracta. This is a tentative suggestion, 
that would need to be worked out in much more detail—it is one of  the main lines of  
future work that I intend to pursue.  
 In general, it seems to me that the most urgent and interesting direction of  future 
research related to powers ontologies and Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics concerns the 
relation between essences and powers. Essence and powers are the two core notions that 
spearheaded the Neo-Aristotelian renaissance in metaphysics  and yet they have been 208
largely treated independently—when they have been both employed (like in the case of  
Ellis’ Dispositional Essentialism) the consequences of  their interactions have not been 
explored in enough detail. I think that Neo-Aristotelians, if  they hope to present a viable 
and challenging alternative paradigm to the Neo-Humean mosaic, should look to bridge this 
gap. I hope that the picture I have presented here represents a fist step in this direction; 
although I stop short of  the thick of  things, the minimal metaphysics shows that, if  you 
buy powers, you have to take essences home, too. We cannot offer a satisfactory 
metaphysics of  powers without appealing to essences. This is not a bad thing—it has 
beneficial effects for powers metaphysics: the appeal to essences allowed us, for instance, to 
dispel the mystery surrounding the status of  unmanifested manifestations. I have not 
argued directly that the converse holds, and that if  you buy essences, you should also buy 
powers, mainly because I have not attempted to convince anybody that the world is 
brimming with potentialities and powers are preferable to categorial properties. However, 
insofar as theory choice in metaphysics is a holistic, systematic matter, by offering what I 
 Honourable mention to Mereological Hylomorphism: see Fine (1999), Koslicki (2008; 2018). 208
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hope is an attractive theory of  powers, I have contributed to the idea that we should all 
believe in powers. I believe that accepting powers brings benefits also to the Essentialist: for 
example, in Giannini & Mumford (forthcoming) I suggest that appealing to powers allows 
essentialists to establish a middle ground between constitutive and consequential essence, 
and thus capture the Aristotelian notion of  propria, which could be of  use in offering 
formal explanations.  
 I think that the results of  this thesis offer some reasons to think that we should try 
to do the same when it comes to our theory of  modality, and attempt to integrate 
Dispositionalism and Essentialism. I suspect that neither Dispositionalism nor Essentialism 
(Wildman forthcoming) as they currently are have all the resources to ground absolute or 
metaphysical modality, but a hybrid theory might yield an adequate theory of  modality for 
the hardcore actualist. Obviously, how to develop such a hybrid theory is far from being a 
trivial matter, and indeed the road to it long and full of  challenges: Dispositionalism and 
Essentialism as they currently are do not overlap seamlessly. Nevertheless, I think that the 
task is an exciting one, and that it should occupy both dispositionalists and essentialists in 
the immediate future.  At least, it is the task that I intend to devote myself  to for future 
work.   
 In this dissertation, I initially aimed to develop the minimal metaphysics of  powers 
to give Dispositionalism its best shot (while remaining in contact with other theories that 
make use of  powers), and this ended up throwing essences in the mix. In doing so, I did 
both more and less than what I originally aimed to do. Less, because the minimal 
metaphysics is not a perfect ground for Dispositionalism as the latter is currently 
formulated: it undermines the prospects of  grounding metaphysical, absolute modality.  
 However, if  the metaphysics I have presented here is independently attractive, 
perhaps I have also done more: perhaps the mismatches between the minimal metaphysics 
and Ambitious Dispositionalism were indications of  possible shortcomings of  
Dispositionalism, and the role that essences play in the metaphysics suggest a direction for 
further development for the theory of  modality. Hopefully, the minimal metaphysics presented 
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here will contribute to it, by providing a solid metaphysical ground upon which to build 
such hybrid theory of  modality.  But even if  the project of  an integrated theory of  209
modality were to turn out not to be feasible, the minimal metaphysics of  powers presented 
here could still act as a common ground for a theory of  the source of  natural modality and 
all others theories that employ powers. This would still be an important step: it is time that 
Neo-Aristotelians and powers theorists make sure that they are on the same page when they 
talk to each other, and ground all their anti-Human projects upon a unitary metaphysics. 
 I think it is an encouraging sign that both are best served by adopting a necessitist ontology, 209
which my minimal metaphysics is (for Essentialism, see Teitel forthcoming. For Dispositionalism, 
apart from the arguments in this thesis, see Kimpton-Nye forthcoming).
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Appendix: Abbreviations and Principles  
Abstract: a is abstract iff  it is essentially non-located. Formally:  ¬Located(a) ∧ □a ¬Located(a) 
AST: □(A→B) → □(A, φ →B) 
Aristotelian Universals: A universal F exists iff  there is some particular x such that x 
instantiates F. 
BAD: ◇p → p 
Concrete: a is a concrete entity iff  it is non-essentially located. Formally:  Located(a) ∧ ¬□a 
Located(a) 
Contribute: For every x and y, x and y have a joint potentiality to p if  and only if  x and y 
individually considered have the potentiality to contribute to p. 
Co-Location: M is actualised at t2 =df there is some xx such that xx are not co-located with M 
at t1 and xx are co-located with M at t2. 
DNec: ‘necessarily p’ is true iff  and because there is no power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘not-p’ true. 
DNec+: ‘Necessarily p’ is true iff  and because i) there is no power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘not-p’ true and ii) there is a power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘p’ true.  
DPoss: ‘possibly p’ is true iff  and because there is some power whose manifestation, if  
manifested, would make ‘p’ true. 
DYN: P dynamically brings about M iff  there is an uninterrupted process φ-ing essential to P 
that has M as its natural endpoint. 
DUAL: □p   ¬◇¬p  
Fine Sentence: Fine Sentence. It is essential to {Socrates} that it has Socrates as a member, 
but it is not essential to Socrates that he is a member of  {Socrates} 
Fundamental: If  x depends upon y, then y is more fundamental than x. 
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General Dependence: x depends for F upon y 
GENERALITY: Our disposition-ascriptions are ordinarily indeterminate under various 
respects.  
HOMOEOMEROUS: If  it is true that O was φ-ing between t1and t2
 
then O was φ-ing during 
any subinterval between t1 and t2. 
Identity-Existence: If  x  depends for its identity upon  y, then, necessarily,  x  exists only 
if y exists. 
IND◇: For some power P such that  P⇀M, it is possible that P is spatiotemporally located and M 
is not spatiotemporally located. 
IND-A: For some power P such that P⇀M, P is spatiotemporally located and M is not 
spatiotemporally located.  
INDE: It is true in virtue of  the nature of  powers that it is possible, for every power P, that P 
obtains and its manifestation, M, does not (is not manifested). 
IND-Process:  The manifestation M of  a power P is a certain process, Φ-ing. The power can 
exist without there ever be any Φ-ing.  
IND-Telos: The manifestation M of  a power P is a certain process, Φ-ing, which has a certain 
telos T. The power can exist and produce the process of  Φ-ing, which however might not be 
completed, and thus without T occurring. 
INTERRUPT: The manifestation of  powers can be interrupted, interfered or tampered with 
before it reaches its telos. 
MD: The power P depends for its identity upon the identity of  its (merely potential) 
manifestation M: P is what it is in virtue of  M’s being what it is. 
MD*: ID(P) depends upon/because/holds in virtue of  ID(M) 
Location Dependence: [Located(M)] depends upon [Located(P)] or, alternatively, 
[Concrete(M)] depends upon [Concrete(P)]. 
MLE: Mere Logical Existent. a is a mere logical existent iff  ¬Located(a) ∧ ¬□a ¬Located(a) 
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Naive Dispositional Necessity: ‘Necessarily p’ is true iff  there is some power P such that its 
manifestation M would make p true and P necessitates that M is spatiotemporally located. 
Non Modal: An entity is actualised (namely, concrete or abstract) iff it has powers as well as 
categorical properties, and is merely logically existent iff  it only has powers. 
One Existence: Existence is univocal—to exist is not said in many ways.  
One Quantifier: Existence is captured by the unrestricted existential quantifier (of  our most 
natural language). 
One Commitment: We are ontologically committed to everything in the domain of  the 
unrestricted existential quantifier. 
Operational MD: ‘IDx’ because ‘IDy’ 
P@T: x is part of  y at t iff  x and y each exist at t, and x’s instantaneous temporal part at t is part 
of  y’s instantaneous temporal part at t. 
Productive Dependence: x depends for its being spatiotemporal located/for its being 
concrete upon y 
PPI: Every universal must be at least potentially instantiated: there is a property universal of  
being F only if  there is some particular thing which is F, is potentially F, or is potentially 
such that something is F 
PRECISION: The metaphysics of  manifestations must be fine-grained enough to differentiate 
between manifestations that are the result of  distinct powers. 
Process Bearer Identity: The identity of  an individual process φ-ing depends on the identity 
of  the substances involved in φ-ing. 
Process Identity: the identity of  a process depends upon its telos 
Process Production: P productively brings about M iff  there is an uninterrupted process φ 
essential to P that has [Located(M)] or [Concrete(M)] as its natural endpoint. 
Weak Production: P produces M at t =df M productively depends upon P and M is actualised 
at t. 
Production-Existence: If  x depends for its being located upon y, then necessarily, x exists 
only if  y exists 
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PToken: The type/token distinction applies to processes. There are individual processes. 
PType: Processes come only in types. There are no token processes, no individual processes. 
Platonic Universals: A universal F is an abstract entity which exists necessarily at all times, 
independently of  being instantiated. 
RA: An object a changing from being F to being G =df  There is a time t such that a is F at t and 
there is a time t’ such that t<t’ and a is G at t’. 
RAD: An object a changing from being F to being G iff  there is a time t such that a is F at t and 
there is a time t’ such that t < t’ and a is G at t’. 
RAE: An object a changing from being F to being G iff  and (fully) in virtue of there is a time t such 
that a is F at t and there is a time t’ such that t < t’ and a is G at t’. 
RAD+: An object a changing from being disposed toward F to being more disposed toward F iff 
<(nPa⇀F) at t, (n+1Pa⇀F) at t’>. 
RAD++: An object a changing from being disposed toward F to being more disposed toward F 
iff  <(nPa⇀F) at t, (n+1Pa⇀F) at t’> & there is (the right kind of) process φ such that there is 
φ-ing between t and t’. 
Relational MD: R([IDx], [IDy]) 
Time-Independence: An individual power (token) might exist unmanifested for some time, 
but it has to manifest at some other (later?) time 
SCHEME: Manifestations of  powers must not be essentially non-located; Manifestations of  
Independent powers must not be essentially located. 




then O was φ-ing during any 
interval between t1 and t3 that has t1
 
and t2 as subinterval. 
Simple Degree: Independence is grounded in a power’s degree, and holds only for non-
maximal powers. 
TM: A → ∃x □(∃y x=y → A) 
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TM*: A → ∃x □((∃y x=y ∧ Fx) → A) 
TM∨: A → (∃x □((∃y x=y ∧ Located(x)) → A)) ∨ □x A 
TMP: Too Much Possibility. 
TM-SpatioTemporal: A → ∃x □((∃y x=y ∧ Located(x)) → A) 
TM-SpatioTemporal*: A → ∃x □((∃L y x=y → A) 
Token-Independence: A token power P of  kind O might exist and be forever unmanifested, 
but some other power of  kind O has to be manifested at some time. 
Trope Predication: Fa iff  i) a is located at R, and ii) F is located at R. 
TT: Independence holds iff  α - β ≠ α 
TT-IND: For all powers whose manifestation would verify p, if  i) the vectorial sum of  degrees 
of  powers for p is a finite value α>0 , ii) if  the vectorial sum of  degrees of  opposite powers 
for non-p is a finite value β>0, then it is possible that P is spatiotemporally located and M is 
not spatiotemporally located.  
TTNec: Independence does not hold and it is the case that necessarily p iff  α - β = α 
Type-Independence: There could be a kind of  powers that never manifest. ‘There is type-
independence iff  a disposition trope of  kind O can exist without a manifestation of  any 
trope of  kind P existing’ (Molnar 2003: 82).  
Universal IND◇: For every power P such that P⇀M, it is possible that P is spatiotemporally 
located and M is not spatiotemporally located. 
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